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DIMENSION:
THEOLOGY IN CHURCH AND WORLD

Volume 4 Fall 1966 Number 1

J. Randall Nichols, *Editor*

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THE volume enumeration for this issue resumes the proper sequence after an erroneously numbered issue in the spring of 1966. Instead of Volume I, Number 1, that issue should have appeared Volume III, Number 2, with Volume III, Number 1 nonexistent.

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DIMENSION

THEOLOGY IN CHURCH AND WORLD

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FALSIFICATION AND A PERMISSIBLE BELIEF IN GOD

BY JAMES L. MUYSKENS

I. THE FALSIFICATION DILEMMA

THIS essay discusses the question whether or not it is rationally permissible for an individual to live on the basis of a putative conviction of God's "existence." The thesis to be presented is that it is rationally permissible and furthermore it is a live and intellectually satisfying option.

This presentation is for apologetic interest—an attempt to demonstrate the validity of the above proposition to those who are not persuaded of its validity. He who lives on the conviction of God's existence has no personal interest in this problem. To raise this question for him is as senseless as asking if it is rationally permissible to live on the basis of his conviction that his wife exists. In either case, the existence of the other is so much a part of the meaning of his thoughts and the direction of his activity that it has seemingly passed beyond the necessity of scrutiny. In fact, to question it seems absurd.

But this points out the dilemma. Obviously not everyone is so strongly convinced about the reality of God. If *all* that can be said is that some people are aware of God having to do with them and others are not, there seems to be an impossible gap between the two camps. This seemingly impossible gap is the concern of this paper. We are thus presenting an apologetic and dealing with a problem of the philosophically literate "unbeliever," namely the rational credentials of a belief in God.

Development of this thesis must begin by a consideration of the falsification debate. This challenge is best presented by Antony Flew

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and clearly expressed in an oft-cited parable. Flew sees Christianity—a religion which asserts God's existence—as wrong and dangerous. The difficulty of religious language, he says, is that religious expressions appear to be empirical (and therefore arguable) statements, yet they are not. He offers the following parable as an illustration of this.

> Once upon a time two explorers came upon a clearing in the jungle. In the clearing were growing many flowers and many weeds. One explorer says, "Some gardener must tend this plot." The other disagrees, "There is no gardener." So they pitch their tents and set a watch. No gardener is ever seen. "But perhaps he is an invisible gardener." So they set up a barbed-wire fence. They electrify it. They patrol with bloodhounds. (For they remember how H. G. Wells' *The Invisible Man* could be both smelt and touched though he could not be seen.) But no shrieks ever suggest that some intruder has received a shock. No movements of the wire ever betray an invisible climber. The bloodhounds never give cry. Yet still the Believer is not convinced. "But there is a gardener, invisible, intangible, insensible to electric shocks, a gardener who has no scent and makes no sound, a gardener who comes secretly to look after the garden which he loves." At last the Sceptic despairs, "But what remains of your original assertion? Just how does what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?"[1]

The question Flew is raising is: "What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or the existence of, God?"[2] The premise upon which this question is based is this: If there is nothing which a putative assertion denies, then there is nothing which it asserts either—thus it is not really an assertion. What starts out as a genuine assertion is reduced to a mere picture preference if we remove any possibility of putting it to an empirical test. Thus in Flew's paradigm we see the religious claim of God's existence dying the death of a thousand qualifications.

Before we see how philosophers and theologians interested in defending religious language have answered this formidable challenge by Flew, it would be well to see this demand for falsifiability within its developmental context. The universe of discourse is an empiricism allegedly based on Hume's empiricism and his distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas. From this basis and following the work of Ernst Mach, metaphysics (and theology) are in trouble, for the attempt is to "reduce" everything to things that can be observed. In this line of thought, M. Schlick "reduced" all meaning to scientific meaning when he claimed that "The meaning of a Proposition is the method of its Verification."[3] A. J. Ayer tried to apply the method of verification to the entire enterprise of philosophy. From this perspective, his response to the metaphysician was simply that "no statement which refers to a 'reality' transcending the limits of all possible sense experience can possibly have any literal significance; from which it follows that the labours of those who have striven to describe such a reality have all been devoted to the production of nonsense."[4] Of course if metaphysics is out so is theology which is but a species of metaphysics. "The conclusion of the positivist that he has eliminated metaphysics follows logically from his account of meaning and his analysis of metaphysical claims as being neither analytic nor empirically verifiable."[5]

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[1] Antony Flew & Alasdair MacIntyre, *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, p. 96.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

R. Carnap substituted the word "confirmation" for "verification." This "confirmability requirement did not insist upon either complete verification or actual confirmation (incomplete verification), but simply upon possible (logically possible) verification."[6] Carnap's confirmability requirement is very close to Karl Popper's falsifiability criterion. Popper claims that a statement has empirical content if it is possible to refute it by experience. Some data must be incompatible with it. "If a statement forbids nothing, is compatible with everything, it says nothing."[7] His criterion is a test for empirical meaningfulness. If nothing is incompatible with the truth of a purported statement, then the statement asserts nothing.

With this test, reputable philosophers today no longer arbitrarily reject metaphysics and theology. Thus the door of dialogue is again open, even if only an inch. The questioning of philosophers now is whether or not metaphysical and theological language has any "cognitive significance." As we have seen in Flew's challenge, the problem seems to be that theological statements *are compatible* with any state of affairs and hence (from the perspective of the positivist) devoid of factual meaning.

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[3] William T. Blackstone, *The Problem of Religious Knowledge*, p. 6.

[4] A. J. Ayer, *Language Truth and Logic*, p. 34.

[5] Blackstone, p. 10. The term "positivist" as used in this paper simply refers to those standing in the empirical verifiability/falsifiability tradition. Though not always appreciated by some members of this group, it seems to be the most adequate one-word description of the position.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

To this challenge we must now respond. First of all we can either accept or reject the premise, i.e., that the meaning of an assertion must always be equivalent to the *perceptible* events relevant to its verification or falsification. If the premises are rejected, alternative premises must be given and vindicated. If Flew's premise is accepted, there are several logical alternatives open to the believer each with its champions.

> These alternatives are the following: one may assert that theological statements are relevant to falsification but never conclusively falsifiable; one may hold that they are wholly unfalsifiable because they are not assertions at all; one may take the view that they are assertions which can be falsified in principle and in practice; or one may claim that they are falsifiable in principle but not in practice.[8]

The responses of Basil Mitchell who chooses the first approach, R. M. Hare with his *bliks* following the second alternative, and John Hick and Ian Crombie by the method of eschatological verification developing the fourth possible approach are well known. Rather than discussing each of these attempts—a subject which has been sufficiently analyzed in the literature—we shall move first to the development of the fourth alternative following Hick and Crombie. Secondly, we shall discuss the problem of the rational permissibleness of a theistic belief in a completely different context.

II. ESCHATOLOGICAL VERIFICATION

The first order of business must be to determine whether or not the existence of God in the context of Christian faith must have factual status. J. Hick is correct in claiming that religiously and philosophically the prime question concerning the language of the Judaic-Christian religion is whether, or in what sense, such core statements as "God created the universe," and "God loves mankind" make *factual* assertions, and how these are related to the assertions of everyday life and the physical sciences.

If it is true that the existence of God must have cognitive significance for the believer, it is also obvious that God cannot be observed with the senses. A believer is in the position in which he must assert the factual status of his belief that God exists, etc., yet this cannot be *sensually* observable fact. Language itself seems to be geared most easily to the sensually observable realm. Thus the believer often speaks of what he claims to be unobservable fact in terms of the language of observable fact.

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[8] Frederick Ferre, *Language, Logic and God*, p. 51.

Assertions about unobservable fact may well say nothing which will assert or deny observable facts. Both the believer and the unbeliever will no doubt expect the very same physical events to take place. Thus in terms of Flew's parable it seems that talk about God—at least about God as a being having factual status and yet whose activity is unobservable—is meaningless. There are no immediately perceptible events relevant to its verification or falsification.

We say *immediately* perceptible because there is a way of meeting this demand *if* one will grant the possibility of life after death to be used as a premise. With the addition of this premise it has been attempted to demonstrate that Christian religious language can be meaningful on Flew's ground. Eschatological verification points to a perceptible event in the future which would be relevant to verification or falsification of belief in God.

In following through on Flew's ground we see that the theory of eschatological verification does *in principle* make claims of God's existence verifiable and thus cognitively meaningful (granted the right to use the possibility of life after death as a premise). The fact that the position demands that one be in a certain position as a prerequisite of verification is not *in itself* a weakness, for many times it is necessary to put oneself in a certain position or to perform some particular operation as a prerequisite of verification.

Having tried to argue from Flew's premise and also upholding the requirement of the cognitive significance of God's existence, here is where we seem to have come out: We saw four possible alternatives for meeting the falsification challenge on its ground. Alternative number one seems only to pay lip service to the falsifiability principle and thus was passed over quickly. Alternative number two is unacceptable in its denial of the cognitive significance of the existence of God—this view is hardly the usual Christian understanding. Making sense of this understanding is really the point of this discussion. Alternative number three has obvious difficulties with its claim that these assertions are falsifiable *in practice*.

The form of alternative number four which we are discussing is the eschatological verification principle presented by J. Hick and I.

Crombie. This view takes seriously the Christian claim of the factual existence of God and also meets the falsifiability test. A positivist, however, would very likely reject the possibility of life after death as a verification of the existence of an infinite Being.[9] The positivist's premises just are not broad enough to include anything other than that included in the sensibly perceptible of this life.

Rather than trying to meet the positivist on his own ground, it is more fruitful to challenge his premises and offer more adequate ones. Although the demand for falsification has contributed greatly to clarification and precision, it will now be argued that it is based on a weak foundation coming out of a reductionist tradition. The following will be a criticism of the positivist premises and the vindication of other premises.

III. SEARCH FOR A COMMON NORM

Herbert Feigl has made a distinction between validation (*justificatia cognitionis*) and vindication (*justificatia actionis*). Validation takes place in terms of a norm. The rules of validation are deduction and induction. If we do not have a norm or criterion from which to function—which is the case here—we must offer vindicating reasons for adopting some criterion.

> Vindicating reasons are not logically coercive. They are reasons intended to persuade, and whether or not they are efficacious depends upon whether those reasons conform to one's interests, purposes, or ideals.[10]

Since we have decided not to accept the positivist norm, we are now dealing with the aims and desired goals which will determine what will be a satisfactory norm. It is only when attempts to express one's own position on the terms of the other ends in futility that it seems wise to reject that criterion and present another.

We are now involved in such an attempt to persuade the positivist to move from his set of premises. In this pursuit, we must rely largely on a general impression of rationality and spiritual worth. In other words, this process of choosing between positions based upon different premises is more a matter of intuition and conscience than judgment according to a criterion.

To get at the basis of our differences and also to try to undercut the demands which we found we could not satisfy, it does not seem unfair to think of the Verification or Falsification Principles as implying an interpretation of nature—that is, an interpretation of what *is*, a feeling as to what is the *real*, an opinion as to what *is possible*. Even though such talk smacks of metaphysics and is thus taboo for a positivist, it still can not be eradicated. It is basic. It is only on such an intuitive base that one could claim a criterion for cognitive meaningfulness. Perhaps this would seem more obvious if we ask who it is that accepts the positivist principle. The answer is that it is those people who are convinced that the real (no matter what term is used or is not used) is the observable and that the way to come into contact with the real is to follow a "scientific" procedure.

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[9] Cf. Blackstone, pp. 112-124.

[10] Blackstone, p. 170.

Even though the positivist would not be willing to talk about the real or the general nature of things, a conviction concerning this matter is present in his view as it is in any other view offered to us for interpretation of that which is around us. Perhaps this is a clue to our difficulty in the first section of this paper. The Falsification Principle is based upon a total interpretation of reality which we could call for want of a better term "naturalism." Even though it gives lip service to its open-endedness, it cannot accommodate a view based on a broader intuitive conception of reality. It is forced either to deny such "data" as unreal or cognitively meaningless, or else it must give up its basis. In the last analysis the clash between those who maintain that key religious sentences do constitute knowledge and those who deny this is based upon *normative differences*.[11] And these norms which are our keys to interpreting that which is about us are themselves derived from our sense of the real and meaningful about us.

We shall return to the "intuitive" base for knowledge and ideas of meaning, but now we shall see if we can agree on a common goal for our normative position.

Although on the positivist's own grounds the status of the Verification Principle is merely emotive—at least it is supposedly neither an *assertion* of any kind nor is it an analytic truth—the good reason for adopting it is that it is claimed to be fruitful for one interested in scientific hypotheses and common-sense statements. We shall accept this as a desirable goal for our norms. Thus we shall continue the dialogue with this goal as the common factor. We shall challenge the normative value of the Verification Principle by showing that some other norm more adequately makes sense out of scientific hypotheses and common-sense statements.

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[11] Blackstone, p. 168.

Let us see how scientific hypotheses and common-sense statements are viewed through the glasses of the linguistic analysts. The glasses are stratification—a movement to a basic level, as W. P. Alston points out:

> A basic level is singled out, the members of which have meaning in a specially direct way; other elements of the language have meaning only if they have the right kind of connection with the basic level. In fact, logical atomism and the verifiability theory are virtually the same theory stated in different ways.[12]

This movement toward the basic constituents and seeing all in terms of them is also the way the verifiability theory views science. A common view of science which has resulted from the influence of the Vienna school of positivism is that one must not go beyond experience by affirming anything that cannot be tested by experience—the basic level. Furthermore, scientists must drop a *theory* (a higher, more complicated level of construction) once there is a conflicting *observation*—that is, once there is counter-evidence from the basic level. A theory which cannot be tested by the basic level, experience, must be revised so as to fit the observable. To facilitate this, the rigorous procedure of scientific methodology is supposed to be followed to the letter. Thus it seems that the movement is toward 1) a basic level; 2) impersonal, indubitable knowledge; 3) the reduction of all meaningful data into a prescribed scientific method or a verifiability principle.

All three of these points must be called into question. First there are no simple facts. The point of view of the "observer" to a large extent determines the facts. If there is any basic level it is the *person* doing the acting; yet this is precisely the opposite of what the positivist has in mind. The procedure of singling out a basic level, the members of which have meaning in a supposedly direct way, is also inadequate as any kind of complete definition of a more complicated linguistic formulation. An illustration pointing to the fallacious thinking of some behavioral psychology is analogously appropriate here. The attempt is to try to understand more complicated levels in terms of lower, simpler levels:

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[12] William P. Alston, *Philosophy of Language*, p. 71.

> . . . it is as meaningless to represent life in terms of physics and chemistry as it would be to interpret a grandfather clock or a Shakespeare sonnet in terms of physics and chemistry; and it is likewise meaningless to represent mind in terms of a machine or of a neural model. Lower levels do not lack a bearing on higher levels; *they define the conditions of their success and account for their failures, but they cannot account for their success, for they cannot even define it.*[13]

Certainly we would not want to think of all of science in terms of reduction to basic levels. This is completely the wrong direction. Yet this is the tendency suggested in the attempt to see science through the glasses of linguistic analysis.

Secondly, the ideal of impersonal knowledge is never reached. M. Polanyi points out the dilemma of the reflecting person caught in the demand for impersonal disinterestedness:

> The reflecting person is then caught in an insoluble conflict between a demand for an impersonality which would discredit all commitment and an urge to make up his mind which drives him to recommit himself. Hume has described most candidly the ensuing oscillation between a scepticism which admittedly lacks conviction, and a conviction which dare not consciously acknowledge its own acts and can be upheld only by neglecting the result of philosophic reflection. I shall call this the objectivist dilemma.[14]

It is inevitable that the person caught in this dilemma must either accept the importance of personal commitment in all knowledge or else be self-contradictory. Polanyi sees the following as the answer to the objectivist dilemma:

> The answer is this. The "actual facts" are accredited facts, as seen within the commitment situation, while subjective beliefs are the convictions accrediting these facts as seen non-committally, by someone not sharing them. But if we regard the beliefs in question non-committally, as a mere state of mind, we cannot speak confidently, without self-contradiction, of the facts to which these beliefs refer. For it is self-contradictory to secede from the commitment situation as regards the beliefs held within it, but to remain committed to the same beliefs in acknowledging their factual content as true.[15]

Thirdly, to see all of the scientific process in terms of a prescribed scientific method certainly is not the complete picture. In fact the methodology applies only to the latter stages:

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[13] Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, p. 382.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 304.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 304.

> The propositions of science . . . appear to be in the nature of guesses. They are founded on the assumptions of science concerning the structure of the universe and on the evidence of observations collected by the methods of science; they are subject to a process of verification in the light of further observations according to the rules of science; but their conjectural character remains inherent in them.[16]

To say that propositions of science appear to be in the nature of guesses is not to undercut science. It is in fact a demonstration of its genius. It places emphasis again upon research, discovery, and progress. Rather than seeing science as a computer and the scientists as survey workers, it is to see them as explorers and pathfinders. Rather than following charts and well-worn paths, the scientist is seen as a producer of maps and a maker of roads.

It is evident that he could neither discover nor invent anything unless he was convinced that it was there, ready to be found. "The recognition of this hidden presence is in fact half the battle: it means that you have hit on a real problem and are asking the right questions."[17] This same kind of belief is behind all our knowledge:

> We must now recognize belief once more as the source of all knowledge. Tacit assent and intellectual passions, the sharing of an idiom and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to a like-minded community: such are the impulses which shape our vision of the nature of things on which we rely for our mastery of things. No intelligence, however critical or original, can operate outside such a fiduciary framework.[18]

From the positivist view the problem is posed this way: If we say that belief must come first, this is impractical and unreasonable unless it is further clarified. We must understand something before we can possibly believe it. The positivist says that he simply wants and has to know what it is one is asking him to believe before he could even consider belief. However, this problem arises as a result of an oversimplification of what it means to know. The question "How can you be sure that you are believing anything if you do not *know* what it is you are believing?" usually means by *know* having explicit knowledge—that is being able coherently to present the position in the form of propositions and theoretically being able to verify it empirically. Such a demand ignores the first steps in the process of knowing.

[16] Michael Polanyi, *Science, Faith and Society*, pp. 31-32.
[17] Michael Polanyi, *The Study of Man*, p. 35.
[18] Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, p. 266.

Such a condition of the mind is possible only *after* much ground work has been laid and many beliefs have been assimilated.

The positivist position completely ignores the personal dimension of all reasoning. Human beings are by necessity believing persons:

> A child could never learn to speak if it assumed that the words which are used in its hearing are meaningless; or even if it assumed that five out of ten words so used are meaningless. . . . We have here an instance of the process described epigrammatically by the Christian Church Fathers in the words: *fides quarerens intellectum,* faith in search of understanding.[19]

Although through positivist influence we have come to see rationality as synonymous with the propositional rigor applicable only to the impersonal, empirical area of thought, it would seem that a more fruitful understanding of the term is the entire process of coming to know—where knowing is human knowing which originates in the context of *believing* persons who have interests and purposes. Rather than the all-important factor in gaining knowledge, verificational and logical rigor are to be seen as one very important ingredient in the process of coming to know.

If verificational and logical rigor are seen as one ingredient in the process of coming to know, it is important to see what shall be suggested as the other ingredients. Following a model which Polanyi presents in regard to the scientist there are two other ingredients—"intuitive impulses" and "scientific conscience."[20] First there are intuitive impulses, hunches, feelings, interests, wishes, needs, new claims. In opposition to this process is the application of rigorous tests of the credentials of all these unsettling bombardments. "Both these parties are blind, as either of them left to itself would lead indefinitely astray. Unfettered intuitive speculation would lead to extravagant wishful conclusions; while rigorous fulfilment of any set of critical rules would completely paralyse discovery."[21] This conflict is resolved, in Polanyi's view, by a third party standing above the contestants. This third party in the scientist's mind is his scientific conscience. In this broader application the scientific conscience includes a philosophic conscience achieved by dialogue with living and past philosophers or for the theologian his assimilated respect and commitment to the Church and its doctrine. The interaction of these three—intuitive impulses, rigorous tests, philosophic conscience—seems to be the process by which knowledge is gained.

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[19] Polanyi, *Science, Faith and Society,* p. 45.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 41.
[21] *Ibid.,* p. 41.

In this context then, the core of the concept of verification is the removal of uncertainty and confusion concerning the truth of some proposition by the interplay of intuition, logical rigor, and conscience. Those theories, hypotheses, predictions, and assertions that survive this process gain the status of being considered true. When it is clear in this way that a particular assertion is true, it is seen as verified. Thus the locus of verification is the individual himself who contributes to and receives from the tradition or community in which he stands.

The preceding arguments have been an attempt to vindicate this normative base as an alternative to the Verification or Falsification Principles for judging the authentic and the scurrilous. What we now have is the rough outline of a procedure rather than a principle. The procedure described is that which is followed when discoveries are made and clear thinking is achieved. It also makes good sense of scientific procedure even if this view of science is not the popular understanding.

This procedure is certainly not rationally binding. It involves leaps which one can decide either to take or not to take. However, I submit that neither is the procedure rationally objectionable—at least from the premise we established. It begins on the one hand with deep rooted questions and continues with hunches, intuitive impulses; on the other hand, these are tempered with tests of coherence, logic, and correspondence with the evidence. Neither side dominates. The final judgment rests with neither, for the final judgment rests with each person's conscience. As we have suggested, a person's conscience ultimately is his norm.

The fact that in the last analysis the judgment belongs to the person's conscience is evident especially when the presentation of a view demands obvious heuristic leaps such as this analysis has. It is of course the case that any view other than a solipsism requires some such leaps. The only view not demanding a leap never moves beyond the retina of the eye. However if such an understanding and caution is the inclination of the other, we cannot expect to argue him out of it. Given his personal conscience, all the experiential data he receives will be interpreted solipsistically. Likewise in terms of the unbeliever, unless he will be willing to attempt to see himself, his environment, and the cosmos in a radically different total interpretation, we cannot expect him to discover or even think it sensible to speak of further dimensions either beyond himself (for the solipsist) or beyond physical phenomena (for the positivist). It can never be shown by any conclusive philosophical argument that one has been blind to further dimensions of the environment.[22] One can only come to the realization that *it is possible* that he has. Then he can either continue as in the past and ignore this realization, or else courageously take the heuristic leap. It is precisely this point to which this paper has been moving. We have tried to give some reason for hazarding the leap by pointing out the possibility that we have blinded ourselves to a further dimension—a further dimension which it is rationally possible to consider.

It follows that for the person seeing validity in this approach this is just a beginning—and a barren one at that. For this opens up to one the entire exciting and complex discipline of theology and the claims of religious persons (both past and presently living) concerning revelation and religious experience. All of this then becomes directly involved in an understanding of the meaning of living one's life upon the conviction of God's existence.

In looking back we see that what has been involved in all of this discussion is the ability of being open both to the deep rooted questions and intuitive impulses within us and being capable of releasing the creative possibilities available to us by responding to them. What we have attempted to do is to interpret in a new way what has already been before us. The search for the epistemological status of the claim of God's existence is not comparable to the discovery of a man concealed behind a screen or a concealed gardener. It is instead comparable to the discovery of the pattern in a puzzle picture. It involves grasping—not by a prescribed method but by creativity, ingenuity, and reason—a total interpretation. What is at stake is a proper perspective and a framework for action and rational interpretation.

Instead of Flew's parable about the invisible gardener, a clearer understanding of what is involved in a theistic understanding is offered by John Hick:

> Consider the following imagined situation. I enter a room in a strange building and find that a militant secret society appears to be meeting there. Most of the members are armed, and as they take me for a fellow member I judge it expedient to acquiesce in the role. Subtle and bloodthirsty plans are discussed for a violent overthrow of

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[22] John Hick, *Faith and the Philosophers*, p. 244.

the constitution. The whole situation is alarming in the extreme. Then I suddenly notice behind me a gallery in which there are batteries of arc lights and silently whirring cameras, and I realize that I have walked by accident onto the set of a film. This realization consists in a change of interpretation of my immediate environment. Until now I had automatically interpreted it as being "real life," as a dangerous situation demanding considerable circumspection on my part. Now I interpret it as having practical significance of a quite different kind. But there is no corresponding change in the observable course of events. The meeting of the "secret society" proceeds as before, although now I believe the state of affairs to be quite other than I had previously supposed it to be. The same phenomena are interpreted as constituting an entirely different practical situation. And yet not quite the same phenomena, for I have noticed important new items, namely, the cameras and arc lights. But let us now in imagination expand the room into the world, and indeed expand it to include the entire physical universe. This is the strange room into which we walk at birth. There is no space left for a photographers' gallery, no direction in which we can turn in search of new clues which might reveal the significance of our situation. Our interpretation must be a *total* interpretation, in which we assert that the world as a whole (as experienced by ourselves) is of this or that kind, that is to say, affects our plans and our policies in such and such ways.

The monotheist's faith-apprehension of God as the unseen Person dealing with him in and through his experience of the world is from the point of view of epistemology an interpretation of this kind, an interpretation of the world as a whole as mediating a divine presence and purpose. He sees in his situation as a human being a significance to which the appropriate response is a religious trust and obedience. His interpretative leap carries him into a world which exists through the will of a holy, righteous, and loving Being who is the creator and sustainer of all that is.[23]

[23] Hick, *Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 127-129.

S E R M O N

THE IMPOSITIONS OF JESUS

BY DANIEL MARTINEZ

> And as he was setting out on his journey, a man ran up and knelt before him, and asked him, "Good teacher, what must I do to inherit eternal life?" And Jesus said to him, "Why do you call me good? No one is good but God alone. You know the commandments: 'Do not kill, Do not bear false witness, Do not defraud, Honor your father and mother.' " And he said to him, "Teacher, all these I have observed from my youth." And Jesus looking upon him loved him, and said to him, "You lack one thing; go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me." At that saying his countenance fell, and he went away sorrowful; for he had great possessions.
>
> And Jesus looked around and said to his disciples, "How hard it will be for those who have riches to enter the kingdom of God!" And the disciples were amazed at his words. But Jesus said to them again, "Children, how hard it is to enter the kingdom of God! It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God." And they were exceedingly astonished, and said to him, "Then who can be saved?" Jesus looked at them and said, "With men it is impossible, but not with God; for all things are possible with God." (Mark 10:17-27)

IN THIS TEXT we find one of the most impressive persons of the New Testament. This man who came to Jesus was an affluent member of society: "He had great possessions." The Gospel of Luke informs us that the man was also a ruler, and probably also shared in the leadership of the Jewish community. Rulers were the religious and spiritual leaders of the Jewish community. It is probable that he performed certain duties in the temple or in a local synagogue. He was respected among his people. He had social, financial, and religious stability or security. From the text we also learn that this wealthy

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ruler was genuinely devout. He seriously followed the traditions, beliefs and practices of his faith. This was an honest man, a man with sincerity in the question he posed to Jesus. He perceived that Jesus was a "Good Teacher" and he came and knelt, showing great respect for the "Good Teacher." We cannot but be favorably impressed by this man. In fact, Jesus was so impressed that his heart warmed to him: "Jesus looking upon him loved him."

The man had an important question. He asked how it would be possible for him to attain eternal life. Perhaps he was motivated to ask this question by a fear of death. At least he was honest with himself and faced the problem. Or maybe he felt that a certainty of the afterlife would give more meaning to his life and present existence. Or perhaps he wanted to make sure he was aware of and complied with all "methods" of salvation.

Whatever the motive was, it did not induce a sufficient question. The scope of his inquiry was too narrow, for the question was limited to the issue of eternal life. The wealthy ruler was too satisfied with the present state of things. He felt that his past, present and immediate future were righteous and properly secure. After all, had he not followed all the commandments since his childhood? He came to Jesus to seek something which he thought would not disrupt the external securities which he presently enjoyed. The sick and blind came to Jesus seeking his mercy and grace; the wealthy ruler came seeking only the benefit of eternal life.

The answer of Jesus was concise: "Go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me." The reply of Jesus was a demand for three things. First, the wealthy ruler must give up old, false securities. Jesus wanted him to come as humbly as the other less privileged people who had received the grace of God. Second, the wealthy ruler must be willing to have a real concern for others. If he had really adhered to the Jewish Law, laws of charity would not have been new to him. The demand of Jesus, however, was more than organized charity. Finally, Jesus demanded that he become a disciple. This independent wealthy ruler was asked to accept the lordship of Jesus.

When the man heard the answer of Jesus, "his countenance fell, and he went away sorrowful." He had come to talk about eternal life, not discipleship. Jesus had partially ignored and had not satisfactorily answered his particular question. He had hoped to have a long and fruitful counseling session with the "Good Teacher." But the answer of Jesus left no room for dialogue. *Jesus was imposing upon him.*

The idea of giving up all his material security was just out of the question. He had come to receive some positive advice, not to give away those things which were dear to him. Everyone seeks blessedness or ultimate happiness (whatever you wish to call it). We continuously strive to attain it. As T. S. Eliot wrote, "Issues from the hand of God, the simple soul to a flat world of changing lights and noise, to light, dark, dry or warm; moving between the legs of tables and chairs, rising or falling, grasping at kisses and toys, advancing boldly, sudden to take alarm, retreating to the corner of arm and knee, eager to be reassured. . . ." When we do have successes, accomplishments, or acquire certain advantages, we cherish them dearly and hesitate to give them away. We can easily sympathize with the wealthy ruler when he refused to give up his great possessions.

We struggle so much to obtain everything we own that the idea of giving sometimes appears unrealistic, even when the needs of others are starkly real. The idea of giving becomes so foreign to us that we tend to accept poverty and misery, even when they are caused by social injustice. We tend to sponsor the social, political, or economic conditions in which we have prospered, even at the expense of the underprivileged. And as to personal handouts—that is the job of the "Great Society," not ours. We can easily sympathize with the wealthy ruler when he refused to give to the poor.

The most difficult challenge was to become a disciple of Jesus, to accept the Lordship of Jesus Christ. It is too much of a sacrifice of his personal freedom. It is, we may say, dehumanizing. It is too much a cult of the personality. A person who demands so much personal power or influence is suspected of being a tyrant. In fact, no one wants to have anything lorded over him. The teen-ager says, "I do not want to have anything or anyone telling me what to do or not to do." The Southern segregationalist says "Civil rights laws violate my personal freedom and state's rights." No one wants to have anything lorded over them, especially not the lordship of a Palestinian Jew. We can easily sympathize with the wealthy ruler when he refused to go and follow Jesus.

The wealthy ruler went away sorrowful and very disappointed. He probably thought that Jesus did not fully understand his situation. It appeared that Jesus had given too simple an answer to a very delicate and complex soteriological question. The aftermath of this encounter was almost sympathetic to the wealthy ruler. Jesus himself, having fully understood the complexity of the problem, sympathetically said, "How hard it will be for those who have riches to enter the kingdom of God! Children, how hard it is to enter the kingdom of God! It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God."

When the disciples heard what Jesus had commented, they were astonished. It was the discussion between Jesus and the disciples which clarified the meaning of his words. They understood that Jesus used "riches" to mean any assets, securities, privileges, or positions in which we place our ultimate trust. The tragedy of the wealthy ruler was that he had placed more confidence in his great possessions than in the good news of Jesus. He trusted more in his own great possessions than in the good news of Jesus. He trusted more in his great possessions for ultimate happiness. When Jesus forced him to choose, he chose his own assets. The disciples further realized that every person has something in which he places his ultimate trust and confidence. Thus, they did not ask how it would be possible for a rich man to be saved. Rather they asked, "Then who can be saved?"

Once again Jesus gave too simple an answer to a very complex question. Jesus asserted the sovereignty of God. He said, "With men it is impossible, but not with God; for all things are possible with God." Simple as the statement is, it brought everything into focus and clarity. The answer of Jesus to the wealthy ruler and to the disciples is that salvation is given by the grace of God. This grace is free to everyone, whatever their status may be. The tragic flaw of humanity is well illustrated by the wealthy ruler. That tragic flaw is a lack of belief or trust in the grace of God, selfishness and an unwillingness to be genuinely and actively concerned with the welfare of other persons, and a pride which refuses to accept the lordship of Jesus Christ into our personal lives.

But over and against our difficulties and flaws, the Spirit of God still witnesses to the Jesus Christ of the New Testament. Although we continue to ask God insufficient questions and make petitions in accordance with what we think is meaningful, Jesus Christ has given us answers which challenge us to reconsider even our inquiries and wanderings in order that the grace of God can work in our lives.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR

BY GARY D. BOUMA AND ROBERT W. BATTEY

THIS STUDY is an empirical inquiry into the patterning of religious behavior by social stratification. On the basis of past research and current theories of social stratification we would anticipate some patterning of the attitudes and behavior of church members on the basis of their positions in the social class stratum. The purpose of this paper is to discover whether there is in fact such patterning, to discover some of the features of that patterning, and to comment on its significance.

I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Previous studies of the influence of social class on religious behavior have dealt mainly with religious behavior as measured by church membership and church participation. Several generalizations about the relation between social class and religious behavior can be made on the basis of these previous studies. For the most part previous research indicates that the rate of church membership is directly related to social class, i.e., the higher the social class the higher the rate of church membership. This same relationship is true of participation in church programs. There is much debate over whether this direct relationship is linear or curvilinear. Some of the research shows that the rate of church membership and the rate of church participation are highest among the middle class and taper off with the upper classes. This question, however, remains unsettled. Although the upper classes tend to have a higher rate of church participation, "nevertheless, of the time spent in formal or organized, voluntary,

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leisure-time activities a larger proportion of the total is spent in the church by the lower classes than by others."[1]

Each Protestant denomination tends to draw its members from certain segments of the class structure.

> Protestant Episcopal, Congregational, Unitarian, and Presbyterian churches tend to attract more upper and upper-middle class people than other Protestant congregations; Methodist, Disciples of Christ, Lutheran, and Baptist members generally fall in the middle to lower-middle social class range; and Assemblies of God, Pentecostal, and Holiness churches tend to draw more members from the lower classes. Distinctions within Protestantism are so prominent that some researchers have used their subjects' denomination of church membership as a partial means of identifying their social class positions. There are, however, great variations from one community to another in the social prestige of local churches, and the denominations cannot be ranked as invariably having the same position in the social class hierarchy.[2]

The positions of formal authority in a religious organization are generally filled by members who are of a higher social class than the general constituency. "Social class, church participation, and other social participation are correlated; high participation in the church is generally linked with high participation in other community organizations, and the highest social participators tend to be from the highest social classes of the community."[3] "Church membership and activity often reflect the climbing or attempted climbing of the social ladder."[4] These are some of the conclusions reached by previous studies of the relationship between social class and religious behavior.

Several indicators have enjoyed great popularity in previous research as tests of the nature or degree of a person's religiosity. Those most used as indicators of the degree of religiosity are church membership, attendance at church services, and participation in parish activities. Demerath points out that the difficulty with using these three indices is that they have a class bias in that, "on each of these measures persons of high status appear to be more deeply involved than those of low status."[5] However, on such indicators of the kind of religiosity as intensity of emotional involvement, orthodoxy of belief, and benefit derived from their religion, the lower classes are apt to appear more religious than those of the upper classes. Thus, the indices of degree and kind of religiosity previously used seem to have a built-in class bias. The result was that depending on the indicator used either the upper classes or the lower classes would have the higher rate of religiosity.

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[1] David Moberg, "Social Class and the Churches," *Information Service of the National Council of Churches*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 12, p. 6, June 14, 1958.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[5] N. J. Demerath III, *Social Class in American Protestantism*, p. 4.

N. J. Demerath III, cognizant of the difficulties in former indicators of religiosity, has attempted to develop a measure of religiosity which will not suffer these disadvantages. He has developed a typology of religious commitment using the following six indices of kinds of religiosity: attendance at Sunday services, parish activities, involvement in community organizations, communal involvement, religious aid and reward, and opinion of the role of the minister in public affairs. These are taken to be indices of kinds of religiosity and the degree of religiosity as measured by the levels of involvement in each of these areas.

Demerath combines the first three indicators into an Index of Churchlike Religiosity and the last three into an Index of Sectlike Religiosity. He claims that attendance at church services is a characteristically church type activity in that most Protestant services tend to address conditions in the secular world and often reflect a compromise with the standards of the secular world. Involvement in parish activity is considered a church type indicator in that most parish activities are hardly distinguishable from their secular counterparts.

> Meetings of the young adults, the women's auxiliary, and the high schoolers are designed to provide secular attractions within the church itself. The common weekly businessmen's lunch is a counter to such groups as the Rotary, Lions, and Kiwanis clubs. In all of this, then, there is a tendency to dilute the traditional doctrine and to accommodate the outside world in a decidedly churchlike fashion.[6]

Organizational involvements outside the church are considered a church type indicator in that they clearly show the accommodation of church members to the secular world. They also show that the member is involved in more things than just the church, whereas the sect member, if involved, is apt to be involved only in the church. Demerath's primary criterion for distinguishing church and sect is their respective stances *vis-à-vis* the secular world. The church is marked by an accommodating stance, whereas the sect is distinguished by alienation.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

Demerath considers communal involvement (having a large number of close friendships within the parish) to be an indicator of sectlike commitment. Such a commitment suggests that the person "puts inordinate emphasis on an intimate fellowship of the morally elect."[7] He would consider a person who claimed to receive much help from his religion to have sectlike commitment in that this suggests that the person is grappling with secular issues but doing so on religious terms as he understands them.[8] Receiving much religious aid reflects one of the chief characteristics of the sect, this being "that its influence is inordinately pervasive for its members. . . . the sect demands that secular life proceed on the sect's own terms."[9] He considers a negative opinion concerning the role of the minister in public affairs to be an indicator of sectlike commitment because the sects tend to isolate themselves from the community and because, "the sectarian is likely to view the pastoral participation on such issues as a breach of privacy and support for the opposition."[10] These then are the components of Demerath's Index of Sectlike Religiosity.

Demerath's typology of religiosity consists of the following four types: 1. The *totally involved parishioner* is one who received high or moderate scores on both the Index of Churchlike Religiosity and the Index of Sectlike Religiosity. 2. The *pure church type* is one who received a high or moderate score on the Index of Churchlike Religiosity and a low score on the Index of Sectlike Religiosity. 3. The *pure sect type* is one who received a high score on the Index of Sectlike Religiosity and a low score on the Index of Churchlike Religiosity. 4. The *dormant parishioner* is one who received low scores on both Indices. By thus combining measures of degree and kind of religiosity into a single typology of religiosity Demerath tries to combat built-in class bias of single measures.

One of the secondary aims of this study is to take Demerath's typology and test it by using it to analyze two congregations. We shall seek to discover which of the three objective indicators of social status—occupation, income and education—is the most influential in patterning the type of commitment a person is apt to have to a religious organization.

II. METHODOLOGY

The two churches selected for research are located in a middle eastern seaboard state in a town of approximately twenty-five thousand people. The town is largely a middle to upper middle class commuting community. There are three Presbyterian churches and two Episcopalian churches in this town. The Presbyterian church, to be known in this study as the Memorial Presbyterian Church, is over 200 years old, and has approximately 1500 members. The Episcopal church, to be known in this study as St. Luke's Episcopal Church, has about 900 members. Both churches draw the bulk of their congregations from the upper classes of this town.

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 69. [8] *Ibid.*, p. 74. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 73. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

The method employed in gathering the data was to mail questionnaires to random samples of the congregations. At Memorial Presbyterian Church questionnaires were mailed to two random samples of one hundred members each; one sample received a cover letter from the pastor and the other did not. At St. Luke's Episcopal Church the questionnaires were sent to a random sample of 100 parishioners without a cover letter from the pastor. In addition questionnaires were sent to half of the session and the deacons of the Presbyterian church and to half of the vestrymen and the wardens of the Episcopalian church. The questionnaire had four sections: 1. The first section contained background information wherein we asked concerning age, sex, occupation, income, education, length of membership, involvement in community organizations, self-ranking according to one of six social classes, and information regarding father's occupation and education. 2. The second section of the questionnaire consisted of the six Indices of Religiosity used in Demerath's typology of religiosity (see Appendix for this section of questionnaire). 3. The third section asked the respondent to evaluate some activities of the minister, session, church and laymen in the churches. 4. The fourth section of the questionnaire was designed to elicit opinions regarding certain aspects of the churches.

III. FINDINGS

A. General Picture

From the background information it is possible to paint a general picture of these two congregations. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 (cf. Appendix) the majority of both churches consider themselves to be middle or upper middle class. However, a much larger percentage of the Episcopalians consider themselves to be of the upper class than do the Presbyterians. In terms of occupation both churches are predominantly made up of people who are business executives or proprietors or are in one of the professions. 92.5% of the Episcopalians and 92% of the Presbyterians are professionals or in business. 87% of the members of St. Luke's Episcopal Church and 86% of the respondents from Memorial Presbyterian Church have a college degree or more. 74% of the Episcopalians and 82% of the Presbyterians reported incomes over $9000. Only one-third of the members of St. Luke's came from non-Episcopalian backgrounds whereas 59.4% of the respondents from Memorial Presbyterian Church came from non-Presbyterian backgrounds. It is interesting to note that 71.5% of the denominationally mobile Episcopalians came from the Presbyterian denomination. The denominationally mobile Presbyterians came predominantly from the Methodist and Congregational denominations. The members of both churches are very active in community affairs although the members of St. Luke's Episcopal seem to be more active than the members of Memorial Presbyterian Church. Thus, in summary, it is possible to describe these two churches as ministering largely to the upper classes of the population of this town and having highly affluent and well educated members.

B. Social Stratification and Typology of Religiosity

In this section we shall examine the patterning influence of subjective social class and the objective indicators of status (occupation, income and education) on the type of religiosity manifested by church members. Tables 3 through 12 (cf. Appendix) present the relevant data regarding the influence of social stratification on the typology of religiosity in these two congregations. One of the most striking facts is that there is not a single instance of Pure Sect Type religiosity among the Episcopalians and that Pure Sect Type religiosity is over-represented in the lower segments of the class structure found in the Presbyterian church. Throughout Pure Sect Type religiosity is a feature of the lower levels of education, occupation and income. The only two professionals that exhibited Sect Type religiosity could be called only marginally professional, one being a dietitian and the other a land planner.

The relation between social stratification and the other types of religiosity is less sharply defined. Dormant Parishioners tend to be over-represented in the lower segments of the class structure. Type of occupation does not seem to particularly affect the distribution of the Dormant Parishioner Type. In St. Luke's Episcopal Church those with lower levels of education tend to be Dormant Parishioners whereas in the Presbyterian church they tend to have a Sect Type religiosity. In both churches those with lower levels of income tend to be Dormant Parishioners. Pure Church Type religiosity which is exhibited by 62% of the congregation of the Presbyterian church and 37% of the Episcopalian church is over-represented in the upper classes and is exhibited by those in business and professional occupations in both churches. Church Type religiosity is also over-represented among those of high income and high education. Totally involved parishioners are found only among those of the higher occupation, income and education level and are found with one exception only among members of the upper middle class. Most of the totally involved parishioners are in their forties with very few older and only one who is younger. The majority of the Dormant Parishioners, however, are in their thirties. Only in these two categories does age appear to be a relevant factor.

Thus we can see that the type of religiosity exhibited by a person tends to be patterned by factors of social class and social stratification. The most significant factors seem to be subjective social class, income and education. Occupational type, although important, did not bear a clear relationship to religiosity. Moreover, in our sample, only two types of occupation were found in any sizable number.

C. Mobility and These Churches

The town in which these churches are located is a highly mobile community both in terms of the turnover of its population and the social mobility of its people. This mobility is particularly reflected in the membership of the Presbyterian church. 52.5% of the respondents from the Presbyterian church have lived in this town under 8 years and only 30% over 15 years. Thus, the membership of the Presbyterian church has a high rate of physical mobility. The fact that 58.2% of the respondents were of non-Presbyterian backgrounds further indicates high physical mobility. Of those coming from other denominations 70.5% came from denominations with lower class orientations rather than that of the Presbyterian church, 12.9% from churches with higher status orientations and 16.6% from churches with similar status orientations. In addition 41% of the respondents were classified as upwardly mobile and only 12% as downwardly mobile. (In order to be classified as upwardly mobile the respondent had to score at least two points higher on a ten-point scale than his father in terms of occupational prestige and amount of education.

This was done to counterbalance the general trend toward increased higher education so prevalent today.) Thus it is clear that the membership of the Presbyterian church in addition to having a high rate of physical mobility also has a high rate of social mobility. The Episcopalians seem to be less mobile both physically and socially than the Presbyterians. 80% of the Episcopalians were classified as socially non-mobile as compared with only 47% of the Presbyterians. Moreover, more than one-half of those Presbyterians with upward denominational mobility also had upward social mobility. This coincidence of physical, social and denominational mobility at the Memorial Presbyterian Church suggests that as persons become upwardly mobile and move to this town part of the process of upwardly mobility is joining Memorial Presbyterian Church. The reason for joining could be in order to strengthen status claims or because the change in status brought a change in religious needs or preferences. The Memorial Presbyterian Church seems to be among other things a reference group of high status individuals with whom the upwardly mobile person wishes to associate and be identified. The Episcopalian church for some reason does not appear to have this same appeal to upwardly mobile people, at least not to the same extent.

D. The Formal Power Structure and the Members

One of the interests of this study was to discover how the formal power structure, the session and deacons of the Presbyterian church and the vestry and wardens of the Episcopalian church, compare with the membership in terms of social class, occupation, income and education, and type of religiosity. As was anticipated from previous studies the formal power structure is drawn in both churches from the upper segments of the class structure. With one exception the formal power structure of the Episcopalian church is drawn from the upper two segments of occupation, income and education and that exception is one person with only a high school education. The formal power structure of the Presbyterian church is drawn without exception from the upper two levels of occupation, income and education. Thus the earlier finding that the formal power structures of churches tend to be drawn from the higher segments of the class structure present in the church is confirmed by our research. The types of religiosity that are exhibited by the formal power structures, with one exception, are the Church Type and the Totally Involved. The one exception is a Presbyterian deacon who is a Dormant Parishioner.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. On the basis of the above data it is possible to affirm the hypothesis that the religiosity of the members of these churches is patterned by social stratification.
2. The data support the description of these churches as being highly oriented to the upper and upper middle class segments of the population.
3. The type of religiosity that predominates at the Presbyterian church is that of Church Type orientation as would be anticipated of a church with members drawn largely from the upper levels of the class structure. In the Episcopalian church, however, the type of religiosity that predominates is the Dormant Parishioner.
4. The membership of the Presbyterian church tends to be very mobile in terms of physical, social and denominational mobility. The Episcopalian church does not seem to be quite so mobile.
5. The coincidence of physical, social and denominational mobility suggests that one of the needs served by the Presbyterian church in this community is that of a reference group for the status identity of upwardly mobile people.
6. The formal power structures of these two churches are drawn from the upper segments of the social class structure of these churches.
7. The most influential factors in patterning a person's type of religiosity seem to be his subjective class identity, his income, and his education.

V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABOVE DATA AND CONCLUSIONS

In this section of the paper some of the implications of the above data and conclusions for these two churches and for the church in general shall be discussed. Some comments about Demerath's typology will be made in the light of our research. The implications drawn will be of two types. First, those drawn explicitly from the data; and secondly, those suggested by the data which should be dealt with in future research and analysis.

In recent years the Memorial Presbyterian Church has been considering several proposals of merger with other churches in the community. One of the implications of the data is that the Memorial Presbyterian Church has an image in this community of being the church of the upper classes in this town. This image seems to be instrumental in recruiting new members from the upwardly mobile sections of the population. If this is still to be one of the church's drawing cards it must maintain this image. It is likely that a merger with a church having a lower status orientation than that of Memorial Presbyterian Church would have the effect of diluting the appeal of Memorial Presbyterian Church to the upwardly mobile person. A likely effect of a merger of such a church would be to lose those using membership in the Memorial Presbyterian Church as a status symbol and to reduce the number joining on this basis. Considerations of this nature may have been behind the rejection of a proposal of merger with the other two Presbyterian churches in this town. Further attempts to maintain or enhance this image can be seen in a recent joint congregational dinner and pulpit exchange between the Memorial Presbyterian Church and St. Luke's Episcopal Church. Such activities can be carried on with a minimum of threat to the self-image of either church since both have virtually the same class orientation.

The coincidence of a high rate of social mobility and denominational mobility is not to be seen as a result of widespread ecumenical sentiment but rather shows the influence of social stratification on religious behavior. Social and physical mobility seem to be weakening the denominational ties of many church members. This weakening of denominational ties suggests that the unification of current American denominations may be made less difficult. This suggests, as have other studies, that the things dividing American Protestants are not so much their theology or church polity as the socio-economic stratification of the membership of the church.

The data show that the formal power structures of the two churches have a disproportionately high representation from the upper strata of these churches. This confirms the findings of previous studies that the power structure of any given group will consist of its socially elite. This however tends to be circular in that any leader is apt to be considered a part of the socially elite and most any member of the socially elite is considered to have leadership potential.

It is interesting to note that the Pure Church Type is predominant at Memorial Presbyterian Church whereas the Dormant Parishioner predominates at St. Luke's Episcopal Church. One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that those Presbyterians using their membership as a status symbol must be active in the church for such membership to bear the necessary status connotations. This difference however might also be produced by such factors as a differing emphasis placed on church attendance and participation in church activities in the two churches.

In the light of this study it can be said that Demerath not so much removes the class bias from his indicators of religiosity as leaves the discussion of religiosity and social class on the level of amount of religiosity and moves to a discussion on the level of kinds of religiosity. He simply does not ask which class is most religious. Rather, he asks how various types of religiosity are patterned by social class. This shift of emphasis is valuable in that it leads to a much more significant level of discussion.

APPENDIX

*Tables 1 through 5 "Totals"***

TABLE 1. The Actual and Percentaged Distribution of Subjective Indication of Social Class

Class	*Memorial Pres.* N	 %	*St. Luke's Epis.* N	 %
Upper	5	5.7%	10	26.9%
Lower Upper	7	7.9%	6	16.8%
Upper Middle	52	59.1%	11	30.8%
Middle	23	26.1%	8	22.3%
Working	1	1.2%	1	3.2%
Lower	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	88	100.0%	36	100.0%

TABLE 2. The Actual and Percentaged Distribution of Annual Income

Income	*Memorial Pres.* N	 %	*St. Luke's Epis.* N	 %
$15,000 & up	37	48.1%	17	56.7%
$9,000-14,999	26	33.8%	4	13.4%
$6,000-8,999	10	12.9%	7	23.3%
$4,000-5,999	2	2.6%	1	3.3%
$2,000-3,999	2	2.6%	1	3.3%
less than 2,000	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	77	100.0%	30	100.0%

** Only Table 1 includes data drawn from the session, deacons and vestry. The rest have data drawn only from the membership of the two churches.

TABLE 3. THE ACTUAL AND PERCENTAGED DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF OCCUPATION

Occupation	*Memorial Pres.*		*St. Luke's Epis.*	
	N	%	N	%
Professional	45	62.4%	13	48.1%
Business	25	34.8%	12	44.5%
Sales & Clerical	1	1.4%	0	0.0%
Skilled	1	1.4%	1	3.7%
Unskilled	0	0.0%	1	3.7%
Total	72	100.0%	27	100.0%

TABLE 4. THE ACTUAL AND PERCENTAGED DISTRIBUTION OF INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY

Direction	*Memorial Pres.*		*St. Luke's Epis.*	
	N	%	N	%
Upward	28	38.9%	6	19.3%
Downward	9	12.5%	1	3.2%
Same	35	48.6%	24	77.5%
Total	72	100.0%	31	100.0%

TABLE 5. THE ACTUAL AND PERCENTAGED DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION

Amount of Education	*Memorial Pres.*		*St. Luke's Epis.*	
	N	%	N	%
Graduate Work	43	56.0%	17	55.2%
College Grad.	23	29.9%	10	32.1%
Some College	5	6.4%	3	9.6%
High School Grad.	6	7.7%	1	3.1%
Some High School	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Grade School	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	77	100.0%	31	100.0%

*Tables 6 Through 15***
"Social Stratification and The Typology of Religiosity"

TABLE 6. Subjective Social Class and Type of Religiosity at Memorial Pres.*

Class	Totally Inv.		Church Type		Sect Type		Dormant		Total
	N	O/E	N	O/E	N	O/E	N	O/E	N
Upper	1	5.00	2	.80	0	0.0	1	1.1	4
Lower Upper	0	0.0	4	1.29	0	0.0	1	.83	5
Upper Mid.	4	1.48	30	1.14	2	.54	10	.91	46
Middle	0	0.0	10	.81	4	2.50	6	1.25	20
Total	5		46		6		18		75

* In this and subsequent Tables O/E refers to the ratio between the observed frequency and the expected frequency in each cell. A score of 1.00 indicates that there is no difference between the observed and the expected frequencies; a score of less than one means that the observed underrepresents the expected; and a score of more than one means that the observed exceeds the expected. Thus, this table, for example, indicates that in the upper class the Totally Involved and Dormant Types are Overrepresented while the Church and Sect Types are Underrepresented.

TABLE 7. Subjective Social Class and Type of Religiosity at St. Luke's Epis.

Class	Totally Inv.		Church Type		Sect Type		Dormant		Total
	N	O/E	N	O/E	N	O/E	N	O/E	N
Upper	0	0.0	5	1.78	0	0.0	2	.46	7
Lower Upper	0	0.0	1	1.00	0	0.0	2	1.00	3
Upper Mid.	1	2.5	2	.54	0	0.0	7	1.18	10
Middle	0	0.0	1	.46	0	0.0	5	1.43	6
Total	1		9		0		16		26

** Tables 6 through 15 include data drawn from the membership of the two churches, but they do not include the data drawn from the session and deacons or the vestry.

TABLE 8. Income and Type of Religiosity at Memorial Pres.

Amount of Income	*Totally Inv.*		*Church Type*		*Sect Type*		*Dormant*		*Total*
	N	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*
$15,000 & up	3	1.35	27	1.1	0	0.0	7	.79	37
$9,000-14,999	1	.66	13	.83	4	1.65	8	1.2	26
$6,000-8,999	1	1.66	7	1.1	2	2.5	0	0.0	10
Total	5		47		6		15		73

TABLE 9. Income and Type of Religiosity at St. Luke's Epis.

Amount of Income	*Totally Inv.*		*Church Type*		*Sect Type*		*Dormant*		*Total*
	N	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*
$15,000 & up	1	.77	9	1.37	0	0.0	7	.75	17
$9,000-14,999	1	2.5	1	.43	0	0.0	4	1.21	6
$6,000-8,999	0	0.0	1	.43	0	0.0	5	1.51	6
$4,000-5,999	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.81	1
Total	2		11		0		17		30

TABLE 10. Occupation and Type of Religiosity at Memorial Pres.

Occupation	*Totally Inv.*		*Church Type*		*Sect Type*		*Dormant*		*Total*
	N	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*
Professional	2	.74	30	1.09	2*	.57	11	1.01	45
Business	3	2.00	15	.98	2	1.00	5	.83	25
Sales & Cler.	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	12.50	0	0.0	1
Skilled	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	12.50	0	0.0	1
Total	5		45		6		16		72

* These two professionals were rather low level professionals. One is a dietitian and the other a land planner.

TABLE 11. Occupation and Type of Religiosity at St. Luke's Epis.

Occupation	*Totally Inv.*		*Church Type*		*Sect Type*		*Dormant*		*Total*
	N	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*
Professional	1	.83	5	1.40	0	0.0	7	1.00	13
Business	1	.91	5	1.13	0	0.0	6	.92	12
Sales & Cler.	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0
Skilled	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.85	1
Unskilled	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.85	1
Total	2		10		0		15		27

TABLE 12. Education and Type of Religiosity at Memorial Pres.

Amount of Education	*Totally Inv.*		*Church Type*		*Sect Type*		*Dormant*		*Total*
	N	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*
Grad. Work	2	.77	32	1.1	0	0.0	9	.90	43
College Grad.	3	2.30	10	.71	3	1.66	7	1.27	23
Some College	0	0.0	4	1.28	0	0.0	1	.80	5
H. S. Grad.	0	0.0	2	.52	3	7.5	1	.71	6
Total	5		48		6		18		77

TABLE 13. Education and Type of Religiosity at St. Luke's Epis.

Amount of Education	*Totally Inv.*		*Church Type*		*Sect Type*		*Dormant*		*Total*
	N	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*
Grad. Work	0	0.0	7	1.09	0	0.0	10	1.07	17
College Grad.	2	2.86	5	1.32	0	0.0	3	.54	10
Some College	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	1.87	3
H. S. Grad.	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.82	1
Total	2		12		0		17		31

TABLE 14. Social Mobility and Type of Religiosity at Memorial Presbyterian

Direction	*Totally Inv.*		*Church Type*		*Sect Type*		*Dormant*		*Total*
	N	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*
Upward	2	1.25	18	1.4	2	.91	5	.74	28
Downward	0	0.0	6	1.12	1	1.43	2	.91	9
Same	3	1.11	21	.95	2	.71	8	1.06	35
Total	5		46		5		16		72

TABLE 15. Social Mobility and Type of Religiosity at St. Luke's Episcopal

Direction	*Totally Inv.*		*Church Type*		*Sect Type*		*Dormant*		*Total*
	N	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*	*O/E*	*N*
Upward	1	2.5	1	.43	0	0.0	4	1.21	6
Downward	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.81	1
Same	1	.55	11	1.21	0	0.0	12	.91	24
Total	2		12		0		17		31

FOR BEGGARS ONLY

BY GEORGE W. RENWICK

> When one of those who sat at table with him heard this, he said to him, "Blessed is he who shall eat bread in the kingdom of God!" But he said to him, "A man once gave a great banquet, and invited many; and at the time for the banquet he sent his servant to say to those who had been invited, 'Come; for all is now ready.' But they all alike began to make excuses. The first said to him, 'I have bought a field, and I must go out and see it; I pray you, have me excused.' And another said, 'I have bought five yoke of oxen, and I go to examine them; I pray you, have me excused.' And another said, 'I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come.' So the servant came and reported this to his master. Then the householder in anger said to his servant, 'Go out quickly to the streets and lanes of the city, and bring in the poor and maimed and blind and lame.' And the servant said, 'Sir, what you commanded has been done, and still there is room.' And the master said to the servant, 'Go out to the highways and hedges, and compel people to come in, that my house may be filled. For I tell you, none of those men who were invited shall taste of my banquet.' "
>
> (Luke 14:15-24)

AS THE BLIND MAN poked his way down the sidewalk, he was still overwhelmed with the splendor and fellowship of the banquet in which he had just participated. Though a man of little learning, he knew that the banquet was more than the lavish provisions which he had tasted and the generous people whom he had enjoyed. He was correct. If we understand banquets as the Jews and Jesus did, we will recognize them to be representative of the Kingdom of God. The Jews associated the advent of the messianic kingdom with banquets of food more delicious than manna. Jesus said at his last supper: "I will no more drink of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the Kingdom of God" (Mk. 14:25). Jesus was explaining that it was the

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last meal of fellowship in which he would participate with his disciples before his death, but that he would be present with those who met for meals of fellowship in the future. The banquet that has attracted our attention was for the dispossessed, and it can be understood to represent the Kingdom of God.

One of the last to leave the banquet was a particularly tattered beggar. As he meandered through the shadows toward his distant home, he was much absorbed in thought. He had almost reached his home when another beggar emerged to ask him for a cigarette. The second beggar was surprised when he received one. He asked the first beggar where he had been all evening. The latter responded: "I have had quite an experience tonight. This guy came up to me and asked me to go to some banquet I had never heard of before. Of course I didn't believe him at first, but he kept on and on at me, and finally I decided he wasn't trying to put one over on me. But can you see *me* going to a banquet! I told this guy that I couldn't go because my clothes are all torn up and I don't have any shoes. He said that it was a great honor to be invited to this banquet, but that I was fit to accept the honor. He kept on and on at me, so I figured, what have I got to lose?

"It was a long walk, but it was worth it. You should have been there. So much food and so many people! But what I still can't understand is why the guy who paid for the thing would put out such a spread just for us. Sanchez and another guy who pushes dope and porno were there. Everybody was there!

"Another thing I can't understand. There was this fellow there who was kinda different. He sat there and ate like the rest of us, but he seemed to know why all this was happening. Everybody noticed him. And the strangest thing, as I was leaving he walked up to me and gave me this pair of shoes. Then he went over to a J.D. and I saw that the shoes had been his own."

The beggar then walked on down the alley which is his home. He passed a store-front church in which someone was reading the Bible:

> God has chosen those who are poor in the world to be rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom which he has promised to those who love him. (James 2:5)
>
> Truly, I say to you, the tax collectors and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you (chief priests and elders). (Matt. 21:31)
>
> The very stone which the builders rejected has become the head of the corner; this was the Lord's doing, and it is marvelous in your eyes. (Mk. 12:10)

> The spirit of the Lord is upon me because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord.
>
> (Luke 4:18ff.)

The significance of the banquet we have been considering is enhanced when we realize that in oriental culture the granting of table fellowship is an act of love, acceptance and honor. This table fellowship is also fellowship before God; it is fellowship with Christ. It is this love, acceptance and honor which God in Jesus Christ is providing for the beggar. In it we see God's special love and care for the poor and the outcast. We see the special mission of Jesus to the lowest in society, those for whom we reserve our most deliberate indifference, our special contempt.

We can learn from the beggar that God's grace does not seek those who may think themselves worthy of it; rather, it is God's grace which makes man worthy, and God's grace is the one force which elevates, dignifies and justifies the spirit and the endeavors of man. We are not blessed because we have achieved abundance; we have been granted abundance because we are blessed. We are not loved because we are good; we are good because we are loved. The banquet, therefore, represents the kingdom and sovereignty of God, the remarkable condescension of God, and the inestimable love of God for those who realize they do not deserve it.

Among the last of society's dispossessed to leave the banquet was a J.D., a juvenile delinquent, whose name is Sandy. He, like the beggar, found the generosity of the host of the banquet virtually inconceivable. What more profoundly impressed him, however, was the sheer abundance of the feast. Unable to understand this, and hoping to find an explanation, he went to a priest from whom he had once stolen some food.

The priest explained that the abundance, the brightness and the joy of the banquet were difficult to comprehend because they resemble the splendor of the Kingdom of God, and that all this was being provided by God to the untouchables of the world, to the deprived and the poor, like Sandy. "You see," the priest continued, "the Kingdom of God with all its power and beauty is something we can look forward to in the future; but it is also something we can participate in right now, just as you participated in the banquet. It consists of the finest of all the good things in the world, and the change of all destructive things. Jesus made it clear that when God reigns there occurs a total renewal of the world and individuals in it according to God's original purpose. The Kingdom, therefore, means life—life at its richest, its fullest. In Matthew we find the Kingdom described as 'treasure hidden in a field which a man found and covered up; then in his joy he goes and sells all that he has and buys that field.' It is also described as 'a merchant in search of fine pearls who on finding a pearl of great value went and sold all that he had and bought it.' "

"And what does this mean?" Sandy wondered. The priest explained that the Kingdom of God means, in the immediate sense, the establishment of a dynamic relationship between the individual and God, the rule of justice, the presence of love in the hearts of men, the deliverance of the individual from sin, mental and nervous disorder, fear and despair; it means communication and cooperation between different nationalities and different religions; it means the abolition of hunger, poverty, war and preparations for war; it means the strengthening of the positive forces in society—art, industry, education and science; it means new hope for wholeness, freedom and peace. "It also means, Sandy," the priest continued, "all that you need as a person, as an individual spirit, as a child of God; all that you need to insure your wholeness. It means confidence and respect for yourself when you are not with your gang, no more gang wars, a goal beyond the tenement, a purpose and joy beyond the self-defeating race for excitement; it means love beyond mere sex; it means disagreement without hatred, resolution without knives; it means new responsibility and great hope."

Sandy sat happily astonished. "Can this really be given to *me*?" he asked.

"Was there room for you at the banquet, Sandy?"

"I got there very late," Sandy replied. "There were thousands of people there. Yet there *was* room." After a long pause, Sandy asked again, "Why didn't everyone go to the banquet?"

"There is a story which may help you to answer that, Sandy," the priest replied. "It goes like this:

> A man once gave a great banquet, and invited many; and at the time for the banquet he sent his servant to say to those who had been invited, 'Come, for all is now ready.' But they all alike began to make excuses. The first said to him, 'I have bought a field and I must go out and see it; I pray you, have me excused.' And another said, 'I have

> bought five yoke of oxen, and I go to examine them; I pray you, have me excused.' And another said, 'I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come.'

"In other words," the priest explained, "when the people were first invited they said yes, but when they were actually summoned to come to the banquet as was the custom in those days, they begged off. This is very much like our attitude toward the Kingdom of God. We think it is a good idea and all, but when it comes time to do something about it, when we are actually summoned to participate in the Kingdom, we back off; we make excuses; we say, 'Excuse me God, not just now, I'm busy.'

"There are several important things to notice in the excuses in the story for not participating in the banquet and in our excuses for not participating in the Kingdom of God. The first is the unanimity of the excuses: *all* of those first invited excused themselves. It does seem strange that everyone would not accept the invitation, especially when that to which they were invited was a banquet of such splendid proportions.

"The second thing to note is that every excuse is of the I-have-done-such-and-so-variety. Because *I* have done something, I cannot attend the banquet. Do we not often let something which we have done and to which we have become too attached come between us and God? Should we not instead concentrate upon and participate in what *God* has done and is doing? Sometimes, in fact, we concentrate so intensely upon what we are doing for God, we forget what God has done for us.

"In the third place, each excuse was made up at the last minute; each could have and should have been anticipated when the initial assent was given. This indicates that the initial assent was not really serious. Had there been serious intent to go through with the initial assent when it was given, future contingencies would have been anticipated. Perhaps our initial "yes" to God's invitation to participate in his Kingdom is likewise only half-hearted; perhaps we don't really mean to commit ourselves and really engage ourselves and actually participate after all.

"Finally, each excuse reveals the same attitude toward the host of the banquet. This attitude is not antipathy; rather it is courteous disassociation—the kind of luke-warm, maybe tomorrow indifference we often show toward God. This attitude regards the host as a person of little consequence whom we can deal with purely as we please. Do we not often attempt to deal with God in the same way—as someone of equal authority to our own, someone with whom we can fudge a bit? This attitude also fails to appreciate all the preparations which the host has put into the banquet. Similarly, preparation for the royal banquet to which Christ summons each of us began before the times of the prophets and has proceeded through Moses, Abraham, Christ and up to the present day. Has the seriousness of our response been commensurate with the magnitude of our Lord's preparation of the Kingdom, and the love with which he invites each of us to participate in it?

"Now, why did the men in this story make these excuses? Why did they not strongly desire to participate in the banquet? The reason is not that they had responsibilities with regard to a field, a yoke of oxen, or a wife. There is no incompatibility between the thorough enjoyment of a farm or a wife and accepting the invitation; nor is there any between being a disciple and using earthly good fully, truly enjoying it. The incompatibility comes in our false estimation of these: when we put them first they make our participation in the feast impossible.

"When we put the invitation and participation in the Kingdom first, we then can understand properly the meaning of sacrifice. Sacrifice is not something we *must* do, something we are forced to do; it is something which we naturally do. It is hardly even sacrifice! When it is said that a mother is sacrificing for her child, this is the description of an outside observer (and probably not one who has ever been a mother). So intent is the mother upon securing the best for her child that her own interests and discomforts are secondary if they are perceived at all; she would have it no other way. Furthermore, sacrifice basically does not mean rejecting the world—the field, the oxen, the wife, and their enjoyment—for these are all a part of the banquet with which a loving Lord has provided us. Sacrifice means, rather, an attitude, a willingness to subordinate one's relationship to these to one's relationship with the Lord, and a willingness, if it is the Lord's will, to part sometime, anytime, with them. It is to emphasize the determinative relationship which we are privileged to have with the Lord that the strong language is used in Luke 14 immediately following the story of the three excuses above:

> If any one comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple. And whoever does not bear his own cross and

> come after me, cannot be my disciple. So therefore, whoever of you does not renounce all that he has cannot be my disciple.

"Why is it that we lack this determinative relationship with the Lord, that we fail to derive nourishment and joy from participation in his Kingdom, that we are unwilling to subordinate all else to this cooperation and participation with him? There is one striking reason. We fail to perceive the splendor of the Kingdom. Once we have the slightest glimpse of the abundance of God's table we recognize our profound need. Because of the magnificence of his provisions, we recognize also our utter impotence to supply our need. The recognition of our great need and our impotence to meet our need precedes our acceptance of the invitation. You have just been granted this glimpse, Sandy; most are not so fortunate as you.

"The reason that most have never been allowed a glimpse of grandeur is that priests and ministers have failed to portray the positive, the joyous, the beautiful. Men do not need to be told what is wrong with them. They need to be told what is right with God. You have had a glimpse of what is right with God. More is certain to come, for the resources of God are unlimited and his promises to us are still far beyond our conceiving.

"So you see, Sandy, God summons the poor to feast with him. The poor are those who realize that nothing they have is their own, and who understand that in the end all they have is the Kingdom. You see, Sandy, we are all poor. We are all beggars. Some of us are just slower to realize it. Yet in our poverty we are rich, very rich indeed. For it is our privilege to participate in a banquet of fellowship, a banquet through which God bestows upon us love, acceptance and honor."

> Everyone who thirsts come to the waters; and he who has no money, come, buy and eat! Come, buy wine and milk without money and without price. Why do you spend your money for that which is not bread, and your labor for that which does not satisfy? . . . Incline your ear, and come to me; hear, that your soul may live and I will make with you an everlasting covenant. . . . (Isaiah 55:1-3)

THE CONSUMER AS THE MAN OF FAITH

BY J. RANDALL NICHOLS

I. PREFATORY REMARKS

Because this is a somewhat unusual treatment of an unusual book, several prefatory items should be mentioned by way of explanation. The book most centrally involved in the essay is Marshall McLuhan's *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (McGraw-Hill Paperback, 1965). All parenthesized page numbers refer to this book and this edition, and will not be noted further. McLuhan presents some devilish problems in interpretation, largely I think because he is trying to write *as* the artist he sees as prophet in the electric age. One can very nearly begin anywhere in the book, work forward or backward, and still have the author's meaning. He will not be reduced to outline or topical sequence, and so like an academic vulture I have circled him again and again, picking up more of his thought with each "swoop."

This leads me to say that this essay is more an art exercise than a bit of research. It could have been shorter or longer with little difference in the essential evidence and thesis. As it developed, however, more elaborate illustration and restatement of thought in different ways seemed necessary to get a decent picture of McLuhan and the theological use I want to make of him. I may, of course, stand in need of absolution for taking a small subject and making of it an impossibly large picture; that will be for the reader to say. In any event, there is not much more logical outline or development to my thoughts than to McLuhan's, and although I recommend starting at the beginning, I cannot allow the reader to anticipate any precise analytical development to a soaring conclusion.

Two terms in particular recur regularly and need some advance explanation. *Gestalt* is not necessarily used as the orthodox gestalt psychologist would use it, although the similarities are obvious. What

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I intend by the word is a completed image, which may be pictographic, purely verbal, or even behavioral. It should be taken generally.

More difficult is the dual term *information/media*, which the McLuhan reader will recognize as used here with considerable generality. A very troubling question to ask is "What is information, anyway?" Basically I believe it comes to be the contents of nearly any perceptory experience which is mediated to the receiver by some agency intervening between the experience of perception and the perceiving sense. This puts us very close to the old metaphysical feud between the idealists and the realists, of course, but one distinction which may persuade the Berkelians to put down their imaginary rifles will be to say that the mediators of information are always distinguishable from the information. Hence the difference between media and information, and the distinction between media and the perceptual forms imposed by the mind on raw, unstructured sense data (if such truly exist). When, therefore, we begin to speak of theology as information, or the "divine information," the reader will understand that God is being talked about, but not the purely private God of mystical or devotional experience.

This paper is essentially a study in communication, and if something inherently cannot be communicated it is not information and not our subject. What we say *about* the something—by analogy, perhaps—is, of course, a different story. The whole thesis I am arguing can be introduced by saying that the image of the consumer of information has changed in the electric technology of our day, and that with it the image of the man of faith has changed insofar as the man of faith has always been at a more general level a consumer of theological information.

I have not taken the space to draw out implications of my remarks for the individual theological disciplines. It will be obvious, however, that the Christian educator and the homiletician will be affected most directly by the speculations and criticisms herein. If there is merit to my thought I would like to see it concretized in these directions.

II. INTRODUCTION

The subject of this essay is one problem, one question to which we ministers must find an answer in order to be about our business of preaching the gospel of God's saving revelation in Jesus Christ: What is man *like* now? That is a cumbersome question, which we would never dream of entertaining without elaboration and/or dissection into its parts. But that is the context of this discussion.

Notice that I am not asking "What is man?" although before college sophomores began to study theology that was a perfectly good question. It is ruined now, I think. Nor am I concerned with "What age are we living in?" although sweeping methodological distinctions between the "machine age" and the "electric age" are made and used. The "like" in "What is man like?" is a crucial word, as will be seen in a moment, because it is the clue both to understanding what the trouble is and to finding out how to fix it. What I am finally going to say is that the theologian as prophet/artist is constantly working with information about God, but information he knows and presents by analogy, as in any artistic medium. The whole context of his efforts is that something is *like* something else. His theological task is representational, i.e., aesthetic.

Although this is not a book review, a single book is never far from the discussion, Marshall McLuhan's *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man.* As will be apparent I am adopting McLuhan to my own ends, and avoiding tempting forays into criticism of his occasionally weak arguments and material. McLuhan is on an intellectual romp, and it seemed a pleasant thing to romp with him. He is, to be sure, saying some important things and some new things, and not just about media and information transmission. It is his picture of the present post-war American scene that is interesting, because it offers some surrealistic views of modern man in his technology, his "electric age." They are surrealistic partly because they are predictions about the future, partly because they are glances at things you cannot see—God, desire, ambition, pain, etc.—and partly because they just are not true, i.e., they are not representations of life as it is, but visions of what life is like, analogies between two things one of which exists and the other of which does not—so far as the poor ordinary man is concerned—in order that what really is may be separated in truth from what really is not. Things are not as they seem, in a word, but the concern is not for their being seen as they are, so much as for their seeming like the right things.

I have been concerned to anchor McLuhan's generalizations in something concrete, and therefore I have made an irreverent juxtaposition of economics and theology in such a way that what man is like as a man of faith is not totally different from what he is like in the marketplace, as a consumer (of information, always, if nothing else). In the same way my biblical exposition is almost as surrealistic as McLuhan's anthropology: I certainly do not intend for us to believe that Peter was a forerunner of the electric age, but I do intend to maintain that when we have a portrait of the modern consumer we shall be able to say, "Peter was *like* that; the man of faith can be *like* that." Obviously I have just discarded one of McLuhan's main theses, viz., that man is changing into something different in the technological society. I do not believe it. That is the old question of what man *is*. I do believe that man is developing some characteristics that we never saw quite so well or so often before, but that is the question of what man is *like*, and analogies are not time-bound. Peter would not know what to do with a Ford Thunderbird, and the T-bird owner today might be lost in a dinghy. But they are alike somehow; they are equally fantastic characters as men of faith, and it is just that it took the electric light to let us see what they really are like.

III. McLUHAN: MAN IN THE ELECTRIC AGE

I suspect that McLuhan fancies himself in the role of artist violently in revolt against the Gutenbergians, and so he is not as upset as his readers are about the string of interchangeable adjectives he uses to describe the present age and its anxious denizens. McLuhan cannot be forced into a rational outline, I have concluded, and it may be that the best way to grasp him is in "swoops," several passes in each of which a few more bits of his material are gathered up and put in place (pace!). There is little more order to the "swoops" than to his book; when the last pass has been made we will hopefully have enough material to know what he is saying.

McLuhan's protagonists are, in a manner of speaking, Gutenberg and Henry Ford. They stand for an age that is almost over, a machine age whose cultural neurosis is not hallucination but repetition compulsion. We are capable of doing the same thing over and over and over, whether reading letters (or setting them in type), or assembling automobiles. *Repeatability*, there is one adjective. "The car and the assembly line had become the ultimate expression of Gutenberg technology; that is, of uniform and repeatable processes applied to all aspects of work and living" (221).

In such a society as this things become very small and distinct, for the essence of the Gutenberg technology is that it puts small things together to make large things, and it does so in repeatable sequences so as to be uniformly productive. There you have two more adjectives for the machine age: *fragmentary* and *sequential* (6-8, 63). The picture we are getting is of a man who has a certain task which is part of the whole sequence of operations, the final result of which is a product larger than and different from any single operation that went into it. The whole process is *implosive* and *centralizing*, other adjectives.

McLuhan is talking about information, of course, not industry, which only enters the picture as an illustration of the way media work. The man who reads his morning paper differs little from the assembly line worker. The one puts nuts and bolts together, the other assembles letters again and again and they will not change; if ever he asks "Just what have we here on this page?" he can only conclude that there are many little fragments arranged in sequences that can be relied upon to repeat themselves on command. The end of a sentence and the end of an assembly line are really the same so far as the medium (in which the information conveyed is an experience of the thing—car or sentence), is concerned.

Delayed is another adjective to describe the age.[1] The forming of the sequence takes time; there is always a delay between any fragment and the completed product, always a delay between the starting up and the getting there of the medium. A warm-up period is necessary. The man who begins to read knows that the completed sentence is going to say something, but he also knows it will be a while before it actually does. The Aristotelian sees here a final, telic cause; the Gutenbergian, once he is into the electric age, sees only an annoying delay. The electric age's preoccupation with speed betrays its frustration with it. What is really desired is not speed, strictly speaking, but electric instantaneity.

Over against Gutenberg and Ford stands the humble electric light bulb, symbol of a vast change in the machine age technology part of whose picture we picked up on the last "swoop" above. Electricity is, above all, *instantaneous*, the first adjective in a new string which describes the direction man and media are moving. "Sequence yields to the simultaneous" (13). Obviously we are not dealing here with "real" time, for even in something that seems instantaneous and simultaneous there is a reaction time, though the child who stands entranced switching the light on and off trying to catch the time lag will not be able to see it. A more traditional way of putting the difference might be to say that quantitative changes increase to the point of becoming qualitative changes, so that the sequence gets faster and faster and then ceases to be a sequence but becomes a simultaneous occurrence of several events. Then it is only a small step—on the other side of the quantitative/qualitative bridge—to say that the whole media process is not many events but one, hence *integral* rather than fragmentary. And there is another adjective to describe the electric age. Automation replaces the assembly line, so that many things are done at once: they are integrated, not assembled.

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[1] Or, to be more precise, the media through which anything we know about the age is transmitted—I see the two working almost interchangeably in McLuhan.

In this electric age the gestalt psychologist is again respectable, for pattern recognition—instantaneous, simultaneous, integral, etc.—is a closer analogy to human consciousness and awareness than data classification ever was. We are naturally more seer than sorter, and we like pictures better than words. The pattern is an icon, a "large region of experience in tiny compass" (20), and seeing an icon is to traverse the whole region instantly and in one act. In a classic gestalt illustration, we do not see the woman's profile as a series of disjointed lines which by some optical trick seem to be a woman's face. We see the picture as a woman's face right from the start, or we see it as meaningless. In parlor trick photographs where some real thing is cleverly camouflaged, recognition—once it occurs—is instant. We cannot point to an interval in time when slowly the bits of data—visual in this case—assembled into progressively a more intelligible pictorial statement, into information. Whatever delay there is is not while waiting for the fragments to march forward and account for themselves, but for the interpreter to look the whole assemblage over and figure out what in the world it is. That difference becomes very important a little later.

Thus far we have been talking about the means of transmission of information as though they were purely external to man. Now we must make another "swoop" at McLuhan to pick up perhaps his most crucial thesis, viz., that media (as distinguished from their contents) are profoundly related to man by being extensions of his senses, of the way he perceives his world, and nature. The wheel is an extension of the foot, for instance. The significance of the electric age is that through electric technology, especially the computer, man's entire central nervous system is extended technologically. That explains why the electric age is closer than was the machine age to the consciousness of man. As a matter of fact, the electric age is nothing more than an extension of this consciousness, which presumably has always rebelled at the Gutenberg technology as something alien to its basically artistic nature.

Indeed, such natural suitability of the extensions of man bestows on McLuhan's intellectual gyrations the aura of religious rite, as will be apparent in a long quotation:[3]

> The aspiration of our time for wholeness, empathy and depth of awareness is a natural adjunct of electric technology. The age of mechanical industry that preceded us found vehement assertion of private outlook the natural mode of expression. Every culture and every age has its favorite model of perception and knowledge that it is inclined to prescribe for everybody and everything. The mark of our time is its revulsion against imposed patterns. We are suddenly eager to have things and people declare their beings totally. *There is a deep faith to be found in this new attitude—a faith that concerns the ultimate harmony of all being.* (5-6, emphasis supplied)

The same age that wants totally to declare its being has in effect totally declared its consciousness in the extension of the central nervous system through electric technology. There seems to be no reason why all being should not be integrable into the same pattern.[4]

It is not, however, an altogether healthy public disclosure of being, for extending a sense may mean dulling, closing, or amputating it, or worse, "auto-amputating" it, so that it comes to have an independent existence "out there." Such an undertaking, in the interests of avoiding pain and self-recognition, and of maintaining equilibrium is, however, suicidal.[5] When one sense is amputated and the other senses

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[3] Let me confess a confusion as to which age McLuhan really likes. Sometimes he is nostalgic for the old days of Ford and Gutenberg. Other times he is frankly irritated with them. The present quotation seems to find him in a good mood with the electric age, but we cannot rely on that all the time.

[4] The theological problem is already obvious: if the medium for the transmission of this total being is an extension of human consciousness, how will God be expressed, who is not part of man's consciousness? That, in most sweeping terms, is our present problem, and it is no wonder that "God is dead." The absence of God is the natural result of the electric technology, to the extent that information about God has had to have sequentially oriented media for presentation.

[5] McLuhan, pp. 42-43. I do not find the dynamics of this autoamputation altogether clear. Apparently the c.n.s. is just overburdened with information and resorts to an extension in the computer to relieve its pain. Manifestly, the wheel was the invention of a race of sore feet, while the computer comes from a long line of soreheads. The interesting thing is that this totally declared, natural faith is just as much concerned—subliminally at least—with something "out there" as highly mythological supernaturalism.

"close" around it, sensation remains 100 per cent, so the dictum goes, but without the amputated faculty. There is clearly something more than good-natured paternal irritation to the father's lament that his automobile bound teenager will ultimately lose the use of his feet! McLuhan would say that this is exactly what will happen, artistically speaking, and that if the central nervous system is extended we may expect a general numbing of consciousness. Narcissus is the slave of his mirror image, as the technologically extended man is the slave of his technology.

What would such a man be like? In the final "swoop" over McLuhan we are back to the original question. The answer is really quite simple: the electrically extended Narcissus is like *pure information*:

> In this electric age we see ourselves being translated more and more into the form of information, moving toward the technological extension of consciousness. . . . Under electric technology the entire business of man becomes learning and knowing. (57-58)

The electric heresy is clearly a neon gnosticism. When consciousness is irritated, extended, benumbed, and autoamputated, the sense closure that follows confirms the transformation. Man can then recognize the pattern of his being only through a medium, only as something to be learned and known, only as information. It is the end to introspection.

Now the string of adjectives to describe the electric age becomes a strangling cord. Narcissus is instantaneous, integral, once-for-all, uniform; he has made his electric medium, and the contents of it are himself; he does not move; he is no longer human. Whether this is good or bad theologically I will leave for a later section. A single ambiguous quotation will illustrate the possibilities:

> . . . Might not our current translation of our entire lives into the spiritual form of information seem to make of the entire globe, and of the human family, a single consciousness? (61)

Some would see this as new hope for the family of man, a renewed domesticity among men and nations. Others would see a uniform dullness and dehumanization.

We can use McLuhan's beginning to get a picture of man which has theological dimensions, of considerable importance in the later sections of this essay. The danger of the machine age was that its fragmentation in media would also fragment the men who created the media out of themselves, and then consumed the media back into themselves. That danger has been realized, and we now face the explosive interpenetration of machine and electric cultures, in which situation man's transitional media have made him a trifle schizoid.

Sequential operations and task orientation are threatening to the instantaneous electric age man. Formerly he could perform his repeatable task—whether on the assembly line or in less obviously sequential positions—and the evaluation of his labors would wait for the finished product (on the industrial analogy). With the printed word, as we have seen, the reader was content to be puzzled until the data were classified and he could make a judgment on their meaning. He would never say, "That sentence makes no sense" until he had read it, and reading it was a sequential, task oriented operation. Here is the crucial thing I am suggesting: evaluation of the meaning of an operation could and had to wait until the operation culminated in a "product." The fragmented bits of information resolved into a communicable result, which was not evaluable until then.

The new electric age man will not wait for that, and this haste is of the essence of electric technology, pattern recognition, and the like. No longer are his operations in, on, and over against media conceived as *tasks*, whose value lies solely in their orientation toward the completion of the task. The key word now is *role*, whether in the productive or the perceptive process. In instantaneous operations the question of role, what happens *now*, means that an evaluation of the operation need not wait to be made. The process which formerly could be called a task is now complete at its inception, though it may develop and become larger. The gestalt is complete with a few lines, and no matter how many more lines we add—even to the extent of having a photographic likeness— its identity will not change.

Now there is a difficulty here which involves changing the metaphor of information transmission and/or production. *Rather than thinking of an object being assembled, we should now begin to think in terms of a confusion being clarified,* which is exactly what happens with pattern recognition as opposed to data classification. Time—bringing with it that nemesis of the electric age, sequence—is a necessary evil in the essentially non-temporal resolution of chaos into order, of nonsense into meaning, of random data into recognizable pattern.

When we ask, then, What is man like? we will keep in mind this radical change from task orientation to role playing.[6] It may be that we will not escape the typographic technology or the assembly line technology that are the best illustrations of this way of living. But the image of electric age man is that of a man looking at an icon, not reading a line of type; creating in his single operation the whole result, which will be no better or different from the operation he performs, whether putting a tiny piece into an unassembled automobile, or sitting down to read.

IV. DANGERS OF THE ELECTRIC AGE

Why, we must now ask, is the new age of electric technology fraught with peril? What was there about the Gutenbergian which was so precious and worth saving? If man can be like superman, why not let him go ahead and be it? Why not let his fantasies match his genuine technological achievements? Here we must pay strict attention to the irrationality of those processes we are discussing. Technology does not affect man at the level of his opinions or concepts, says McLuhan (18), but in his sense ratios, his patterns of perception. The danger here is numbness, self-annihilation through autoamputation not of concepts of rationality, but of man's awareness and perception of himself as a patterned human being. Man become pure information—no matter how "spiritual"—is no longer man, and will no longer treat other information-units as men.

There stands to be a radical transformation in theology, the first fruits of which we have probably already reaped in the "new morality," and situational ethics, which are especially attractive to the electric age man who insists on evaluating his performance *now*, rather than waiting for the completion of the task and evaluation with reference to a result. That is, I suggest, another way of saying that the absolutes and norms of Gutenberg ethics have dissolved, and what we have is a recreation of "the norms of status and role" (224).

Put another way (not to be confused with McLuhan's discussion of the same thing, page 26, which I believe is hopelessly confused) the question is whether in the transmission of information, i.e., in an ethical decision making operation, we are after the *effect* or the *meaning* of a given situation. Whatever evil we may want to find in the electric age (contrary to McLuhan) the ethical, evaluatory judgment it seeks to make is "What does this mean? What is this pattern?" When sequence is abandoned the productive, delayed-in-time effect of one thing on another is an unimportant piece of information. Rather than find a meaning which is possibly painful, man extends and amputates the part of himself which would be affected by the meaning. It will do little good to talk about right or wrong, or the meaning of persons, or the salvation in Jesus Christ, if the information we are talking about is divorced from the person we are talking to; and such a rupture is exactly what threatens to happen in the electric age. As McLuhan has it, "Under electric technology the entire business of man becomes learning and knowing. . . . All forms of wealth result from the movement of information." (58) This is a modern version of gnosticism, and the death blow to that Socratic optimism which thought that knowing the good and doing the good were related as night follows day. No more. The good, insofar as it had to do with a result, a product, a delayed action to which we were related as task is to completion, has disappeared; and knowing and doing are indistinguishable. As McLuhan has said, *à la* Bertrand Russell, the electric age has discovered the technique of suspended judgment, which is another way of saying it is not important to look for effect, or to classify data (in, for instance, an ethical scheme), but to see meaning and recognize patterns.

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[6] "Role" is admittedly a difficult word, and overworked in many contexts. As I am using it here and throughout the paper it signifies a single important fact about a man's participation in his media, or about his life generally: whatever operation he does is never separated from the result (in Gutenbergian terminology). Though his performance may come at the first of the "drama," it is immediately evaluable, not separate from the entire play. In the electric age he participates in the result at the moment of his single operation, unlike the Gutenbergian—the modern reader—who sets the first letters of type or reads them and then waits for that operation to be a part of the total result.

We may now say, if it was not implicit before, that theology (seen, for instance, in ethics) has become aesthetics, as man's inclination to move himself has become, as with Narcissus, the determination to contemplate himself as separate from himself. If man before could consider the consequences of his actions for a yet unrealized result, or a yet unfulfilled good, he now has no more to do than assess his knowledge not of actions but of the information he has become. We are, as McLuhan says, "losing all confidence in our right to assign guilt" (16), to which the corollary must be added, we are losing all sense of our susceptibility to being guilty.

V. SOLA GRATIA: PETER ON THE WATER[7]

Let us make no mistake by calling McLuhan a theologian, or even by forcing his generalizations and illustrations into a conceptual theological mold. His theories have to do with sense ratios and patterns of perception, and if a theological view of his work is to be meaningful it must accept in evidence perceptual data and theory. This is built into a media study: the contents of media may be completely rational and conceptual, but the way the media operate as carriers of information is non-rational.

Now let us put the problem baldly: electric age man who insists on having an active role in the electric technology which gives him his information about the world will hardly be receptive to the presentation of a situation where information about his salvation is received passively, sequentially, fragmentarily and over a span of time. The man to whom *sola gratia* appeals, as much as the devout pre-Reformation merit theologian, is a Gutenbergian. Electric age man, living under completely different conditions of perceiving his world, seems to demand some things that cannot be had even in a less than extreme version of justification by faith alone.

For example: we have said that man in the electric age needs to be able to evaluate the meaning of his information instantaneously, without waiting for fragments to pile up into a result. His ethics are situational, immediate, gestaltish. Take his "information" about the state of his being vis-à-vis God, human possibility, the afterlife, in a word about his salvation. Will he not want to make a judgment of meaning on that *right now*? Or put it in terms the consumer will find familiar: will the man of faith be content to consume the theological product without referring it to a situation where he is in the role, somehow, of producer as well as consumer; where he gets into the economic act not as the logical but separate result of the assembly line but as part of the gestalt which includes the result not as a sequentially constructed product but as an experience of life without which the gestalt would not be merely lacking something but would not exist at all as that gestalt?

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[7] I do not intend here to discuss the doctrine as a theological concept. Rather I have taken the phrase, *sola gratia,* to use as expressing the perception (not the conception) that participation in salvation is low: God does most if not all the work, irrespective of what man does. That is not sharp enough for a theological formulation, of course, but I think it conveys some of the emotion behind the man of faith's theological position, and that is all my use of *sola gratia* intends to do. *Sola gratia* is a medium, not theological information.

If absolute honesty about the state of man's sin, finitude, and inability to earn salvation is requisite for salvation—true confession—can we long hope to be persuasive in that theology when man is less and less honest in his dealing with information, even to the extent that he is dealing with himself not as man but as information? I find it hard to believe that the superman consumer of the electric age, who is becoming pure instantaneous information, will somehow become a tame and respectable Gutenbergian again when we approach his perceptual apparatus with a theological picture of sinful, finite man in need of a redemption in which he has little if any productive part or creative role.

If electric age man is to play a role rather than execute a task in his life, then we must ask what role he is to play in his salvation. Recall "the electric forces that are now ending this mechanical age of uniformity and standardization, *and recreating the norms of status and role*" (224, emphasis supplied). We wonder just what the recreated role is, and whether in the role of instantaneous superman man can perceive the information theology has to offer about man as a creature of God in need of God's sustenance and redemption.

A biblical character comes to mind as illustration of this disparity between the consumer of information and what theology holds up as the man of faith. It is Peter walking on the water—impatient Peter—and while I do not pretend this to be biblical exposition there is a strikingly contemporary theological gestalt to be found here.[8] The astounding and often forgotten thing about this story is that Peter succeeded in walking on the water for quite a while! Let us put this into McLuhan's idiom, and say that Peter extended himself into an altogether new medium. It was a simple test: if Jesus was really the son of God, then Peter ought to be able to walk on the water. That is a non sequitur to the Gutenbergian, but perfectly understandable in the electric age. Peter simply asks to be included in the picture he has of God's son Jesus. He is in the producer role, not the consumer role at this point. He recognizes the pattern of divinity—walking on

[8] I am treating this story much like an advertisement, viz., as an icon, encompassing in small space a much larger region of experience, to borrow McLuhan. It might be well to tickle our interests a little and wonder how the Bible as a forthright example of a medium will fare in the electric age. I take McLuhan as ammunition for a non-verbal interest of mine which if it did not turn the Bible into a picture book would nevertheless translate sequential stories and doctrinal reflections into iconic presentations, whether visual or audial.

the water, suspending natural laws—and like Narcissus recognizes that this could be himself. Jesus as the medium of God is a recognizable extension of humanity, and Peter who sees himself in that same gestalt makes electric age man's mistake of supposing the self-extension has a real existence "out there." Peter "amputates" himself from his situation in the boat and is willing to become *utterly part of the information he receives* in the sight of Jesus walking on the water.

Thus far we could take this as a signal illustration of faith, a total giving of oneself to the divine information, and we would be right in so doing. But Peter falters when he sees the gust of wind coming up, an element he had not originally included in this gestalt of faithful coalescence with the Master, and he begins to sink. That is to say he realizes that the transformation into information is not complete. When Jesus chides him for the near disaster, the reference is not to his presumptuousness in trying to walk on the water, but strangely (and irritatingly for most interpreters!) he criticizes Peter for not going ahead, for not having enough faith to keep on walking.

Something very important happens next in this icon. They all return to the boat and the wind dies down. Time for another try at the water? Not a bit of it! Now they are ready to confess that Jesus is the son of God. That strikes us as distinctly odd, as though the miracle were of little avail, and as though the communication of the information about Jesus took place in the mundane rather than the dramatic, supernatural instance.[9]

In what sense can we say that Peter and the modern consumer are the same? They both want to leave their present tasks and take on new roles in the drama which information they receive tells them is being played. Both see themselves as abandoning an old status of fragmentation, being bound to a sequence, and cleaving to a new status of integrity in which sequence is escaped. Natural laws are suspended in both cases. In both cases the delay in transmission of information is eliminated. Peter closes the time gap between him and Jesus, and the consumer closes the time gap in the production process. But the most important similarity for our purposes is that both are men of little faith: both are fooled into extending themselves beyond their limitations *in order to be like something else.* The self-extension ends either in suicidal denial of self-recognition and amputation of the self (i.e., becoming pure information) or, *in what*? That is the crucial question for the theologian who wishes to put electric age man into his theological icon.

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[9] I realize that a plausible interpretation would be that the whole spectacle had persuaded them of Jesus' divinity, and that they would not have made the confession otherwise. The Marcan interpretation, however, seems to support my view. Mark leaves the matter of a test of divinity or identification of Jesus entirely alone, saying that the disciples just did not understand. Matthew says, in effect, that they understood all right, but they did *not* understand the miracle ("men of little faith" being roughly equivalent to "hardened their hearts": their perceptual patterns did not recognize the pattern of divinity in either case). Their reaction to the miracle is the same; only their subsequent relationship is changed.

What is the man like whose self-extension does not result in suicidal amputation of self-consciousness? He is the electric age man of faith, as much as he is the electric age consumer, for the medium in which the information is handled can be no different for him as man of faith than as consumer.[10] We shall propose a theological answer to the question What is man like? which intends to offer the alternative to annihilation in total extension of the consciousness in electric technology.

VI. THE DELAYED PAROUSIA

We turn now to the problem of the "delayed parousia," not in the familiar biblical-historical sense, but in the sense of a theological icon which reveals a problem in handling theological information in the electric age. Often in the foregoing pages we have referred to the instantaneity and immediateness of the electric age. The general principle at work here, which produces a certain urgency in the modern man's handling of information, is the desire to make judgments of meaning and/or value without waiting to refer the momentary task to the final result. Ethics is already familiar with the problem, and McLuhan observes that we are "losing all confidence in our right to assign guilt" (16). This is really the decline of a productive, task-oriented way of life and media. It would not be strictly proper to say that absolutes give way to the transitory, for that misunderstands the nature of absolutes, whose ethical utility follows not from being immutable so much as from being delayed, uninfluenced by the operations of a present ethical decision making operation or information transporting operation. There must be a built in delay between the situation and the absolute rule or being (God, perhaps) by which the situation is judged to have a certain meaning, perhaps a meaning of "right" or "wrong." The delay may be temporal, as in a crude casuistic system, "If you do something, then subsequently you will be punished or rewarded," or it may be purely spatial, as "Your situation now is punished or rewarded by a being (or rule) which is not in the same situation." What threatens the absolute, then, is not the transitory or the relative, but the instantaneous. Absolutes cannot work *without* a delay, and the electric age cannot work *with* a delay. Or to put it differently, unless the standard of judgment (functionally, the absolute) is somehow part of the instant process, the recognized pattern or gestalt, the standard will not apply to the interpretation of the information at hand. High participation electric age man simply will not wait around, for such a delay threatens his sense of participation: such a delay is what causes him initially to extend himself such that the participation is high.

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[10] This, I suspect, lies at the root of the always troublesome affirmation that the Bible is the word of God in fallible human word matrices. What we are really saying is that the medium is human and the contents divine, and heretofore that has always made all the difference. Not so in the electric age where the "medium is the message." We are going to have to reckon—as "Christian atheism" struggles to do—with the fact that God meant business when he reduced himself to human media. We can hold out no longer for a theological differentia in contents, when the media of God and man are the same.

We come then to a curious theological contradiction. We have always said, in a vain attempt to orient man toward the future and his salvation, that we condemn him for what he is now, but value him for what he can become, perhaps in heaven. Blessed no more, however, are those who wait around, for the kingdom of heaven cannot be delayed and still be a kingdom. In a word, religion at this point has always held a view in which man was *like* the logical symbol for condition, if . . . then. That symbol has little meaning as a way of handling information now. And if man is in the "if," and God in the "then," the ethical "closure" of electric age man will come about without God and/or without meaning.[11]

But we wonder whether the resulting closure will really find the pattern sufficiently complete and actually recognized. It is possible, after all, for the information to be transmitted but not as well as we would like it. We make the basically aesthetic judgment that although the pattern is recognizable it is not altogether pleasing; that although there is meaning here it is not altogether pleasant meaning, is therefore painful and anxiety-ridden. Faced with this uneasiness, electric age man may begin to wonder whether he is right in dismissing time along with sequence, whether the old metaphysical adage that time is the measure of change is in fact to the point, where change is a sequential operation. Would it be possible, for instance, to speak meaningfully of time without sequence? Or to put the matter still more broadly, will it still be possible to speak of the transmission of information *in time* in McLuhan's electric age? Everything we have said so far seems to say not; but implicit in all these observations is another option, which I suggest can function as an alternative to the exclusion of delayed information, just as (from the point of view of *sola gratia*) there is an alternative to autoamputation in self-extension. We want to keep (for we have no choice) the electric age extensions of man, and we will keep his impatience with delay. At the same time, however, we will propose that theological and ethical information about God can also be retained, that although man is *like* the electric age this does not mean he must be *unlike* the theological picture we have had of him in the machine age. I propose that the consumer can be the man of faith, and to this proposition we must finally turn.

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[11] Indeed, the handy theological phrase that God can no longer fill in the gaps of life or knowledge is a fortuitous way of putting it. He cannot stop up the gaps in understanding precisely because the closure of sense perception—information receiving and pattern recognition—will not wait for him. God could be real, all right, if he could manage to be on time. The delayed parousia is no delay anymore; it means the parousia cannot happen.

VII. PROPHET AND PRIEST IN THE ELECTRIC AGE

It is McLuhan's cardinal thesis that the effects of the electric technology are felt not at the level of opinion or concept but in altered sense ratios and patterns of perception. A study of media has little to do with content information which will be rationally structured: its concern is strictly with form media which will not themselves be perceived but will determine the way in which the world (i.e., information) will be perceived. Thus the Gutenbergian comes to perceive his world, at least the part of it which he finds in the printed page, as sequential and fragmented. So too the machine age man is capable of perceiving everything in nature on the analogy of the assembly line. He makes the mistake of assuming that nature or God is really as he categorizes it, because the assembly line is an extension of his own sequential, task-oriented way of doing things and this self-extension has a pseudo-existence independently of man. Who can understand this and see it for what it is? Only the artist, says McLuhan:

> No society has ever known enough about its actions to have developed immunity to its new extensions or technologies. Today we have begun to sense that art may be able to provide such immunity. (64)

In McLuhan the artist's work is primarily noetic:

> The artist is the man in any field, scientific or humanistic, who grasps the implications of his actions and of new knowledge in his own time. He is the man of integral awareness. (65)

The artist can avert the blows of the new technology before the extended senses are benumbed. I suggest that this is only saying that the artist plays two roles familiar to theology, those of prophet and priest. If we can determine to what extent theology can be "artistic" in this electric age sense, we may have a way of knowing what the consumer as man of faith is like.

Let us recognize first that what the prophet essentially does is to recognize the patterns his media offer before other people do. While the pharisees are toying with content, the prophet is interested in media, even in a biblical sense. The prophet's sense closure comes faster and can therefore recognize more patterns with less data than other men's. Just so in the biblical prophets you have the prophetic sign, the holy act. Jeremiah with the yoke around his neck is an artist. Other people could not see the delimiting and enslaving nature of either the law or coexistence with the enemy. Jeremiah did see it, made the closure, and showed the medium of Israel's salvation-information (whether legal or political) for what it was, a yoke of slavery. In much the same way, perhaps, Jesus' calling over the waves to Peter was a prophetic sign, a way of showing Peter how over-extended he was in trying to make the divine information flow through the medium of humanity. Because the medium within another medium is an art form, the artist alone can tell the difference.

So far as theology is concerned, this is what the prophet has usually done, show up the extensions of man for what they are, viz., *over*-extensions; and over-extension has something to do with sin and suffering. We might even see the Fall as an icon expressing the same thing. When Adam and Eve are aware of their extension, having eaten the forbidden fruit, they are aware of their sin. Sin is awareness of over-extension, and the awareness comes when the pattern recognized is chaotic, either no pattern at all, or an ugly pattern. The prophet therefore sees the extension of man as ugly and painful, just as Peter was aware of the wind coming up and his over-extension at the same time. In effect they were the same thing. The non-artist knows only discontent; the prophet knows why the discontent. The prophet stands against most men because at the same time as men are extending themselves to be rid of irritating, painful finitude, the prophet is trying to get them to experience the pain. Electric age man is trying to put himself to sleep, like Narcissus, while the prophet is trying to stir him into sensibility and pain.

Man sees the threatening confusion of his information about himself and the world, and like the characters of tragedy, seeks to clarify and resolve the confusion. What I am calling divine information—God—is handled in exactly the same, resolute way. For electric age man the confusion is the incompleted sequence, the fragmented series, the delayed reaction. The theologian, attempting to be prophet, may tell him that endurance of the sequence—of time perhaps—is necessary for the clarification he seeks, but electric age man is continually fighting that information. Indeed, he should struggle against it. The true prophet will seek equally to show man what he is really like—finite and in danger of over-extending himself (the hybris of the Greeks comes close to this)—but he must not at the same time force man back into a Gutenbergian sequential salvation that is noxious to him.

The prophet can accomplish his task by sharply distinguishing between sequence and time, by showing that a delay need not be waiting on fragments to assemble but on chaos to resolve into clarity. To use an imperfect illustration, the Gutenbergian puts a camera which is aimed away from the subject in front of man, and tells him to wait while the camera slowly pans around to include the subject in its picture. The man will not wait. The true prophet, however, sets *his* camera up aimed squarely at the subject, telling and showing the man that the subject is there in the picture—recognizable all right—but not yet focused. There will be a delay while focusing takes place, but it is not a delay while the sequence (panning, completing the fragments of the compass) is completed. Man can distinguish the pattern right from the start, and the meaning is clear from the start; but he will wait until the picture is clear before he takes it, because although all the data are present their configuration is not yet pleasing to him.

We have come close, I believe, to a very important thing: *Theology, including ethics, in the electric age must be primarily aesthetic.* Peter's loss of faith on the waves is an aesthetic loss of faith, for his picture of himself in that particular iconic situation suddenly had to include the wind. No new logical connections are made, no new data need be introduced. It is simply a clarification of the pattern inherent in what is there all along, just as the man with the camera sees gradually more clearly what he has known was there from the first, but not in sufficient detail for meaning to have been transmitted fully *or beautifully.* The delay which has proved abhorrent to electric age man is not, therefore, a lag in the completion of a sequence, not a logical delay of the if . . . then variety; it is an aesthetic delay, in which the passage of time and the completion of sequence are wholly separated in their relation to the emerging meaningful pattern of information.

But, it will be said, this has not solved the problem; for the delay is what is painful to man—sequence or no sequence—and this is what his self-extension into electric media is designed to eliminate. The objection is really serious, for what we seem to have done (and what McLuhan has done) is include the prophet but exclude the priest. It is fine for man to know these things about himself, but what is there that will enable him to change things? Does knowing make all the difference, or does something have to *happen* to man in order for knowing to count at all? Without the priestly functions the prophet would merely contribute to the transformation of man into pure "spiritual information," becoming a man whose business is only knowing and learning, and whose treasure is stored not in heaven but in a memory cell. Man would rush headlong into an over-extension of himself towards God, to the extent that the divine information he must work with in his media is all homogenous with the human information that he is becoming. That will not do, for that is one of the very things we are trying to prevent. The danger is that the old priestly medium of salvation has become the contents of the new prophetic-noetic medium in such a way that the contents are (following McLuhan) reduced from a status of information to that of art form. We must retain the priestly as a medium in the electric age, at the same time as the prophetic/artistic media are preserved.

This can all be done, I suggest, in an aesthetic, pattern-oriented theology which takes seriously the two phenomena of covenant and suffering. What theology must do is show that the delay in information handling which is painful is itself a meaningful experience of pain; which will be a way of saying that *so far as meaning is concerned there is no delay at all*; and that is thoroughly consonant with the electric technology and information handling we now have. This can be accomplished, but *only* after the above distinction between time delay and sequence delay has been made. The delay is meaningfully endured precisely for this reason, that what is happening in the interval is a clarification process that is inherently instantaneous—a tending to closure which *can* happen at any moment, unlike a logical, Gutenbergian sequence in which closure inherently *cannot* happen until all the fragments are assembled—and in which man must wait not for another fragment but for his own understanding to develop. The ethics of such a theology will be ethics of awareness and relation. Other men, for instance, are no longer fragments man must impatiently wait for; they are elements of his gestalt which he does not yet see clearly because he does not yet have insight about them. His relation to other men and to God is not that of one man on the assembly line to another, nor of typesetter to impatient reader, but is a relation basically of love, of recognizing another man in the fog.

And what that means has everything to do with what has traditionally been called "covenant," the perhaps chaotic presence of God which has the theological result of endowing man's situation with all the elements it needs for meaning right from the very start. The delay is purely a factor of man's limitation; and the suffering of the delay is possible to him when he comes to see that the limitation is not the limitation of one fragment waiting for another fragment, but of one already whole being being arranged, ordered, and clarified by the work of God which is information already wholly present if not wholly accounted for aesthetically. The covenant—this assurance that the data are already classified and now only remain to be recognized in pattern—is possible in the willingness of God to insert himself as divine information into the human medium of Jesus Christ. It is the suffering of Christ that assures man he is not a fragment waiting either for God or another fragment. Christ "over-extended" himself in an amputatory, suicidal way (one might say), but because it was an extension of God humanly, the result was not benumbed death.

The priestly function of the prophet/artist is served, then, when the prophet causes man to see that the extension of himself need not be suicidal, no more than Peter's daring act drowned him, no more than Jesus' death was the end of things. It is in the covenant that *sola gratia* and high participation of man dwell together, for man will himself extend himself so far that the pattern he recognizes will be himself as information; but man will also recognize that unless the pattern includes the divine information it is an ugly pattern, unresolved, chaotic, painful without meaning, knowledge-without-love. It is this inclusion that is sacramental and priestly in effect, and it occurs not so much with contents and information as with the medium itself. Man knows that the closure he wants and finds pleasing *will not occur*—the media will not transmit the information—until his over-extension is recognized as being an extension toward a something he is not like, viz., God. Thus an aesthetic theology, an aesthetic ethic of awareness. We can call such a man a man of faith because for the sake of a pleasing information pattern about himself he has been willing to include (or more precisely, been willing not to be satisfied without) something other than himself, God and other men. When we ask him what man is like, he is at least able to say now that man is like something *besides* pure information; for if our prophet/artist has done a good job in his aesthetic theology the information man handles in his autoamputated self-extension is not enough for him to recognize the pattern of his highest being, and he returns in the electric age not to the Gutenbergian age of sequential degradation, no more than to the electric age of dehumanizing information, but to the age inaugurated by God's information transmission in the medium of humanity, Jesus Christ. He returns to the covenant.

I would not want this essay to end on the absolutely pure note of resolution and aesthetic bliss. We should add that talk about God always includes a willingness to be puzzled about God.[12] This is saying much the same thing I have argued above, viz., that the delay before pattern recognition, closure, clarity, or what have you is itself meaningful through the suffering of Jesus Christ in covenant with suffering man. Being puzzled about God is being puzzled about a suffering God.

All the artist/prophet's work is by analogy. In the last analysis what he says is that God is like man; and because in the suffering of Christ it can be said that God over-extended himself toward man and cut himself off, it can then be said that man's attempt to do the same thing toward God is suicidal and unnecessary. Man need not be like God because God has become like man. In this sense, if no other, the theologian can agree that the "medium is the message."

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[12] Cp. Anthony L. Hite, "Non-religious Interpretation of the Gospel," *Dimension*, Vol. I, No. 1, Spring 1966 (Pp. 13ff.).

THIS ALSO IS THOU; NEITHER IS THIS THOU

BY STEPHEN SCHNEIDER

> When one of those who sat at table with him heard this, he said to him "Blessed is he who shall eat bread in the kingdom of God!" But he said to him, "A man once gave a great banquet, and invited many; and at the time for the banquet he sent his servant to say to those who had been invited, 'Come; for all is now ready.' But they all alike began to make excuses. The first said to him, 'I have bought a field, and I must go out and see it; I pray you, have me excused.' And another said, 'I have bought five yoke of oxen, and I go to examine them; I pray you, have me excused.' And another said, 'I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come.' So the servant came and reported this to his master. Then the householder in anger said to his servant, 'Go out quickly to the streets and lanes of the city, and bring in the poor and maimed and blind and lame.' And the servant said, 'Sir, what you commanded has been done, and still there is room.' And the master said to the servant, 'Go out to the highways and hedges, and compel people to come in, that my house may be filled. For I tell you, none of those men who were invited shall taste of my banquet.' "
>
> (Luke 14:15-24)

How it was I stumbled onto that particular house that night, I really cannot remember. The first that I recall was standing in a large triangular room whose rich wood walls stretched to a high vaulted ceiling. A pendulum was suspended from the center of the ceiling and it cut its arc with a solemn dignity. But these observations came later; for what immediately caught my attention was a man seated at the point where the pendulum formed a perpendicular with the floor. He was seated before a large oak desk with his head arched over a book so large as to dwarf even the most pretentious dictionary. He did not seem to notice my presence, but was intent upon his task

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of recording in the book. It would be hard to characterize his appearance. He was dressed in a plain business suit and his face was singularly undistinguished—neither youth nor age betrayed him.

My natural inclination was to address the scribe, but as my lips began to form the first syllable of a question the very silence of the room cried out against a verbal violation. Then it was that my eyes drifted to a small envelope on the desk, and to my amazement it carried my name.

I reached down and opened the unsealed flap. Inside I found a card with the lines:

Behold the doors of life!
Open and Look and Live!

It was then I first saw that behind the scribe in the mahogany wall a circular door had been made. Taking the card as a summons, I walked over and grasped the handle, but it was locked. I looked again into the envelope and there I found the key which when placed into the lock instantly released the door, and I stepped into a *new world.*

My senses were reborn as a second springtime. All of life was infected with a contagious sound. It was revealed in the gentle laughter of the brook, the steady rhythm of the swaying timbers which formed the stately forests that encircled this garden-world. Even flower and shrub were engaged in the joyous song. This was a world of luxurious color, but most unforgettable was the sound, a music more sensually full and all-pervasive than I had ever known. It seemed to float over this whole world so thickly that to breathe was to become intoxicated with its warm honey.

As my eyes became accustomed to the new surroundings, I began to see how very much like a garden it was—a *world* patterned after an English formal garden!

But there were also people here. Those I first saw were walking on a stone roadway which led from a castle located on the only one of the many rolling hills that might rightly be called a peak. The castle itself was that masterful combination of sturdy limestone and aquiline form which expresses a rugged grace. As the small band of men came nearer on the roadway to where I stood I noticed that all but one were clothed in the bright costumes of peasants. The other, around whom the life of the group centered, was a striking figure whose robes were the extravagant robes of royalty, robes of purple and crimson. On his head rested a thin rim of gold in which was set a large red stone, red as ruby.

This Royal One appeared to be leading his group in song, and the sound which filled the air seemed to echo until the world itself became a unison song. I wanted to join in with this chorus, but a mist rapidly descended and the sound was silenced. I found myself once again in the high room, with the circular door shut behind me. In my enchantment I wanted to return to that world, but the door was hopelessly locked and the key nowhere to be found.

I was a little unsure just what to do next, but recalling the card I had received earlier I decided to try the door which was on the wall to my right. It was a double door and opened freely with the touch of my hand.

The view which met my eyes was that of a vast estate which had fallen into decay with the departure of the owners. The geography was generally the same as that which I had so recently left, but the heavy aroma of music was replaced by the distant sound of discord. No longer could the chorus of nature be heard echoing the song of the Royal One. There were other differences in this world. While forest and hill and plant were still there, the sense of proportion and balance was gone. And the castle which once stood tall as timber lay in ruins.

What had happened to the magnificent garden? My question demanded satisfaction and so I stepped up to the nearby roadway, which led to the castle ruins, to seek out an answer. Before I had traveled too far a young man approached me from the opposite direction. I called to him, "Tell me, friend, what has happened to this place?"

He looked up at me with a puzzled glance. It was only then I could see that he had been crying.

"I don't understand your question," he responded politely.

And so I told him of the things I had seen when I entered the circular door. His gaze turned to wonder.

"I know it couldn't be, but what you have described is just as our fathers tell of the Elder Age under the Great King. But that was in a time long past. Our present age of dissonance began after the Great King departed and the Song of Unison was lost. Since that time my people have followed two queens.

"There is Venus—she is probably the most popular. She tries to recapture the Song of Unison by special days of singing, and so to return to the grandeur of the Elder Age. I know from experience that the ecstatic song of these festival days does give you the feeling that the whole earth has become your echo. But the sadness comes in the days which follow, for then you see that flower and leaf are mute and will have nothing to do with the Song of Unison.

"But there is another Queen—her name is Elizabeth. She mocks what she calls 'the Romantic Notion of Venus' that we can recapture the Elder Age and sing again the Song of Unison. The time of unison, she says, has passed away. We must be satisfied with the distinctive voices which we have and not expect our singing to arouse the silent nature. And so her followers spend their days preparing their voices to attain a pure, individual tone. The sounds which you hear even now are from the rehearsals. Yet they are never happy with their *sound* but are always trying to perfect it—and so we never hear their *song*.

"This then is what makes me so sad. Venus will no longer allow me to attend her festival days, because I believe the Song of Unison is lost forever. And Elizabeth I cannot follow, for she would have me a craftsman and not a singer.

"Where is there a song that I can sing?"

His last words no longer took notice of me and he passed on his way, the staff which he carried sharply cracking on the stony road. I had heard all I wanted of this pitiful land and so I returned to the door, which opened to receive me. I was back again in the high room.

I hesitated to try the third door for fear that something more ominous would await me, but curiosity overcame cowardice and I walked through the doorway.

Rather expecting another dramatic experience, I was surprised to find this world exactly like the one I had just left. I looked around for some sign of difference, but could find none. It was not until I decided to return to the high room that I noticed some commotion in the foothills near what my friend had pointed out as the shrine of Venus. Thinking that this might be of significance, I set out to investigate. As I came closer the air was filled with a floating sound—almost crowding out the discord—and I saw what I guessed to be a wandering minstrel singing on the steps leading to the shrine. As the words flowed out I could hear:

The road is closed
We cannot pass to times of old
But we can learn to sing anew
To every moment fresh and cold

The time at hand is as the Spring
The song is love, join in and sing.

When he had finished, I caught the low-breath remark of one standing near me:

"He seems to have a good song, but come, we must hurry to make preparation for the feast days."

And so most of the crowd evaporated into the shrine. A few, however, continued along with the minstrel as he approached the other shrine, of Elizabeth. Again there was a great amount of excitement as her followers appeared on the steps and again the minstrel sang:

The perfect song which you would make
Begins with every passing day
And finds fulfillment in the one
Who casts his "perfect song" away
And in its place he finds instead
The Song of Life's ongoing sway
Which always lives, is never dead.

But while attracted to its beauty, the followers of Elizabeth also shook their heads:

"He calls us to sing, but our sound is still not pure!"

And they returned to their rehearsals.

He was almost alone now, but for the few followers, and it was then I was first aware that my friend had joined the group and was walking with the minstrel along the road which led to the castle ruins. I kept pace a few yards behind the others and could clearly see what took place. I saw the minstrel bend low over a small clump of dogwood and as he did a song formed on his lips. Then, and I am sure I was not mistaken, I heard the flower return the song, but not the same song, rather one which moved in harmony with the song given it. And this music did not end, for with every object in the minstrel's path a harmony vibrated in exchange, until the path itself became a moving song. The minstrel then turned to my friend and with a song reformed the lines by which his sadness was etched, and he also joined in the harmony. And I thought I could see a green sprout forming on the staff which he carried.

The travelers continued until they stood on the very ruins of the old castle. Here the minstrel knelt down and began to place stone upon stone, and as he built the harmony increased. I crowded up to where he knelt and gained my first long look at his face. It was the face of youth, which yet revealed the wisdom of age. He turned in my direction as he sang:

The time of unison is gone
The age of harmony has come.

With the song he cast aside his outer cloak and his robe flashed in the sunlight—it was red as ruby.

Once more I was back in the high room. My body pulsed with excitement and several minutes passed before I realized that the room was vacant. The scribe was gone, although the book was still open and the pen rested on a corner. The pendulum had stopped its swing. In the silence my mind raced at the strange scenes I had witnessed. I decided I must return through this third door and rejoin the movement of song.

And so I opened it again and as I stepped across the threshold the first yawning rays of dawn met my eyes and I knew I was on the street from which I had earlier entered the house. From a distant window I recognized the sound of *Tannhaüser* played on a phonograph:

Hail! Hail! The miracle of grace!
Redemption for the human race!
At night the power of love divine
Declared itself in certain sign!
The barren staff we brought from Rome
Is wreathed in green and bright with flower,
And sinners, though from hell they come,
May find salvation in its power.
We shout the news through every land:
Pardon for sinners is at hand!
High over man we hail the Lord,
Gracious his rule and true His word!
Hallelujah! Hallelujah!

KULTURKAMPF: BISMARCK'S MOTIVES

BY THEODORE WIGGIN CASTEEL

INTRODUCTION

IN THE seventh decade of the 19th century, there existed in Germany a struggle which today has been nearly forgotten by all but the historically-minded. And yet, this war, waged as it was between the Roman Catholic Church and Chancellor Bismarck, did damage to the foundations of public morality and the German social fabric traceable in the German social structure even to this day. The task of this paper will be to consider a particular facet of that "Kulturkampf"—the underlying motive which drove the German Chancellor to carry on this struggle which gained very little for him and ended only in frustration. The research is in two parts: first, we will consider Bismarck's view of religion and the State, and then we will show how these views compelled him into what seemed for a time to be a life and death struggle—a struggle for Civilization.

Bismarck's religious life has been the subject of much debate. Erich Eyck, one of Bismarck's most prominent biographers, holds it to be a bit suspect.[1] He sees Bismarck's conversion to Christianity as just another example of the Chancellor's diplomatic adroitness. At the time just prior to his "conversion" (1846) Bismarck was courting young Johanna von Puttkamer, a member of a Quaker group and extremely pious. He learned to love her and proposed marriage. Johanna loved him too, but made it clear that she would marry only a believer in Christianity—thus, Bismarck's conversion. Eyck also points out that Bismarck's conversion was politically of great value to him. It brought him into harmony of outlook with the Junkers who were to be his political comrades in the struggle in the next years. It was particularly important that some persons of great influence with King

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[1] Erich Eyck, *Bismarck and the German Empire* (New York: Norton, 1958), pp. 14-16.

Frederick William IV belonged to this circle of decidedly Christian noblemen. The two outstanding men among them were the brothers von Gerlach—General Leopold von Gerlach, the General Adjutant, i.e., personal *aide-de-camp* to the King, and Ludwig von Gerlach, President of the High Court of Appeal. These brothers were the leaders of the High Tories in Berlin and in court society. Beyond this evidence, Eyck applies another measure to the validity of Bismarck's Christianity:

> . . . whoever thinks that the real test of a Christian is the application of religious precepts to practical life will wish to inquire whether Bismarck was at any time of his life influenced in his private or political actions by Christian teaching or, indeed, by any religious principles. In the opinion of this writer no proof of that can be found.[2]

In the opinion of this writer, Eyck has not looked deeply enough. Certainly a complete understanding of the religious thoughts of this extremely complex man will never be found, and yet, as one reads Bismarck's memoirs, speeches, and letters, one becomes convinced that the Chancellor had an attachment to Christianity which, though far from orthodox, was nonetheless deep and sincere.

His youth was a stormy episode in his life. He lived the irresponsible life of a "corp-student," drank excessively, had not less than twenty-five duels, and contracted considerable debts.[3] Religiously, he was a skeptic. At age thirty, however, Bismarck's life turned a corner. This turning point began with his friendship with a woman—Marie von Thadden. She introduced him to a circle of very pious gentlemen of definite and somewhat peculiar Christian beliefs. They were Pietists, and firmly believed in the inspired character of every word of the Bible. At first a deep gulf separated the free-thinker Bismarck—then an agnostic who looked to Spinoza and the radical followers of Hegel for guidance—from this pietistic outlook. But gradually his friendship with this circle of friends "seems to have convinced him of the truth of Christian principles, and he experienced all the typical phenomena of religious conversion."[4]

That Bismarck's conversion was enhanced in part by his love for Johanna von Puttkamer, mentioned earlier, is difficult to say. That she played a part in the flowering of his religious life cannot be

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[3] Eyck, p. 13.

[4] Harold Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924), p. 239.

doubted, but that his conversion was one of convenience is dubious indeed.

Before Bismarck could marry Johanna, he had to secure the approval of her pious father. The letter which Bismarck wrote to him on January 4, 1847, is one of the most important documents of his inner life. It is a warm letter, deep and sincere. Bismarck tells in a fascinating way the story of his religious development, and makes his first prayer for Marie von Thadden its center and turning point.

From this time forward Bismarck did not doubt the power of God in the direction of the world, and he felt the full significance of the need for human redemption from sin. In his letters to his wife, Johanna, one is allowed a seldom-seen glimpse into the more sensitive side of this man whom the world saw as the "Iron Chancellor." These letters are filled with allusions to their common faith and the sustaining power which it gave to him. A letter written from Frankfurt on July 3, 1851, is a mere sampling of this other side of the Chancellor:

> I cannot understand how any man who thinks about himself, and yet neither knows nor wishes to know anything about God can, for very scorn and weariness, endure to live. I do not know how I formerly managed to put up with existence; had I again to live, as then, without God, without you, without the children—I am really at a loss to say why I should not put off this life as though it were a dirty shirt.[5]

It can be substantiated too, contrary to Eyck, that Bismarck did carry his faith into his political life. It was from God that he found the strength and the resources for the relentlessly arduous task which Germany had thrust upon him. "If I was not a Christian," he told Ferrieres in the stress of the Franco-Prussian War, "I could not hold my position for an hour. If I could not count on God's help, I could sacrifice nothing for the sake of earthly masters. If I lost my faith, of what avail would be my fatherland?"[6] Further evidence of Bismarck's reliance on divine aid appears in a letter, dated May 16, 1864, which is addressed to one of the Gerlach brothers with regard to the condition of affairs in Schleswig-Holstein:

> The longer I am engaged in politics, the less I place faith in human calculations. . . . I am animated by an ever-increasing thankfulness to God for His support in the belief that He knows how to turn even

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[5] Otto von Bismarck, *Bismarck—Briefe* (Göttingen: Hubert & Co., 1955), p. 155. Also in this volume is the 1847 letter to Johanna's father, p. 60.

[6] Moritz Busch, *Tagebuchblätter*, Vol. I (Leipzig: Grunow, 1902), p. 249. Conveniently quoted in translation in Busch, *Our Chancellor*, p. 127.

> our mistakes to good account. This I experience daily, to my most salutary humiliation.[7]

In short, though it was not evident to any but his closest associates, the belief in a personal God and in the eternal life, once adopted by Bismarck, served him as compass and guiding star in his actions, and as a source of strength and comfort in the heavy perplexities and struggles of his career as a statesman.

And now, having attempted to substantiate the fact that Bismarck was a religious man—a man whose religion can be characterized by a curious inwardness which was a residue of his Pietistic initiation—let us now look to its political consequences. Because Bismarck came increasingly to emphasize the significance of this inward vision, he came also to suspect, perhaps even to deprecate, its expression in religious societies and institutions. Man had only to do his duty, and the manner in which his belief found expression was unimportant.[8] Bismarck's public speeches bear witness that the Chancellor recognized in religion, and especially in Christianity, one of the foundations and bulwarks of justice and the State, a protection against the Revolution and the forces of disunity and lawlessness. He saw the State as essentially based upon the principles of Christianity and upon that foundation Bismarck took his stand. On the 15th of June, 1847, Bismarck said to the United Diet:

> For me, the words "By the Grace of God," which Christian rulers append to their names, are by no means an empty sound; I perceive in them the confession that Princes are called upon to wield in conformity with the will of God those earthly sceptres entrusted to them by the Deity. But I can only recognize as God's will that which is revealed in the Christian Gospel. . . . If we deprive the State of this religious basis, we shall find that what remains is merely a hap-hazard aggregation of laws—a sort of bulwark against the warring of all men upon one another, erected by antique philosophy.[9]

It was the intimate diffusion of the Christian spirit into the roots of the State that ensures its durability and proves its right to existence. That Bismarck, even in his later years, firmly held to the Christian character of the State is substantiated by the speech which he pronounced to the Reichstag on April 2, 1881, during the debate on the Accidental-Insurance Bill.

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[7] *Bismarck—Briefe,* p. 313.

[8] Laski, p. 240.

[9] Otto von Bismarck, *Bismarck's Reden,* Vol. I (Leipzig, 1898), p. 23. Conveniently found in translation in Moritz Busch, *Our Chancellor,* Vol. I (London: Macmillan & Co., 1884), p. 116.

> I could wish that a State which (however much you may object to the designation "Christian State") consists in a large majority of Christians, should allow itself to be guided to a certain extent by the principles of the religion we profess, especially with respect to the aid every man owes to his neighbor, and to the sympathy due to the sad fate awaiting infirm old people.[10]

As Laski rightly suggests, Bismarck lacked any deep sense of reverence for the institutional Church. "Indeed, he would probably have denied that religion, as internally grounded, has any need of external form, since, so he would have argued, it finds its most adequate expression in political action."[11] No man could have had less taste for dogmatical discussions than Bismarck. Dogmatism was hateful to him.[12] He rarely attended church, did not keep the Sabbath and generally attached little importance to ecclesiastical observances and ceremonies. Bismarck thought that by serving the State he served God, and he regarded his position as imposed upon him by the will of God. It was during the debate on the motion for suspending the State-subventions to the Catholic Church on March 16, 1873, that Bismarck exclaimed: "I believe that I am serving my God by serving my King for the protection of the community whose ruler he is by the Grace of God."[13]

For Bismarck there was but one institution—the State—and he never scrupled in cases requiring the sacrifice of his religious convictions to make that sacrifice. He saw in the State a Church, and his theory of its structure was at the bottom *theocratic*.

> Did I not believe in a *Divine ordinance*, which has *destined* this German *nation* to become good and great, I had never taken to the diplomatic trade; or, having done so, I would have long since given it up. I know not whence I should derive my sense of duty, if not from God . . . were I not a staunch Christian, did I not stand upon the miraculous base of religion, you would never have possessed a Federal Chancellor in my person.[14]

Bismarck's theocratic view of the State found expression in his attitude toward the Jews. As Laski has observed, since Bismarck saw the

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[10] Busch, *Our Chancellor*, p. 120.

[11] Laski, p. 241.

[12] Sidney Whitman, *Personal Reminiscences of Prince Bismarck* (New York: Appleton, 1903), p. 334.

[13] Busch, *Our Chancellor*, p. 136.

[14] Busch, *Our Chancellor*, pp. 127-128.

State as Christian in character, he felt its identity would be destroyed by the admission of non-Christian elements into its composition. In the first United Diet of June 15th, 1847, Bismarck declared himself opposed to the unrestricted emancipation of the Jews: "I am no enemy of the Jews," he said, "and should they be foes of mine, I forgive them. I even like them—under certain circumstances. I would also accord them every imaginable right, except that of holding authoritative office in a Christian realm."[15]

In essence, Christianity appeared to Bismarck to be the very basis of the State. He was thus logically bound to hate all organizations, sacred or secular, that threatened the unity and prosperity of the State, for such an attitude was clear proof of an anti-religious spirit. What he did for the welfare of the State he could not doubt was for the welfare of his Church since it came from his intimate union with God.[16] In an article in the *Contemporary Review*, historian William Clark argues that Bismarck's view of the State was fundamentally *Hegelian*:

> Throughout Bismarck's reign as the first figure of the Prussian ministry, he held firmly to the kind of politics which can be termed Hegelian. He sought to aggrandize the idea of the State and to treat the individual as if he were a cog or pin in a vast machinery. To Bismarck the man existed for the State, not the State for the man. . . . A narrow nationalism, a strong class government, and no "popular" rule in any shape or form—such were the leading notions of Bismarck.[17]

Hegelian Bismarck's view of the State may have been, but he argued to it from *Christian premises*. He was thus perhaps the most completely Erastian statesman that ever lived, since his identification of politics with religion was final and absolute. In such a view, Bismarck was compelled to regard with vehement hostility the exclusion of any sphere of life from the control of the State: "He, in fact, deified the State, and in the light of such identification, the toleration of variety became completely impossible."[18]

With this analysis of Bismarck's views in mind, we are now ready to focus upon the event in German life where his view of the State was directly challenged—the Kulturkampf. It seems obvious in view of

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[15] Bismarck, *Reden*, Vol. I, p. 22. Quoted in translation in Busch, *Our Chancellor*, p. 149.

[16] Laski, p. 242.

[17] William Clark, "Bismarck," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. LXXV (New York: Scott, 1899), pp. 1-2.

[18] Laski, p. 243.

Bismarck's conception of the State that the Roman Catholic Church would awaken little sympathy. For Rome, particularly after Vatican I, claimed a sovereignty superior to that of kings. She regarded the Church as a complete and perfect society, determined to allow no interference with her internal affairs. The Church, furthermore, in the same fashion as Bismarck's State, demanded the unswerving allegiance of its members. The Church laid down its fundamental laws and, at the risk of forfeiting their salvation, men were compelled to obey. For Catholic Germans, a conflict of sovereignty was latent in every decision where the State and Church were both involved. Thus, we can see the reason for Bismarck's uneasiness and concern as the new German Empire took form. If Bismarck could issue commands which the Roman Catholic members of the Empire might refuse, at Papal order, to obey, then his dream of twenty years was a vain and empty thing.[19] Bismarck's absolutism of sovereignty would not allow for division of power and separation of influences. He denied the Roman Catholic distinction between those things which were Caesar's and those which were God's. This surely explains why he regarded with suspicious dislike the Prussian measure of 1850 which guaranteed the autonomy of the Church.[20] If such a power as the Church threatened the domination of the State, Bismarck could see but one alternative, drive it out.

> If such a sect as the Ultramontanes cannot be at one with the ambitions of the State, and even endanger those ambitions, clearly the State cannot tolerate their existence.[21]

Such was the psychological basis of the Kulturkampf. Let us now look at the conflict itself, with the above analysis providing the framework for our interpretation of Bismarck's motive in carrying on this unpopular and unsuccessful struggle.

KULTURKAMPF: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The name Kulturkampf (cultural struggle) is the title given to the great campaign which Bismarck and German Liberalism fought against the Roman Catholic Church and the Catholic Party of the Center. The word was first used in reference to the Church-State conflict by Rudolf Virchow, a radical progressionist deputy. In a pamphlet published in 1873, Virchow advocated support of the struggle which seemed to be assuming more and more the "character of a great universal Kulturkampf." In Germany this struggle dominated the minds of men for four or five years and was looked on by a great part of Europe as one of the most exciting events of the age. Today the questions which then excited so much feeling have receded so far into the background that it is most difficult to understand the excitement. "But there can be no doubt that in those years many of the most enlightened and highly educated men believed that the future of mankind was at stake."[22]

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[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Bismarck, *Reden*, Vol. VI, p. 269.

[21] Gustav Wilmowski, *Meine Erinneringen an Bismarck* (Breslau: Trewendt, 1900), p. 188.

Although the contest spread to Bavaria, Hesse, and Baden, Prussia remained the chief center of the conflict. Under the aggressive leadership of the Chancellor of the new German Empire, Prince Otto von Bismarck, the government embarked on a vigorous campaign against the Catholic Church from 1871 to 1877. After the death of Pope Pius IX, February 7, 1878, there followed a period of arbitration and compromise resulting in the gradual cessation of the struggle.

Two separate factors produced this struggle which came to be known as the Kulturkampf: the interference of German and Polish Roman Catholics on the Pope's behalf for the restoration of his temporal rule, and the friction between the Catholic Church and the Old Catholics. The first led to the organization of a determined group in the Reichstag who, unable to secure any support for intervention on the Pope's behalf, became consistent opponents of the Bismarckian regime. The second, by involving the question of orthodoxy or heresy in the religious instruction of German Catholic youth, forced the question into domestic politics.

There exist two traditional schools of interpretation concerning Bismarck's intentions in carrying on this war against the Catholic Church. The first theory holds that the whole Kulturkampf was part and parcel of Bismarck's foreign policy, not only in its later execution but in its original conception.[23] The second school honors Bismarck's professed aim. Bismarck was very vocal in his insistence that his sole aim was to secure the unity of the Empire against foreign attack and against disintegration from within.[24]

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[22] Eyck, p. 202.

[23] The chief proponent of this theory is Adalbert Wahl, in his *Vom Bismarck der 70er Jahre* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1920), pp. 35-65, and in briefer form in his *Deutsche Geschichte, 1871-1914* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1929), Vol. I, pp. 342-344. It is supported with some moderation by Langer in *European Alliances and Alignments* (New York: Knopf, 1962), p. 36.

[24] Langer, pp. 35-37.

Let us look briefly at each of these theories before we analyze the more palatable of the two in greater detail. The argument that Bismarck's foreign policy dominated the Kulturkampf runs as follows: Since Bismarck felt that France would some day attempt a war of revenge against Germany, it was important that France be kept isolated and incapable of alliances. Two things would contribute to this end: *first,* prevent the re-establishment of a chauvinistic monarchy in France; and *second,* more immediately, bring the three Great Powers—Russia, Austria, and Italy—into as close relations with Germany as possible. The Kulturkampf would serve these purposes neatly. Russia, since the 1863 revolt in Poland, had been carrying on a vigorous war against the Roman Catholic Church in Russian Poland.[25] The Kulturkampf, as common action against Polish Catholicism allied with the Papacy, might serve not only to smash the Polish movement inside Germany, but also to tie Russia closer to Germany, and to hold her aloof from a France that was coming to be controlled by a clerical, pro-monarchist majority.[26] Italy, after 1870 antagonistic to the Pope, might also turn to a Germany engaged in a war against the Papacy, as a powerful ally, and be turned away from an alliance with France. In relation to Austria, the aim was a bit different. Here it was Bismarck's aim to carry Austria into a Kulturkampf of its own, thus not only estranging it from France but also bringing it closer to Italy.[27] At the same time, such a policy would remove Bismarck's fear of a bargain between the Papacy on the one hand, and Poland and Austria on the other.[28] This theory should not be accepted without serious reservations, but it would be foolish to deny that Bismarck desired to isolate France, and that he was anxious to attract to Germany all of those Powers which might be possible French allies. Nevertheless, this view does tend to ascribe to Bismarck an almost supernatural ability to foresee and forestall events and threats on the European chessboard. Bismarck was an opportunist, playing the game as it unfolded from day to day, to accomplish certain fixed ends but approaching those ends from no predetermined path. In the Kulturkampf he found in his hand a weapon capable of being used to accomplish international ends, and having found it, he used it. This does not prove, however, that he created the weapon for that purpose.

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[25] Reuben Parsons, "The Later Religious Martyrdom of Poland," *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, Vol. XXIII (January, 1898), pp. 71-96.

[26] E. Malcolm Carroll, *Germany and the Great Powers, 1866-1914* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938), p. 102.

[27] Wahl, *Vom Bismarck*, pp. 54-58.

[28] E. L. Woodward, "The Diplomacy of the Vatican under Pope Pius IX and Leo XIII," *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs* (May, 1924), pp. 127-128.

The second school maintains that the unity of the Empire was the thing uppermost in the Chancellor's mind when he waged war on the Church. This interpretation suggests that what really gave Bismarck nightmares was the fact that the Center Party was composed of many elements not in sympathy with the new German Empire—the Hanoverians, the Alsace-Lorrainers, the Bavarians, the Poles[29]—and the fact that, in his mind, the Center Party constituted a "mobilization against the State" of the forces of "Polonismus and Welfentum" and a perpetuation of the "bacillus of particularism in the veins of Germany."[30] To Bismarck, fearful that sooner or later Germany would have to face a war of revenge on the part of France and perhaps of Austria, this "bacillus of particularism" was especially worrisome, since he felt that in the event of war these groups might come forward as "fifth columnists" inside Germany, in support of Germany's enemies. This was true in a particular degree of the Polish movement in the eastern provinces—a movement which Bismarck regarded as the most virulent germ in the bacillus of particularism. The Kulturkampf was thus an attempt to fight it both from a national and an international side. The growth of the Polish nationality in the eastern provinces, and more especially, the influence of the Polish nobility who desired to break away from the new German Empire and re-establish the old Poland with its pre-partition boundaries, were topics on which Bismarck fulminated time and time again, both in public speeches and private conversations.[31] And it was not the Center Party alone or even the Polish movement in Germany itself that Bismarck feared as much as the alliances they might make with the Papacy or with revenge-seeking neighbors.[32]

Our study into the nature of this struggle tends to show this second theory of interpretation to be the most credible. The remainder of this paper will be an attempt to analyze the principal factors and events involved in the Kulturkampf, centering on the internal struggle, with the view in mind of bringing into clear focus Bismarck's *primary aim* in carrying on this long and, in the end, unpopular and unsuccessful struggle—the preservation of the unity of his newly created Empire. As Bismarck said in a retrospective comment in 1879, "When I assumed office, I had but one ambition, the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. To that, everything was accessory."[33] It was when he conceived that the Catholics of Germany stood in the path of his ambition, that he set out to ensure their destruction.

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[29] Langer, p. 37.

[30] Otto von Bismarck, *Die Gesammelten Werke* (Berlin: Stollberg, 1924-1925), Vol. XI, no. 23, p. 228.

[31] The evidence on this point is ample. Otto von Bismarck, *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman* (New York: Harper, 1898), Vol. II, pp. 135-142; Bismarck's speech to the Prussian Lower House, February 9, 1872, in *Werke*, XI, 242-244.

[32] See Langer, pp. 36-37; Arthur Rosenberg, *Imperial Germany* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 4.

Let us first take a look at Bismarck's attitude toward German Catholicism at the time of the unification of Germany. It must not be assumed that Bismarck had any hostilities toward the Catholics in Germany, as such, until their Catholicism became a political problem and forced him to change his view. Bismarck denied that he was himself an enemy of religion or that he had any quarrel with the Pope as a religious leader.[34] As a matter of fact, he would not have objected even to the political influence of the Pope or the Church if he had been able to manipulate that influence for his own purposes. Bismarck was even prepared to offer Pius IX asylum in Germany should it become necessary for the Pope to leave Italy; the Chancellor felt that it "would vaccinate the Germans to see the Pope as an old man, smoking a cigar."[35] Indeed, before the unification of Germany had been achieved, Bismarck had expressed categorically to his council of ministers that precautions must be taken so that the confidence of the Catholics in the liberty and security of their cult should not be shaken.[36]

He realized, however, that the *Bavarian* Catholics were the most ardent supporters of particularism in Germany. This attitude was also found among the Catholic clergy in other parts of Germany.[37] What Bismarck was not sure of was whether the Bavarian party was receiving help and encouragement from the papal curia.[38] Arnim, Prussia's representative in Rome, had assured him that the Pope was highly favorable to German unification and was not in sympathy with Bavarian particularism,[39] but he actually feared that this party in Bavaria which had succeeded in ousting Prince Hohenlohe would prevent the acceptance of the treaty of unification.[40]

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[33] Busch, *Tagebuchblätter,* Vol. II, p. 547.

[34] Langer, pp. 36-37.

[35] Woodward, pp. 127-128.

[36] Lillian Parker Wallace, *The Papacy and European Diplomacy, 1869-1878* (Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University Press, 1948), p. 188.

[37] Bismarck to Arnim, Versailles, December 17, 1870, *Werke,* Vol. VIb, p. 643.

[38] Bismarck to Arnim, Versailles, December 20, 1870, *Werke,* Vol. VIb, p. 643.

[39] *Ibid.,* December 17, 1870, *Werke,* VIb, p. 638.

The treaty of unification was finally accepted after much difficulty, and the unification of Germany became an accomplished fact. The agitation might have died down had it not been for the rise of the Old Catholic movement, centering in Bavaria, which inevitably brought about conflict between the orthodox Catholics, who accepted the decrees lately issued by the Vatican Council, and the State, *which continued to recognize as Catholics* those who refused to accept the decrees and were in consequence sundering themselves from Rome. The antagonism of the particularist Bavarian Catholics was easily fanned to a fever heat by the tolerant attitude of the State toward the Old Catholic movement.

The strife between Bismarck and the Catholic Poles in Germany was also a potential factor in determining his eventual war on the Church. The Polish Catholics in Germany were ardent supporters of the Temporal Power of the Pope, and most of the petitions brought before the Reichstag for German intervention were presented by Polish members.[41]

This action irritated Bismarck, and he sided with the Liberals in their position against intervention on the Pope's behalf. The views of the Liberals were ably expressed by Bennigsen who had occasion to point out the need of the newly created German state for peace and friendly relations with neighbors; therefore, it must renounce a policy of intervention. He recalled the disastrous consequences of the medieval interference in Italy and in Church affairs, and warned against the repetition of such a mistake. There was plenty to do inside Germany.[42] The view of Bennigsen prevailed throughout the first session of the Reichstag, although petitions were frequently introduced in favor of intervention on behalf of the Pope. No fewer than ten such petitions were so introduced during the session.[43] The names attached to most of them—Chylinski, Koszutski, Czurminski, Korkowski, Swasakiewicz, and others—seemed to indicate that the Polish Catholics were primarily concerned about the Pope's position. Bismarck remarks in his memoirs that the Polish question was the key issue in his decision to make war on the Church. "The beginning of the Kulturkampf was decided for me preponderantly by its Polish side."[44] Poland was an old danger, and it had by no means proved capable of adequate Germanization; Poland was notoriously Catholic, and Jesuit influence there was known to be strong.

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[40] *Ibid.*, December 21, 1870, *Werke*, VIb, p. 643.

[41] Wallace, pp. 146-147.

[42] Bennigsen in the Reichstag, March 30, 1871, *Die Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstag*, XIX, p. 50. Wallace, p. 147.

[43] *Ibid.*, XX, Supplement.

KULTURKAMPF: THE EXECUTION

A. The Formation of the Roman Catholic Center Party

With the examples of the Poles and Bavarians before us, it is easy to see that there were many elements of conflict already present when the newly created German state began to function. Ultimately these various elements made common cause in a bitter war, a war allegedly of civilization against darkness and superstition. The focal point for the rallying of Bismarck's enemies became the Center Party. Whether this party was originally founded for religious or political purposes it is impossible to say. The name "Center Party" was not attached to it until later, but as a potential political force it existed before the Franco-Prussian War. The first point in its program was the defense of the constitutionally established rights of the Church against the dangers of liberalism.

In the beginning, the party was not at all agreed as to its attitude toward the new German nation which was being constructed by Bismarck. Two leaders voted against the treaty creating the Empire while, on the other hand, Bishop Ketteler, one of its gifted leaders, published a program for the party which accepted unequivocally the political power of the Empire.[45] Ketteler, in fact, claimed that after several conversations with Bismarck he was convinced that Bismarck would not be displeased at the formation of a Catholic party if it frankly accepted the new order of things, and that he hoped to find there a support for the conservative majority on which he seemed to lean.[46] The Catholics, indeed, felt that the new Empire would become the head of a conservative party in Europe.

By the time the elections were held for the first Imperial Reichstag, disillusionment had begun to set in. The altercation of the Bishop of Ermeland and several other similar affairs brought the religious question to the fore and allowed the purely political issues to sink into the background. The sixty-three members of the Center Party who took their seats when the Reichstag convened were in no mood to support Bismarck. Rather, they became the rallying point for all the disaffected elements of the Empire.

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[44] Bismarck, *Man and Statesman*, p. 138.

[45] Wallace, p. 190.

[46] Karl Viktor Hohenlohe, *Memoirs of Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst* (New York: Macmillan, 1906), Vol. II, p. 49.

B. Bismarck's Break with the Center Party

Bismarck's break with the Center Party did not come over the question of intervention, but in the contest over the fundamental laws of the Empire, whose first reading occurred on March 27, 1871.[47] In this contest the reality of the Center Party came into focus. In an article in the *Provinzial-Correspondenz* it was charged that the origin of the party dated first of all back to the destruction of the Temporal Power, which aroused Catholics everywhere to action, and secondly, to the influence of the Bavarian Catholics, who objected to the union with Germany.[48] In this contest over the fundamental laws of the Empire, the Center proposed the inclusion of the laws of Prussia in the laws of the Empire.[49] Prussian law had given Catholics complete freedom since 1850. Bismarck had opposed this law from its inception, for he felt that it threatened the absolute sovereignty of the State. The subsequent debate was long and acrimonious. Bismarck and his followers pointed out bluntly that the demand made by the Catholics for privileges comparable to those of the Lutheran Church was quite out of harmony with the *Syllabus* which condemned all other confessions as heretical.[50] The debate finally came to an end with the adoption of the Constitution on April 25, 1871. The Prussian laws desired by the Catholics were omitted.[51]

C. The Isolation of the Center Party

The hassle over the laws of the Empire irritated Bismarck. He began more and more to throw his weight behind the National Liberals. Meanwhile, the Conservatives, on whom the members of the Center Party had expected to be able to depend, moved away from them. Thus, the isolation of the Center was being effected. Bismarck's irritation was increased by the Pope's refusal to influence the Center Party on the grounds that he did not interfere in the internal affairs of states unless the interests of the Church were directly involved. The papal refusal to interfere seemed to Bismarck evidence that he was dealing with a State within a State, and that reprisals were necessary if the unity of the Empire was to be maintained.[52] He defiantly asserted to the Prussian Parliament in May of 1871 that ". . . the Prussian Cabinet is determined to take measures which shall henceforth render it impossible for Prussians who are priests of the Roman Catholic Church to assert with impunity that they will be guided by canon rather than by Prussian Law.[53] . . . We shall maintain the legislative power of the State against all comers."[54] On June 19, 1871, Bismarck told Hohenlohe that he proposed to move vigorously against the clericals and to throw their clique out of the Ministry of Public Worship.[55]

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[47] *Die Verhandlungen,* XIX, p. 376. Wallace, p. 191.

[48] April 5, 1871. Article quoted in Ludwig Hahn, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes im Preussen* (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1881), pp. 44f.

[49] "The War Between Prussia and Rome," *The Quarterly Review* (London: Murray, 1874), Vol. CXXXVI, pp. 303ff. These laws were subsequently (1875) eliminated in Prussia.

[50] Hahn, pp. 47f.

[51] *Die Verhandlungen,* 1st Leg. Period, July 21, 1871, pp. 21f. Wallace, p. 192.

Remarking in his memoirs, Bismarck asserted that "the Catholic section in the Ministry of Public Worship—originally intended to be an institution by means of which Prussian Catholics might defend the rights of their state in their relations with Rome—had, owing to the change of members, gradually become a body in the heart of Prussian bureaucracy defending Rome and Polish interests against Prussia."[56]

D. Bismarck's Decision to Fight the Center

Whether or not this decision to attack the Center represented any sudden change of heart by Bismarck, it is impossible to say. Perhaps his growing irritation with the Center and his suspicion of its motives just came to a head. He remembered that as a Protestant power, as a victor, moreover, in a conflict with the two greatest Catholic nations, Prussia could hardly inspire affection at Rome. It was not difficult for his mind to consider very seriously if the allegiance German Catholics owed to the Roman See was not at the root of his difficulties. If he could destroy that bond, the obstacle to unity might be removed. At any rate, the ideas expressed to Hohenlohe on June 19, 1871, appeared in an article in the *Neue Preussische Zeitung* on June 22. This article proclaimed that the Jesuits, who had exhausted every effort to prevent the unification of Germany, were responsible for the formation of the Center Party. Although the Papal See, it went on, had greeted the establishment of the German Empire at first with approbation, their actions had belied their words. The government of Germany would never consent "to strengthen a party whose sole aim was to resurrect the powers of the papacy, long since buried, and arouse once more not merely strife between confessions but also between spiritual and secular powers."[57] Although the Empire had been reluctant to oppose the growth of the clerical group, it must find itself in the position of "being the defensive against a lasting aggression. It must meet aggression with aggression."[58] This article was the clarion call to arms in the Kulturkampf.

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[52] Laski, p. 252.

[53] The Bishop of Ermeland had so replied when he had excommunicated two priests contrary to Prussian law.

[54] John Gibb, "Prince Bismarck and the Ultramontanes," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. XX (London: King & Co., 1872), pp. 181f.

[55] Hohenlohe, Vol. II, p. 60.

[56] Bismarck, *Man and Statesman*, pp. 139-140.

E. The Attack Moves from the Center onto the Church as a Whole

Although the attack was originally launched against the Center as a political party, it was inevitable that it should speedily spread and become an attack on the Catholic Church itself. The political quarrel merged with the intellectual quarrel, and the rift soon became very deep between Germany and the Church. The *Germania* stated immediately after the publication of the original article in the *Neue Preussische Zeitung* that science and religion were necessarily at hopeless odds and went on to say that an "ultramontane, that is a Catholic, cannot love his German fatherland; he is a stranger in his own house."[59] *Germania* insisted that the only defense of the unity of the State was to limit the Church's influence in politics, press, and society.

Internal political causes seemed to point in the same direction. The National Liberals had been enthusiastic for unification; and they were the theoretical antagonists of clericalism. It was their intellectual leader, Bluntschli, who at Worms in 1869 declared that the success of German liberty depended upon the destruction of Roman influence. They had already urged the dangers of monasticism and the religious control of schools upon Bismarck. "If Germanism was synonymous with Protestantism, as they did not cease to proclaim, Bismarck would have no doubts as to the requisite policy."[60]

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[57] *Neue Preussische Zeitung,* June 19, 1871, tr. in Wallace, p. 194.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] *Germania,* June 24, 1871, tr. in Wallace, p. 195.
[60] Laski, pp. 247-248.

F. Abolition of the Catholic Department in the Ministry of Religion

The first actual step which Bismarck took in his now professed struggle was the abolition of the Catholic Department in the Ministry of Religion mentioned earlier, on July 8, 1871. More action by the State was taken against the Church in the fall. Lutz of Bavaria proposed a law on November 19 which provided for two years imprisonment for any clergyman who discussed matters of State. After three successive readings it was proclaimed law on December 10, 1871.[61]

On January 22, 1872, Dr. Falk replaced von Mühler as Minister of Religion in Prussia. Dr. Falk outlined his views concerning the State-Church problem on January 30, and emphasized that his program was not to be actuated by any desire to interfere with the liberties of the Church.[62] Windhorst, former Hanoverian minister and one of the outstanding leaders of the Center Party, spoke strongly for the Catholic point of view at the same meeting. Bismarck then rose and spoke bitterly on the creation of the Center Party. He considered it a monstrous thing for a religious faction to make of itself a political party. He inveighed against the particularism of the party and especially its leaders, who had become citizens of the German Empire reluctantly and who were apparently still opposed to it. He begged them lay aside partisan struggles and thus avert what would be a great calamity for the fatherland.[63]

The first action of the new minister, Falk, was a school law proposed on February 8, 1872, which was designed to bring the Prussian educational system directly under State control. Although holding the final responsibility and the final authority, the State previously had worked through the Evangelical Church and the Catholic Church. In the debate over this action, Bismarck again seized the opportunity to speak at length against the Center Party, naming its leaders and blasting their lack of loyalty to the Empire.[64]

At the same time the question of the Jesuits came up, which ultimately resulted in their expulsion from the Empire. The debate was very keen. Fear that the Jesuits were carrying on a conspiracy to under-mine the State was again voiced. Copies of the *Syllabus* were found in the possession of Catholic members of the House. Hohenlohe pointed out that the *Syllabus* and, therefore, the Jesuits, were carrying on a war with progress, liberty, and modern civilization. The eloquence of Windhorst and other members of the Center was to no avail. The supporters of the bill spoke with devastating effect, and the Center was unable to check the attack. The Jesuits were banished by Imperial statute on July 4, 1872. An insight into the mentality of this attack on the Jesuits is found in the memoirs of Hohenlohe, who was the chief advocate of the anti-Jesuit decree:

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[61] Wahl, *Geschichte*, Vol. I, p. 151.

[62] *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Haus der Abgeordneten* (Berlin: 1872), Vol. I, p. 517. Wallace, p. 196.

[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 530ff; pp. 534ff.

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 698-702.

> Apart from the activities of the Order in the press, it is known that the Jesuits appear everywhere as the enemies of Germany. This is especially the case in Posen, where the Jesuits under the leadership of Archbishop Ledochowski, offer open battle to Germany. . . . The intrigues of the Jesuits in Poland offered just the right pretext for proceeding against them. Bismarck shirked fighting. He knew very well that the contest would not just be limited to the Jesuits. He had formerly used the Order as an ally against the Revolution. But finally he was forced to give up his former friends. The Jesuit Order cannot do otherwise than fight against an Empire whose basis is religious toleration; a basis which the Order has never acknowledged and never will acknowledge. . . . If the favorable position which the Catholic Church occupies in Prussia were changed for the worse, who would be to blame? No one but those people who have for years been egging on the Pope to make adventurous declarations against the State, against civilization, against religious toleration, etc., and recently against the German Empire.[65]

The view became more and more widely held that the Catholic Church was opposed to the New Protestant Empire created by Bismarck. The opposition took the form of arousing again the spirit of particularism among the German states and the nationalism of the Poles and Alsatians.[66] The struggle had not yet assumed the international character which it was presently to take on. So far Bismarck was apparently attempting to stamp out what seemed to be a disruptive force in the new State which he was so strenuously trying to stabilize. To bring all of Germany under the control of the new State might mean annihilation of ultramontanism, perhaps even German Catholicism.

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[65] August 9, 1872, Hohenlohe, *Memoirs*, pp. 83f.

[66] *Contemporary Review*, Vol. XX, p. 173.

G. The Legislative Offensive

In the Winter of 1872 the Pope became more vocal in his opposition to Bismarck's attack on the Church. In an allocution of December 22, 1872, the Pope condemned the secret and public "persecution of the Church in the German Empire."[67]

Instead of being deterred by Papal allocutions, the Prussian State, and presently the whole Empire, pressed on with renewed vigor against the Catholic Church. The Falk Laws, introduced first as proposals on January 9, 1873, were adopted by the Landtag on March 20 and 21 and by the Upper House in May. On May 15 they appeared in the collection of laws for all of Germany.[68]

Since the Prussian constitution, to which the Catholic Church owed its favorable position, proved incompatible with the proposed laws, it became necessary to alter it for the Falk proposals to be legal. Bismarck was determined to alter the Prussian constitution in order to legalize the proposed legislation. The Prussian constitution was amended on April 5, 1873, by the addition to paragraph 15 of the words "but remain subject to the laws of the State, and the supervision of the State as defined by law."[69] In paragraph 18 the State declared its control over the preparatory education, appointment and dismissal of the clergy.

Thus the favorable position of the Catholic Church in Prussia was abolished, and the way was left open for the passage of the coercive May Laws, or Falk Laws mentioned above. One statute prohibited the right of employing any means of ecclesiastical punishment or corrective except in the purely spiritual sphere. The right of appeal to the State was also provided for, and in the final decision the State's court would take precedence. The State might also intervene if the circumstances justified it, even in the absence of an appeal. This was a very stringent law, reversing the *Unam Sanctum.* Another statute provided for an ecclesiastical court of eleven members, to be appointed by the King. Still another provided for a State controlled education for all clergy, Catholic and Protestant, through gymnasium and university; it gave the State the right to examine the person at the conclusion of his course; afterwards, the Church might take him, teach him and examine him at will. The State maintained the right to veto clerical appointments. Certain provisions for filling ecclesiastical offices were directly contrary to canon law. In the law for all Germany provision was made for punishing recalcitrant priests by expelling them from the Empire.[70]

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[67] Wallace, p. 206.

[68] *Quarterly Review*, Vol. CXXXVI, p. 323.

[69] The original paragraph stated simply, "The Protestant and Roman Catholic Church as well as every other religious community regulates and administers its affairs independently." Hahn, p. 123.

The law of May 20, 1874, virtually handed over the control of vacant bishoprics to the State, thus making it difficult to enforce an objectionable appointment. All religious orders, save those of a semi-medical character, were forbidden from Prussian soil by Prussian law on May 31, 1875. Catholic churches in Prussia were handed over to the Old Catholics in such parishes as those in which the majority of the people consisted of their sympathizers, for certain hours of the day. The State also charged itself with the surveillance of the fiscal administration of the Church, forbidding it to build or collect funds without permission. This law went into effect June 7, 1876.

The above legislation exemplifies the relentlessness with which Bismarck went about his task. For him it was more than an exercise in political strategy—it was essentially a *religious* conflict. The State was a divine institution, and the Church threatened that institution. For him the Kulturkampf was "the primeval fight for supremacy between royalty and priesthood. . . . What we aim at is the protection of the State, the establishment of a distinct boundary-line between priestly domain and royal rule, defined in such sort that the State may be able to abide by it. For, in the kingdom of this world, the State is entitled to power and precedence."[71] And while it is possible to admire the ruthless thoroughness with which Bismarck conceived his legislation against the Church, it is also true that such legislation would have denied any conception of the Church worthy of that name. It would have prevented the Roman Catholic Church from remaining faithful no less to the letter than to the spirit of its endeavor.[72] Clearly unfaltering hostility was the only path open to the Church if it was to maintain any measure of its integrity.

KULTURKAMPF: THE FAILURE

Bismarck obviously grossly misappraised his adversaries. In 1872 he apparently calculated that the Catholics would either not resist, or, if they did, would soon surrender to a rigorous coercion. He was completely mistaken. When Cardinal Archbishops, with the applause of their congregations, defied the law and went to prison, the State as Power could only bring in the guillotine—if it dared. Bismarck fined, imprisoned, and exiled, but he only lost ground. Universal suffrage proved a terrible weapon in the hands of the Center. Bismarck's pressure seemed only to strengthen them. By 1878 the clericals had built up a powerful and extraordinarily well organized party; they had ample funds and an influential press, and a network of local machinery. It was the Kulturkampf which enabled the Center to become in Bismarck's lifetime the best drilled, most obedient, and strongest single party in Germany. They drew their strength from every class—from cardinals and Polish magnates to the industrial democracy in the old ecclesiastical principalities. The stronger the executive action against them, the stronger they reacted against it.[73] The government struck right and left at high and low with the indiscrimination of brute strength, but with no result. Little by little Bismarck was compelled to relent, against all which he called sacred. By 1879 Bismarck was nominating Frankenstein, a member of the Center, to the Vice Presidency of the Reichstag, and by 1886 and 1887 the Falk Laws were officially abrogated. It was a different Bismarck who in 1881 acclaimed the German Catholics as his compatriots, and the institutions of their Church, the Papacy included, as part of the great confederation it had been his task to create.[74] It seems true, as Laski has stated, that the Kulturkampf taught Bismarck a mighty lesson.

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[70] "Prussia and the Vatican," *Macmillan's Magazine* (London: Macmillan, 1875), Vol. XXXI, pp. 267ff.

[71] Bismarck, *Reden*, Vol. V, p. 382; tr. in Laski, pp. 253-254.

[72] Laski, p. 259.

> He learned that the world, even the Germanic world, is not one and indivisible. He had defined the State to himself as a power which, to maintain itself, must prove its sovereignty over every department of human life. . . . Doubtless so to derogate from the unity he envisaged as desirable was to lessen the completeness of the sovereignty he pursued; but it was to limit it in the direction of its natural boundaries.[75]

That Bismarck was slow to realize that he defined the unity of the State in a manner which could only foster hostile opposition is understandable. His vision of the State as fundamentally theocratic, and his religiously arrived at Hegelian conception of its nature, made him extremely reluctant to compromise his views. In accommodating to the Catholics he was forced to give way on more than mere political principles; at stake were his religious convictions. In the end he came to the conclusion that his convictions were inconsistent with the facts of life. Nonetheless, we must realize that they did lead him to carry on an unpopular and irritating struggle for almost a decade, which led him into deeper water than, as he must have realized, his strength and skill could manage.

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[73] C. Grant Robertson, *Bismarck* (New York: Holt, 1919), pp. 328-333, 337-338.

[74] Bismarck, *Reden*, Vol. IX, p. 162.

[75] Laski, pp. 261-262.

THE ONLY WHO THAT YOU ARE

BY LYNN HOWARD GRAY, JR.

> When the perishable puts on the imperishable, and the mortal puts on immortality, then shall come to pass the saying that is written:
>
> "Death is swallowed up in victory."
> "O death, where is thy victory?
> O death, where is thy sting?"
>
> The sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law. But thanks be to God who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.
>
> Therefore, my beloved brethren, be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, knowing that in the Lord your labor is not in vain. (I Corinthians 15:54-58)

THE GODDESS CARE, being alone in the forest, took a lump of clay and began to shape it into her own likeness, because she feared that death could erase her memory and image from the earth. She toiled hard to embody herself in a timeless form that would always and certainly be recognized. But as she worked she gradually became distressed and puzzled and frustrated because none of her efforts resulted in an image which properly captured her character. As she struggled with her failures, the King of the Gods, Jupiter, entered the forest; upon seeing her he stopped and silently watched as she worked. After a moment he interrupted her struggle and told her that no conceivable modification of the image which she could make would end her frustration; the image would remain hollow and lifeless unless he filled it with spirit. Now Care immediately saw the wisdom of this and begged him to do so at once, only asking that the creation still bear her name. Jupiter at first consented, but upon seeing its beauty he declared that a creature of such magnificence deserved the honor of his name. A heated argument ensued, the noise of which awakened

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the slumbering Earth who, when she had grasped the situation, desired also that her name be conferred upon the creature, for indeed she had furnished it with a portion of her body. Because a solution seemed impossible the three combatants were eventually forced to call upon Saturn, the Final Judge of the Gods, who holds time in his hands. Now Saturn's judgements are, by definition, just and thus there was no further debate following his decree: "Since Jupiter has given the creature spirit, he will receive that spirit at its death; and since Earth has given it body of her body, that body shall return unto her in the creature's death. But since Care first shaped the creature, she will possess it as long as it lives." And they called the creature Man because his roots were tangled and his purpose uncertain.

As Man then struggled to consciousness his only knowledge was of Care, and this knowledge was itself uncertainty. Of his roots and of his destination all that he could grasp disintegrated into the poetic—

> . . . in the beginning god created heaven and earth . . .
> . . . in our own image . . .
> . . . and I saw a new heaven and a new earth coming down out of the sky . . .

Nothing would remain stationary to be held, understood, appropriated. The certainty that he did manage was Lifeless, yet all that he could ever say of the moments he experienced was that somehow, somehow they were real. He was certain.

Gradually a tremendous tension engulfed his whole existence; it was as though there were a colossal civil war being waged at the very core of his being. He seemed to stand against himself, capitulating once to the moment, to the exhilaration of experiencing, and then being immediately drawn over to objectification, to clarified knowing. It was as though his environment itself were a curse. Movement in any direction always brought the same schizophrenic result: he could not both live and know. And yet he thought, "I cannot live without knowing."

If he could have seen the roots, he would have said, "To have been put by time into the hands of Care is unbearable"; but he could not see and so he did not know. Consequently, he was forced to live in hope, hope that his care would be systematized tomorrow, that tomorrow organization would bring certainty and dissipate Care. If he could just linger through today, tomorrow he would know. But the days came and the days passed, yet the who of his being stayed always on the horizon; never coming any closer yet never slipping out of sight. And he saw his resolution to wait gradually transformed before his eyes into the pitiable, hollow carcass of a dream which in life came to nothing.

And he was afraid, because he could not separate himself from the haunting thought that his carcassed dream was perhaps the only who of himself. And for the first time he saw death. And the agony of uncertainty waxed hot in his soul—

> . . . if death should come before I know . . .
> . . . what is my who . . .
> . . . what if I should miss the meaning of everything . . .

Yet curiously, even the agony could not be sustained, for everything was movement and nothing would remain stationary, nothing, delightful or terrifying. The agony was swallowed up at once by a new, unexpected experience of glee—

> . . . a droplet of water hung suspended from a tiny leaf and seemed in its prismed crystal to reflect the wonder of the whole forest . . .
> . . . a young deer struggled through its first hesitant steps and fell kerplunk! in a tangled heap, to the teasing laughter of the forest's creatures.

It was enough sometimes to be a witness to wonderment, to see his delight and bewilderment reflected in the face of nature. But somehow, somehow the spectre of the carcass always returned, and with it, the fear.

At first the death vision appeared fleetingly—

> . . . popping out from behind a giant tree as he wandered aimlessly through the forest . . .
> . . . peering over his shoulder when he stopped to watch his reflection play on the waters. . . .

So short were the moments and sometimes so far apart that he often lived many days almost oblivious to the spectre. But then there would always return that day, a day which began like any other day, except that somehow he knew—no, he felt—something uneasy about him, wherever he went. It seemed that nothing he could do or think or wish made any difference. When it was coming, it was coming. He could only stand—frozen—while it drained him of capability, leaving him limp-as-a-dead-bird, but frightfully sensitive to every movement and sound which the forest produced.

Gradually the impressions of those days engulfed his whole being. He began not-to-live. He at first tried to anticipate gladness and pleasure, consciously to look for it, always to be ready to be overcome by it; but this was very difficult for he had never before thought of what pleasure or gladness might *really* be, and every definition he invented seemed wholly ludicrous. Until he suddenly found himself in a frenzied search, but for what he did not know. And if, in desperation, he decided that a certain definition must be right and then pursued it with all of his energy, he either stopped his struggle in the middle, faced with absurd contradiction or else stood isolated at the end of a day in the depressed hollowness of having found nothing—

. . . he redid what had been before exciting, . . .
. . . he pondered in solitude, . . .
. . . he calculated wild abandon. . . .

Yet nothing he did drew an authentic response. And he became increasingly separated from the forest.

He drew away from all non-essential activity, closing himself up within his mind. For there, though perhaps the possibility of joy was not as great (for what could be unexpected or new there?), at least he could isolate himself from the spectre; he could refuse to think it. Yet it was this very isolation that nearly destroyed him, for though he could not understand it, it seemed that in isolation every thought turned around the spectre, no thought could be pursued that did not suddenly turn and unmask, revealing itself with haunting laughter to be only another side of death. And the deeper into himself he fled, the more he became convinced that the what of his roots was terrifying.

And the coming and the going of the days ground to a near halt. It was as though he existed in an undifferentiated always, bounded by the monotonous sameness of nothing. The whole world became smooth and gray and nauseous, and he would have rejoiced in the certainty of death.

Then from a source that is to this day enigma, a wedge was forced into the sullen grayness; and the isolation began to be attacked. But this time the shifting of experience was not mere movement, rather it was as though movement itself had unleashed its violent fury against the carcassed spectre. But the struggle was deep and terrifying.

Though it broke into Man from some unknown source, it did not bring a knowledge which decimated Care, though he sought frantically, there was nothing that was certain, save the certainty that it was happening. The life-struggle, though paradoxically initiated from the outside, had only one participant—Man himself. And the anguished attempt to destroy isolation became, in the destructive climax, itself an isolation of an unbearably greater depth. And the whole of the forest groaned in terror and much was destroyed in the rupturing of her patterns. Then a deathly stillness fell over movement and all happening stopped. Saturn himself bowed in awe and the haunting laughter of the carcass filled the Earth.

But suddenly the laughter was swallowed up by a thunderous voice which echoed and reverberated over every valley and hill of the forest. Trembling in it, Man heard:

> It is finished! Be no longer afraid, Go and Live.
> But do not expect Care to have departed, for the very who of your being is changelessly committed unto Care, and Care is Good.
> But remember that I am greater than Care and I have done a mighty work for you, such that you cannot understand.
> Do not go into the forest seeking certainty,
> for your certainty shall be always swallowed up in uncertainty,
> and your mortal thoughts in that which is immortal.
> But rather go into the forest and live,
> For I have called you unto life
> and you can live without knowing
> (for indeed I have made this great thing possible).
> And you will discover my work always within you,
> and to you I will not always remain unknown.
> Now go—
> Live.

THE CHURCH AND RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE

BY JAMES R. LAURIE

I. PRESUPPOSITIONS

THE WORLD of men and nations is the sphere of God's activity. He is present in the affairs of this world, creating and recreating the possibilities for freedom and human life. He has revealed himself in the incarnation of Jesus Christ who lived and died and was resurrected to liberate man from the bondage of death and to free him for life. God calls man to respond to his revelation, to live by faith and grace, and to enjoy the promises of new life which are offered to him in Christ.

The Church, in one sense, is the worldwide community of those who know what God has done and is doing in the world. It is the community and the communion of those who attempt to live by their faith. In another distinct sense it is also a social institution which displays many parts, exists under many different brand names, and suggests many different interpretations of what faith in God through Christ means. While there is always *an implicit tension* between the church as a community of believers and the church as a social institution, the two are usually integrally related in the actual situation. In its goals and purposes, in its programs and practices, in its life in the world, the institutional church is usually actively striving to be a more faithful participant in the universal Church. That is, the members of the institutional church usually express some desire and willingness to witness to God's activity, and to participate in bringing about its culmination in the lives of all men in society.

To be responsible and effective in fulfilling its call, the institutional church must know what is going on in God's society. It must be rele-

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vant and related to the world in which God is at work. One of the ways in which the church comes to know the society of which it is a part, and into which it is called, is actively to study the materials which have been gathered and analyzed by the students of the patterns of social organizations, institutions and movements. It is with these thoughts in mind that this paper is undertaken.

II. INTRODUCTION

The world of man and his civilization is turning a corner in the 1960's. The process is marked by revolutions in almost every sphere of man's existence: economic, educational, cybernetic, racial, sexual, military, scientific and technological. In the realm of religion the revolutions come under the rubrics of the end of the metaphysical era, the death of God, the new morality, the new theology, the new hermeneutic, and the process of secularization and religionless Christianity. The type of radical, revolutionary change which is taking place in society today has been approached in kind only once before in recorded history. Even on a broad worldwide scale, it now appears that the present change will take place in a time span which will be a minute fraction of the period which was covered during the first great transition from a precivilized to a civilized society.[1]

To provide a context and a structure for dealing with the potential of the present change, we will consider three epochs of American life. The first period, lasting from the time of Colonial America until the Civil War, was dominated by a rural-agrarian style of life and society. The second period, lasting from about the time of the Civil War until the mid-twentieth century, was dominated by the urban-industrial style of life. The third period, into which the United States is now moving, will probably be dominated by what is termed "the cybernetic-megalopolitan style of life."

During the time of the most rapid and far-reaching change from a rural-agrarian to an urban-industrial society, the sociological study of the church as a social institution was growing in importance. One of the foremost centers for the sociological analysis of religious institutions during the first part of the twentieth century was the Institute for Social and Religious Research, which was funded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and began operations in 1921 on the initiative of a few Christian leaders who wanted to "bring the methods of the social sciences to bear on religious and socio-religious methods.[2] From 1922 until 1935, the Institute conducted 48 research projects dealing with a wide variety of Protestant institutions in rural and urban areas.[3]

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[1] Kenneth Boulding, *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century*, p. 1.

The period of the Institute's studies was a watershed in the development of the urban-industrial society. From about 1860 to 1920, the most important upheavals in society took place as America shifted away from a predominantly rural-agrarian pattern of life. After 1920, until about 1950, the United States was in a relatively stable period as an urban-industrial nation. The works of the Institute, therefore, reflected on the period of change from rural-agrarian to an urban-industrial society, but they did so in terms of suggesting a church strategy for the period of stability which followed. For the most part, society had already turned one corner and was in the straightaway—expanding, gaining momentum, gathering force, but generally proceeding in the same direction. Since the early 1950's, however, it has grown increasingly apparent that society is now in the process of turning another corner. We are crossing an invisible line of demarcation. We are moving into a new age.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the works of the Institute which dealt with the problems of the church in a stable urban-industrial society in order to draw implications for the church as it takes shape in a cybernetic-megalopolitan society. We will deal with those studies which focused on the urban church, and especially those which considered the effects of a changing environment. The primary sources will be the works of H. Paul Douglass, a pioneer in the field of the sociology of the church in America. Other Institute studies will be brought in where applicable.

The plan of this paper will be: to (1) sketch the shape of rural-agrarian society in America prior to the Civil War, (2) briefly indicate the changes which took place as the urban-industrial society gained dominance, (3) present a summary of the work of Douglass and his colleagues, (4) offer theological and sociological critiques of certain elements and emphases in Douglass's work, and (5) present a short statement of some of the implications which may be drawn from this study for the church in a cybernetic-megalopolitan society.

Throughout this study it should be kept in mind that social change is measured in relative trends, rather than in absolute categories. It

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[2] F. Ernest Johnson, editor, *The Social Work of the Churches*, p. 114.

[3] David O. Moberg, *The Church as A Social Institution*, p. 14.

may therefore be the case, for example, that while most of society has an urban-industrial style of life, some segments of the population are still very much rural and agrarian. As a means of clarifying the discussion, the writer will attempt to pay particular attention to three elements in each era which is discussed: the patterns of social organization, the theological response to the social situation, and the form of the institutional church.

III. AMERICA AS A RURAL-AGRARIAN SOCIETY

It is quite difficult from any point in time or perspective to give an accurate, balanced and equitable description of the style of life in a great nation. It seems more immediately difficult when one reflects on a period in the past of which he may have a broader view. To attempt to describe the rural-agrarian style of life in America may therefore be folly; but perhaps an impressionistic picture, which admittedly selects a few strands of the style, may offer some sort of historical context for the major emphasis of this paper.

In rural America before 1860, the extended family or clan was the major grouping for social organization. When families joined together, the grouping was centered on the activities of the town, which served as the economic, recreational, educational, religious and cultural center of a geographical area. For most people, however, the connection with town life was secondary to the connection with home life on the land.

The theological response to this type of social organization was American Puritanism, as influenced by the European Enlightenment, in the Colonial period, followed by the Great Awakening about the turn of the nineteenth century. The revival-centered religion signalled a democratizing of America, opening the country to an even more characteristic form of religion which was less Calvinistic and permitted greater expressions of enthusiasm and mass appeal. Theology, in this period, was dominated by the idea of individual salvation.

The religious life in rural America before the Civil War revolved around the small town church which drew from the family centered society. It was supplemented by itinerant preachers who were apt to bring the isolated family groupings into contact with the American religious institution. Much worship and religious activity was carried on directly in the home. In early America the Bible went with the rifle to the frontier; hell-fire and damnation was the curse; salvation for souls was the promise; and the small country church was the medium for the message of individual salvation.

IV. TRANSITION

The Civil War was the historical marker for the change from a rural-agrarian society. The social and economic foundations on which the antebellum Union had rested were thoroughly undermined. "After the war, the South was reduced to the status of a conquered province, and the North was transformed by a revolution that subordinated the farm to the factory and supplanted the standards of an agrarian society with the mores of an industrial civilization."[4]

Industrialization and urbanization became the main factors of development in the United States as the farm and village type of social organization[5] gave way to the America of "commercial agrarianism and Main Street towns" in the last half of the nineteenth century.[6] By the first decade of the twentieth century, the trends of urbanization and industrialization were widely manifest in American life and the urban-industrial style of life was the rule rather than the exception. The factors which contributed to and were influenced by this change were varied and woven together in a complex pattern. The end of the frontier signalled a new era in American history. The city became the new frontier with industry as the foundation stone. As people moved into the city and into industry their style of life changed. Improvements in transportation and communication made centralized living in large numbers a greater possibility and a greater necessity. Laissez-faire capitalism brought rapid economic advances. The gathering together of great numbers of people and great amounts of economic power gave impetus to new developments in education and recreation. John Dewey and the Progressive Education movement were nurtured in the early twentieth century. As the church began to take notice of this changing environment, the Social Gospel reached its peak of influence. In religion, education, economics, industry and community life the seeds of change which had been planted in the early 1800's and broke ground at the time of the Civil War were beginning to come to fruition.

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[4] Harry C. Carmen, Harold C. Syrett, and Bernard W. Wishy, *A History of the American People,* Volume I to 1877, p. 702.

[5] H. Paul Douglass and Edmund DeS. Brunner, *The Protestant Church as a Social Institution,* p. 26 (*D and B*).

[6] Solon T. Kimball and James E. McClellan, Jr., *Education in the New America,* p. 40.

V. THE CHURCH IN URBAN SOCIETY

By the time the church began to take stock of itself in relation to a radically new situation, the change was well under way, but it was not well analyzed or well understood. Douglass wrote of the church's growing awareness of the city: "The church . . . turned hesitantly, reluctantly, unused to the city, herself immigrant and alien. The city which the church found had not found itself."[7]

Urban life was in contrast to rural life in many ways: the age and sex ratios were quite different; races and nationalities were geographically together while still continents apart in style of life and adjustment; the mechanization of production and power were increasing, but methods of distribution were not enjoying comparable improvements; and the population was becoming mobile and transient; yet while human relationships were becoming more numerous, they were also becoming more superficial. The great awkward and anonymous city was the adolescent giant which the church found surrounding and threatening her life. In 1935 Douglass wrote, "Whatever structural consistency or evolutionary trend may be discerned in the processes of city growth, the city as such (was) rather menacing than comforting to human prospects. . . ."[8]

In terms of social and institutional relationships, the change was equally striking. In the rural life pattern, associations had been made and maintained within a narrow grouping of perhaps several hundred people, determined primarily on the basis of geographical proximity. Marriage, occupation, economic opportunities, recreation and religious activities were all carried out with various re-groupings of the same people. To use Lenski's distinction, the groupings were generally communal rather than associational.[9] Family life was the center for community relationships. In the urban area, however, the opposite tended to be the case. Each major relationship was formed with a different group of associates. Relationships were generally functional and fragmentary. Associations in the city were based on selective affinity rather than on neighborhood or family ties.[10] In the case of older people, family relations had broken down to a large extent, and with young people both the school and the church had become formative influences *apart* from their connection with the family groups.

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[7] H. Paul Douglass, *The City's Church*, p. 7 (*TCC*).

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, p. 20.

[10] *D and B*, p. 76.

The change from a rural-agrarian to an urban-industrial society with the concomitant change from a communal to an associational basis for social and institutional relationships meant that the church as a social institution was viewed as one of many associational ties. If it was to function in urban life, Douglass and Brunner indicated that "for better or for worse the urban church must conform to this new principle."[11]

The goal of many churches in this era of the first third of the century was noted as follows: "The discourse of churchmen with respect to the aims and prospects of the church invariably refers to an unspoken assumption, namely that the entire adult population (and all children) of the United States ought to be enrolled in its churches."[12] Douglass and Brunner recognized, however, that a more realistic view was to conceive of "Christianizing the nation" through an institutional framework which maintained a small closely related inner nucleus that was able to reach out into other areas of society in such a way that all of society was permeated, but not all was expected to respond with equal intensity and participation.[13] The theological position which was most influential in this view was the Social Gospel movement of Walter Rauschenbusch and others.

It was the tension which was evoked by the combination of the views (1) that the church must conform to the urban pattern of social organization, (2) that the Christianizing of the nation was the appropriate response of the church, and (3) that the realistic form of the church was one which attempted to reach all people while allowing for varying degrees of commitment and participation, that formed the basis for the analysis and the guidelines suggested by Douglass and the other sociologists working under the auspices of the Institute for Social and Religious Research.

VI. CONFRONTATION WITH CHANGE: AVOIDANCE METHODS

Generally speaking, the urban areas of the United States grew in concentric circles, with the upwardly mobile segments of the population moving out from the center city and various immigrant groups—often visible minority groups, not well assimilated, and usually of a low socio-economic status—dominating the center or inner city. The studies which the Institute conducted of American city churches and rapid social change revealed a number of different methods for deal-

[11] *D and B*, p. 77.
[12] *D and B*, p. 33.
[13] *D and B*, p. 37.

ing with a changing environment. While most of the churches studied had at one time been oriented to the immediate neighborhood, the change in environment caused many to change either church structure or patterns of evangelism or both, either to avoid a change in the church program or to stimulate an effective ministry for a changing populace.

Three types of avoidance methods were encountered. The church could move to "a more conducive environment," that is, one which was not yet involved in the change or one which was isolated from the factors of change which originally threatened the status quo of the particular church. A second method was for a church in the center city to change from a neighborhood church to a downtown church which drew the same members with the same program but from a greater area of the city. A third common method was for the church to stay in the same vicinity and attempt to carry out a holding action—keeping the appeal limited to those people who remained in the neighborhood. The most obvious disadvantage of these avoidance tactics was that they usually tended to be a postponement of the inevitable confrontation which would come as the areas affected by change widened.

A second category of methods for dealing with recognized rapid social change was to attempt to keep on with the same type of program and at the same time to broaden activities and offer a duplicate or triplicate separate program for the new groups in the environment. For example, in a formerly white middle class English speaking neighborhood the congregation would support a second language program for immigrants, or allow others to use the building without attempting an integration of the congregations. This is analogous to attempting to "have your cake and eat it too" and suffers from similar drawbacks.

A third category was to maintain an area ministry in the period of transition, while shifting the emphasis of the church from a neighborhood oriented program to building up a city wide constituency, so that by the time the change had been completed in the environment, the church could move to a selective city wide ministry—a procedure similar to the method of the downtown church.

Other methods which were noted as ways to avoid integration of the new environmental immigrants involved maintaining the same program with a greater emphasis on public relations work (if your position is threatened, just shout louder), the establishment of chapels or branches to serve the changing population, and offering selective services to the new people in an environment.[14]

VI. CONFRONTATION WITH CHANGE: ADAPTATION METHODS

In his studies Douglass found that approximately one church in ten attempted to meet change with "a process of deliberate adaptation, guided by a policy of meeting the special needs of the present environment."[15] His rationale in concentrating the bulk of his analysis on these situations was that it was the churches which attempted to face their problems squarely which probably offered the most creative and positive guidelines for dealing with change and adversity. He comments: "The prophet Isaiah noted a good while ago that nations which had suffered adversity came to have much more dramatic and interesting histories than those which had known only peace and prosperity. Exactly the same thing is true of churches."[16] The church which attempted to adapt under pressure from the environment has traditionally had a more original and significant life than those which did not.

One of the major conclusions of the Institute studies was that the church should learn to adapt and adjust to a changing environment. The very essence of the church's changelessness was to be seen in its constant striving to keep close to the changes of men in society.[17] The question for Douglass was not whether or not the church should change to meet and adjust to the environment, but rather in what ways it should change to meet the situation most effectively. He analyzed and described the responses of a number and variety of churches to this end.

He discovered that in many churches adaptation was part of the natural continuity of a church. His analysis indicated that ". . . except when . . . fairly recognizable influences intervene, exceptional environmental pressure may be expected to result in institutional evolution on the part of the Protestant church."[18] The three major exceptions which he noted concerned churches of very poor people who lived both environmentally and economically on the border of urban society, churches with extreme other-worldly orientations, and churches of certain racial groups or social traditions which exhibit some combination of the first two factors.[19] With these exceptions, churches which chose to remain in an area of exceptional environmental pressure, carried out the response of adaptation and adjustment as a long and often painful process.

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[14] H. Paul Douglass, *The Church in the Changing City*, pp. xviii-ix (CCC).

[15] *TCC*, p. 112.

[16] *TCC*, p. 83.

[17] *TCC*, p. 8.

[18] *CCC*, pp. xv-xvi.

The basic assumption which underlay the suggestion of certain guidelines for adaptation and church life in the city was that to be true to its calling the church must do something more than simply survive and adjust in urban society—more than just adjusting enough to survive. Douglass affirmed the idea that the church, as viewed sociologically in the 1930's, would survive as an institution in the city in the future which he could foresee.[20] But the more important question which remained was that of the value and effect of the institutional survival of the church. Douglass saw the church as called to master the complex problems of the city in detail, matching and surpassing the variety and richness of the processes of life in the city. Beyond surviving, it was called to run ahead, "understanding, interpreting, and guiding the spiritual life of men under all the variety of urban manifestations."[21]

VII. GUIDELINES FOR ADAPTATION

The guidelines which Douglass suggested for securing institutional stability and the ability to function effectively in the city were basically six, which he stated in terms of promoting a well-churched city.

1. The church should be somewhere near the national and regional averages in terms of institutional resources and maturity, membership, parish size, etc.
2. The church should be institutionally efficient so that the average member was well served in his religious life and fellowship.
3. There should be sufficient churches to serve the population of every area of the city.
4. There should be enough churches of various kinds to serve all kinds of people with a variety of religious orientations.
5. Several patterns of church organization should be planned in order to meet the variety of communal and associational patterns which flourish in the city, e.g. downtown, industrial, neighborhood.
6. New forms of Protestant religious institutions should be developed to relate the various activities and organizations which have grown up with the city: YMCA, YWCA, etc.[22]

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[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *TCC*, p. 158.

[21] *TCC*, pp. 52-53.

[22] *TCC*, pp. 206-232.

After describing the city in which the church is called, Douglass remarked: "This is not a matter in which one can say whether or not the factors are as they ought to be. Whether one likes it or not, the city and its people are like this. The effective church can only adjust itself to the situation."[23]

In order to implement the type of institutional adequacy which he saw as essential for the well-churched city, Douglass advocated a cooperative plan of organization among all the Protestant groups in an urban area. Having analyzed Protestant institutions in the city and found them to be a hodge-podge of overlapping institutions, evolved primarily by accident, he described the major problem of the next generation as one of reconquering its civilization and its church and instituting a system of planned religious organizations in the American city.[24] In the belief that "a really comprehensive all-Protestant city planning project is not beyond the bounds of possibility,"[25] Douglass suggests such a cooperative effort to be guided by the experience of then existing institutions for cooperation. It is significant that one of Douglass's last books for the Institute was *Protestant Cooperation in American Cities* (1930) and that the final volume in the Institute series on the urban church was a study of the *Urban Organization of Protestantism* by Wilbur C. Hallenbeck, also a study of cooperative efforts.

The conclusion which Douglass came to was that cooperation was the answer to many of the problems of the churches in urban areas. He felt that by pooling finances, personnel, administration, strategy and planning, the church could serve the city more effectively.[26]

> No longer at cross-purposes with one another or with urban development, but resolved to think and plan together and to use for their common advantage the resources of the city, the churches might bend their institutions to the better doing of what urban life requires. The tendency is right and the way is open for urban communities to be served more aptly and adequately by their religious institutions.[27]

In short, Douglass saw as a real possibility that "in American cities cooperative human effort, with science to interpret whatever situations have evolved or may evolve, can go far toward assuring the adequacy and effectiveness of city churches as institutions."[28]

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[23] *TCC*, p. 216.

[24] H. Paul Douglass, *Protestant Cooperation in American Cities*, pp. 20-21.

[25] *TCC*, p. 222.

[26] For an example, see *CCC*, pp. 409-413.

[27] *TCC*, p. 198.

[28] *TCC*, p. 232.

The transition from rural-agrarian to urban-industrial society brought exceptional pressures to bear on the church as a social institution. Douglass felt that the church, confronted by this change, should strive to adjust to the pattern of urban life. The means for such adjustment and adaptation were to be found in large measure in increased cooperation among Protestant church organizations.

VIII. CRITIQUE

If the above analysis has been generally accurate as to the intent and movement of the work of H. Paul Douglass and others associated with the Institute for Social and Religious Research in the first third of the century, then several points of comment and critique may be in order.

Basically, Douglass was a very good sociologist and performed a major service to the church in his studies. To a layman, his methods seem sound, his findings generally valid and his conclusions based in the materials he studied.

There are, however, several points at which his conclusions are questionable because he has not given sufficient indication of the presuppositions with which he came to the studies. Because the problem of the social scientist as a scientist is one which is currently receiving considerable notice, it seems valuable to consider Douglass's work in this light. In his recent book, *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century*, Kenneth Boulding makes an interesting distinction between the social and the physical scientist. He says:

> There is a certain fundamental distinction between man's knowledge of himself and of his own society and his knowledge of the non-human universe. In the case of the non-human world our only source of knowledge is external observation. The physicist has never been an electron, the biologist has never been a cell. By contrast . . . the sociologist has been a member of a family (and the church sociologist a member of a church with a particular theological position). . . . In the study of himself, therefore, man has both an 'inside track' and an 'outside track.' The inside track is derived from the fact that he is himself an example of the system which he studies. . . . The social scientist is frequently inclined to deprecate the inside track and to pretend that he operates only on the outside track. If we examine the social scientists carefully, however, we shall find that in all cases they do in fact rely in part on inside knowledge and internal observation, and their

> theoretical models owe a great deal to the power of man to know himself from the inside.[29]

It seems fair to presume that Douglass analyzed the church as a social institution on both an inside and an outside track. He was primarily a physical scientist when he discussed church buildings, finances, membership figures, and geographical location. He was primarily a sociologist applying theological insights when he discussed what the church should do in a changing environment, its responsibility for the city and the basis for a well-churched city. But in reality he was both of these in all that he did. The problem which I have found in his work is an absence of any statement which would help determine when he ceased to talk "objectively" about data that could be empirically tested, and when he began to speak as a theologian who was using sociological data. Further, there are few if any statements which give clues to the type of theology which informed his suggestions. The point here is then that Douglass's work would have a more durable importance if he had taken more care to state his bias and point of view.

Secondly, it is difficult to discern from what Douglass wrote exactly what type of social environment he was positing when he suggested guidelines for the church in the city. As has been noted, he wrote at the beginning of the stable period of urban-industrial society, after the major changes had been partially completed. His projection is into a future of stability, but his analysis is primarily in terms of a past and a present of instability and change. It would seem wiser in retrospect to have differentiated carefully between the role of the church in a stable period and its role in a period of rapid social change. It would have been helpful if he had been more careful to make this distinction, indicating clearly that his suggestions were made with the assumption of a stable social order. The implication could then be drawn that when the society moves out of that period of stability the church might also need to change its form in radical correspondence.

A third point in Douglass's work which I wish to question concerns his treatment of institutions. He made a number of valuable statements about the church as a social institution: noting the inevitability of institutions as people gather together in society for a common interest or feeling or goal; recognizing that in an era of rapid social change the church like any other institution tends to be a conservative force in that it helps maintain the stability of the status quo; and recognizing that the church must have some institutional form to be effective and responsible in society. Douglass went on to note that the church, again like any other institution, is apt to die slowly of irrelevance unless it develops a self-critical strain. He sees the changing intellectual climate as the source for this development in the church which is the foundation for any hope that the church as a social institution can be saved from the "paralyzing divergence between outward forms and inner meanings."[30] Nevertheless, it seems to this reader that most of Douglass's work does not take sufficient cognizance of this stated insight.

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[29] Kenneth Boulding, *Meaning*, pp. 58-59.

This criticism has two basic parts: The first is that Douglass demonstrates too great a reliance on statistically significant, sociologically measurable aspects of the church's life, to the exclusion of theological and biblical insights—the source of the inner meanings. The second part of this criticism is that Douglass has apparently taken over one of the strains of the Social Gospel which in a variant form suggested that the role of the church as an instrument for Christianizing America was almost synonymous with "Americanizing America," that is, bringing the immigrant peoples into tune and harmony with what was then happening in society. The first might be the question of the church as a social institution which embodies certain goals and purposes, the second the question of the relationship of church and society. We will explore these two concepts further.

Throughout the history of the church, there has been a continuing tension between two poles of the faith—one which stresses the maintenance of the internal integrity of the church and the other which stresses the external expansion of the church. For extreme advocates of the former there can be no compromise in any area, in creeds, forms of worship, social practices or relationships with those outside the church in society. Many of the historic persecutions of the church have been caused by the insistence on the part of Christians that internal integrity is of prime importance for the church. For those who advocate the primacy of the external expansion of the church, some compromise has always been necessary. Their feeling is that the basic goal is to get everyone into the church in some way, and this can only be done with a flexible approach. The tension noted here is similar to that between outward forms and inner meanings which Douglass suggested. The problem in his work is the emphasis he places on the extension of the institution, without a corresponding recognition of the need for integrity.

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[30] *D and B*, p. 30.

On the question of the relationship of church and society, a similar polar tension can be set up. To be effective and responsible in society, the church must act on the basis of a tension between an identification with society and a position which is over against society. Perhaps because of the strong influence of the Social Gospel, Douglass indicated a great desire to identify with the culture, and may have taken a too easy view of the similarity of Christianity and Americanism. There is a basic absence of the prophetic pole of Christian faith, which stands over against the social status quo. If one looks at the present state of urban areas in America, a nostalgic wish may arise that someone had taken a long hard look at urban development and acted as a critic rather than a servant.

In the same vein it may not be too far wrong to suggest that the guidelines which Douglass suggested have come into use in American cities. By 1950, his emphasis on a well-churched city, as influenced by a variant strand of the Social Gospel, had become something of a reality in American life. Recently Peter Berger, Will Herberg and others have written of the American religion as embodied in institutions of nationalistic fervor clothed with metaphysical overtones and maintaining only the Christian language system as a vestige of the past tradition. While some basic criticisms could be levelled at the materials used in these studies, and there seems to be an important change taking place today in the life of the church, they do, I think, point out an identification of the American church with the American culture in a way which seems all too close to the type of goal to which Douglass's analysis and interpretation inadvertently pointed. While this may be justified in part by the fact that Douglass wrote for a period of relative stability, it is an ever present danger which should be cautioned against.

These criticisms of the work of H. Paul Douglass are to some extent minor in comparison to the total value of his studies. For Douglass and others connected with the Institute for Social and Religious Research were pioneers in the sociology of the church in the twentieth century and performed an invaluable service. Their own sociological analysis of church and society, and perhaps even more important the fact that they did analyze, pointed to an unmistakable characteristic of life in a social environment. As H. Richard Niebuhr has stated:

> We tend to repeat customary actions unaware that when we do today what we did yesterday we actually do something different since in the interval both we and our environment have changed; unaware also that we now do without conscious definition of purpose and method what was done yesterday with specific ends in view and by relatively precise means.[31]

When Douglass wrote he could say, without drawing much dissension, that the pressure of the changing environment and the influence of social processes had played the role of master architect, rather than the church itself in using science and skill.[32]

If the church is to move into the future aware of what it is doing, then sociological study is an essential ingredient in the mix out of which any projection of the place of the church in the future will emerge on a planned rather than a haphazard basis.

IX. AMERICA AS A CYBERNETIC-MEGALOPOLITAN SOCIETY

The method described in the first section of this paper was one of examining the pattern of social organization in society in a particular period, the theological response of the church to the social environment, and the form or forms of the church which grew out of the meeting of the two. In the rural-agrarian society which provided the starting point for this study, the society was organized on the basis of extended family groups, the theology was one which stressed individual salvation, and the church was a village center for religious activities in which the community of families took part. In the urban-industrial society, which Douglass studied, the pattern of social organization tended to be more associational, across family and geographical lines. For children it was in terms of educational associations; for men, vocational associations; and for women, civic or quasi-recreational associations. The theological response to the early indications of this pattern was the Social Gospel movement as it emphasized societal change and the Christianization of America. The form of the church reflected the shape of urban-industrial society—cooperative, associational, mapped out on a city plan, oriented to a variety of needs and serving primarily as an institution for socialization into the American national process.

As we are now undergoing the major transition from an urban-industrial to a cybernetic-megalopolitan society, it is difficult to project the shape of the society and the church into a stable period which may follow. There may, however, be some value in selecting certain features and trends of the present transitional society and in contemporary theology, combining them, and then projecting a brief idea of the form of the church in the future on that basis.

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[31] H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry*, p. viii.

[32] *TCC*, p. 197.

A. Social Organization

There are two areas of revolutionary change which seem important in terms of the proposed projection: cybernetics, and the new American radicalism. As the cybernetic revolution continues, it is becoming increasingly clear that at least in the case of the United States production of goods and materials is no longer an important problem. America has the technical means to produce a relatively unlimited amount of goods. We have the technology necessary to feed and clothe and house and provide for the economic needs of all the people in the country. The problem of the War on Poverty is not that it gets bogged down in a lack of sufficient means, but rather the more difficult problem of motivation and choice. The problem of economic poverty is one of decision and distribution, not of provision and production. The basic decision which is required to "win" the War on Poverty is that of deciding to change the basic philosophy and economic theory of distribution in the country. To try to solve it with the existing set of assumptions and the system built upon those assumptions is to try to put a round peg in a square hole: it can be done but it necessitates either a very loose fit or a rearrangement of the peg or the hole—in this case either a forcing of the situation of the poor in this country or incredible manipulation abroad in terms of the U.S. War on Poverty. Either case involves a tremendous cost—and one which is unnecessary. The means which are being employed with the present system seem to be enslaving, childish, irresponsible and dehumanizing as well as paternalistic. The cybernetic revolution, however, may be interpreted as God's recreating a new possibility for freedom and human life. In other words it opens up a new possibility and offers a creative way out of the poverty/overproduction dilemma. The cybernetic revolution is one of the new factors in the society which is organized today—it is a factor in social organization.

A second factor which seems important in considering a proposal for the form of the church in a cybernetic-megalopolitan society, or at least in the period of transition, is the theme of participatory democracy advocated by the new student left and many portions of the civil rights movement. The old cry of the white liberal was the integration of the American Negro into the ongoing structure of the society. But the new civil rights leader has changed the tune'a bit. Through spokesmen such as James Baldwin and later, the more active leaders, the goal has changed from one of integration into the present society to one of joining together with like-minded whites in the co-creation of a new society. Put in terms of the radical student left, the desire is for a political, economic, and social system of organization in which all people participate in the decision making which affects them at every level. This process begins with projects like block organization, developing indigenous leadership in ghetto areas, community organization without continued outside control, and a denial of immediate personal or corporate self-interest on the part of the organizer.

B. Theological Response

Before attempting to propose a form of the church, the theological response of the present period should be added to the mix. The theological movement which seems to come closest to meeting the pattern of social organization, as suggested above, seems to be the theology of humanization. It is found described in the work of Harvey Cox in *The Secular City* and related efforts on a Christian witness in a secular world, in the work of Paul Lehmann (*Ethics in a Christian Context*) and Joseph Fletcher (*Situation Ethics*) in ethics, and perhaps from another angle, in Bishop Robinson's *Honest to God* and Pierre Berton's *The Comfortable Pew*. The important point is, however, that the basic message in this period seems to be one of humanization, referring to the process whereby God is at work in the world making and keeping human life truly human, that is, free, responsible, mature and creative. The emphasis in all of these is to some extent on the relative nature of things, on the need to be involved in concrete situations and to act on the basis of the particulars there rather than on the basis of general principles which are imposed from without.

C. Form of the Church

With these three strains of thought in mind the following proposal for the form of the church in the transitional period from the urban-industrial society to the cybernetic-megalopolitan society is offered.

Just as the corporation was the model for the church in an urban-industrial society, so the pattern or organization which the church in this period should follow is that of the radical movements: issue centered, flexible, grass-roots oriented, decentralized in power and centralized in the spread of information and communication. For the church to adopt or acknowledge the corporation pattern of organization would be—or in the case of the Consultation on Church Union is—to fail to recognize that we are in fact in a transitional period to a new type of society. To do so means that we push to a greater rigidity and narrowness in defining roles and religious activities. It is at worst to accept the fragmentation of life in urban-industrial society and simply to draw into coordination all the pieces of machinery which presently divide the secularized pie—taking out the religious associational section but losing the rest by default—by accepting the agenda which the "world" lays down. The corporation model is not the best new answer and as perhaps the best old answer it is no longer useful because the situation has changed. A model based on the idea of participatory democracy is much better for the period of transition. From the theological standpoint, while humanization of the urban-industrial society is important and a necessary role of the church which requires suitable forms and organization (which may or may not be the corporation model—another question), the crucial problem now is that of taking stock of the situation as it is becoming new, and developing new forms which will be able to act as humanizers as the transition comes about. And this form is, I believe, an issue centered form of the church.

To summarize in light of the three periods: the rural-agrarian society was family centered in social organization, directed toward individual salvation in theology, and centered on family centered individuals in church form; the urban-industrial society was organized on an associational basis which was vocational in the broadest sense (counting schools for children, civic and recreational groups for women etc.); the transition period to a cybernetic-megalopolitan society will be issue centered in social organization; directed toward humanization in theology, and formed in such a way that the solutions to the issues are discovered in ways which allow the greatest possible degree of participatory democracy. In the transition period the form of the church is one which brings together those who wish to attack these issues across racial, class, and geographical lines. The theological key is the need for a humanization of the economic sphere of American life. If this form of the church carries the various marks which in any period have distinguished the true Christian church from the apostate, I believe this form is a viable and progressive organizational structure for the cybernetic-megalopolitan transitional period.

ABOUT THE COVER

The Byzantine-inspired double eagle which has become DIMENSION's cover symbol has a long and mysterious history. A single eagle is a more familiar Christian symbol, representing not only St. John the Evangelist, but in some circles baptism, the Ascension of Christ, and the Last Judgment. The double eagle (actually a double-headed eagle) appears most commonly in the Byzantine Empire as an emperor's symbol, suggesting the combination of cross and crown in the single figure of the divinely favored ruler. It was used on coins and tapestries, and as architectural ornamentation. Double eagles can still today be found adorning Greek Orthodox churches, especially in the monasteries of Mt. Athos.

The history of the double eagle before Byzantine times is nearly lost. Specimens have been found in architectural remains of the Hittite kingdoms, leading to speculation that it was introduced into Byzantium and Europe by crusaders returning from Turkey and the Holy Land. Another intriguing theory associates the Roman Janus, two-headed god of beginnings, with the Christian single eagle, which also has to do with the new beginnings of baptism, ascension, and judgment.

DIMENSION's double eagle symbolizes above all the theologian working in two "dimensions," the church and the secular world. It represents academic theology and practical ministry, not as separate, but as two aspects of the same ministry, two perspectives on the saving work of Jesus Christ, two dimensions of the minister's life as a man called by God to be his servant.

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